Whitford v. North State Life Ins. Co.

• Citation: 79 S.E. 501,163 N.C. 223
• Parties: WHITFORD v. NORTH STATE LIFE INS. CO.
• Decision Date: 08 October 1913
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of North Carolina

79 S.E. 501

163 N.C. 223

WHITFORD v. NORTH STATE LIFE INS. CO.

Supreme Court of North Carolina

October 8, 1913

Appeal from Superior Court, Craven County; Allen, Judge.

Action by G. A. Whitford against the North State Life Insurance Company. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

This is an action to recover upon a policy of insurance issued by the defendant on the 29th day of December, 1910. The insured died on the 13th day of May, 1911. The defendant denied liability and set up as a defense that W. B. Burgess, the insured, in violation of the terms of the policy and of the application therefor, committed suicide, and the further defense that the policy was void for the reason that the applicant, W. B Burgess, had made material false representations in his application for the insurance.

The defendant introduced in evidence on the issue of suicide, the following papers:

"To My Wife:

"Telegraph Joe Latham to come to you at once.

"Look out for my Royal Arcanum and Heptasophs.

"My Union Central policy is in the hands of the company as collateral for $180, there is a thousand available on it.

"Look into one of the little drawers and you will find a policy in the North State Mutual for $1,500, they hold my note for the premium but the interest is paid on it up to May 30th, see if you can collect on it.

"Tell Joe to write Carey J. Hunter for instruction in regard to the Union Central.

"I owe Sam King $20.

"I owe Gus Pritchard, (colored) $50. Allan Jenkins, colored, $20.

(over)

"Sell the place for what you can get, pay Mr. Cannaday and take the rest and do the best you can.

"God bless you and the children. Goodbye.

"Bat.

"Sam can tell you of the other colored people."

This note was in an envelope and on the back of the envelope the following was written:

"To Mam Important.

"Mrs. W. B. Burgess.

"See Eugene Wood and get him to bury me and wait until you get insurance."

Plaintiff excepted.

Notice was duly served on the plaintiff to produce said papers on the trial. The papers were written by the husband, but were not delivered by the insured to his wife, nor did she know of the existence of either until after the death of her husband, when they were brought to her from the private desk of the husband by one of her children. She then gave them to G. A. Whitford before his qualification as administrator, and he retained them until a few days before the trial, and after notice had been served on him, when he returned them to the wife. The indorsement on the envelope was shown to Eugene Wood, who was undertaker and coroner, and upon request the papers were delivered to the coroner's jury at the inquest, but it does not appear that the paper inclosed in the evidence was read.

The jury returned the following verdict:

"(1) Did the defendant insure the life of W. B. Burgess in the sum of fifteen hundred dollars ($1,500.00) as alleged in the complaint? Answer: Yes.

"(2) Did the insured, W. B. Burgess, die by his own hand, with intent to commit suicide? Answer: Yes.

"(3) Did the assured, W. B. Burgess, represent that he had had no serious illness or disease other than that stated in the application? Answer: Yes.

"(4) Was said representation untrue? Answer: Yes.

"(5) Was such representation material? Answer: Yes.

"(6) What sum, if any, is the plaintiff entitled to recover? Answer: --"

Judgment was entered in accordance with the verdict, and the plaintiff excepted and appealed.

Guion & Guion, of New Bern, for appellant.

Rouse & Land, of Kinston, for appellee.

ALLEN J.

The statute of this state as to communications between husband and wife provides that "no husband or wife shall be compellable to disclose any confidential communication made by one to the other during their marriage," and it is by this statute, construed in connection with the rules of the common law as to what communications are confidential, that the admissibility of the papers introduced in evidence is to be tested. The inquiry naturally resolves itself into two propositions: (1) Are the papers communications from the husband to the wife during marriage? (2) If so, are they confidential?

We will consider the two propositions together. The reasons for the rule preventing the disclosure of confidential communications between husband and wife, as enforced at common law, are well stated by Taylor, C.J., in Mercer v. State, 40 Fla. 216, 24 So. 154, 74 Am. St. Rep. 135: "Society has a deeply rooted interest in the preservation of the peace of families, and in the maintenance of the sacred institution of marriage; and its strongest safeguard is to preserve with jealous care any violation of those hallowed confidences inherent in, and inseparable from, the marital status. Therefore the law places the ban of its prohibition upon any breach of the confidence between husband and wife, by declaring all confidential communications between them to be incompetent matter for either of them to expose as witnesses. *** The reason of the rule for excluding the confidences between husband and wife as incompetent matter to be deposed by either of them, though they may be competent witnesses to testify to other facts, is found to rest in that public policy that seeks to preserve inviolate the peace, good order, and limitless confidence between the heads of the family circle so necessary to every well-ordered civilized society" --and Judge Daniel admonishes us in Hester v. Hester, 15 N.C. 228, that "the rule should not be extended, to the exclusion of truth, beyond the limits within which the reason of the law calls for it."

Words in a statute are to be construed as they are ordinarily understood, and where "the language is plain and admits of but one meaning, the task of interpretation can hardly be said to arise. It is therefore only in the construction of statutes whose terms give rise to some ambiguity, or whose grammatical construction is doubtful, that courts can exercise the power of controlling the language in order to give effect to what they suppose to have been the real intention of the lawmakers. Where the words of a statute are plainly expressive of an intent, not rendered dubious by the context, the interpretation must conform to and...