Whiting Milk Companies v. Grondin

• Decision Date: 15 February 1933
• Citation: 282 Mass. 41
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
• Parties: WHITING MILK COMPANIES v. WALTER GRONDIN & another.

282 Mass. 41

WHITING MILK COMPANIES v. WALTER GRONDIN & another.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

February 15, 1933

November 18, 1932.

Present: RUGG, C.

J., CROSBY, PIERCE FIELD, & LUMMUS, JJ.

Contract, Of employment. Labor Union. Equity Jurisdiction, Specific performance.

A labor union made with a corporation, engaged in the business of buying selling and distributing milk and milk products in Boston and vicinity, a contract in writing containing the following "Each man employed under this agreement covenants and agrees with the employer that should such man's employment cease for any reason during the term of this agreement and for ninety days thereafter, he will not, by himself, by agents, or as the servant or agent of another interfere with the business of said employer or sell milk, cream or other dairy products to any customer of said employer for a period of ninety days from the cessation of said employment." A member of the union who was familiar with such provision became employed by the corporation, afterwards was discharged, entered the employ of another corporation and within two months of his discharge violated the agreement by soliciting customers of his former employer and inducing them to transfer their patronage to his new employer. The former employer notified the new employer that the employee was violating the agreement, but the violation continued. In a suit in equity commenced thereafter by the former employer against the employee and his new employer, a final decree was entered permanently enjoining the defendants from selling or delivering milk and milk products to certain former customers of the plaintiff in Cambridge, Medford and Somerville, assessing against the defendant employee damages resulting from his dealing with such customers both before and after the plaintiff's notice to the defendant employer, and assessing against the defendant employer damages so resulting after the giving of the notice. The defendants appealed. Held, that

(1) In the circumstances, the agreement between the plaintiff and the union of which the defendant employee was a member was binding on that defendant;

(2) Although the agreement covered so broad a territory as to make an enforcement according to its full terms unreasonable, against public policy and improper, the final decree cut down its effect so that the restraint was within reasonable limits as to territory;

(3) The defendant employer properly was held liable for damages, because it had continued, after receiving the notice from the plaintiff, to receive the benefit of the defendant employee's breach of the agreement;

(4) Damages for a permanent injury to the plaintiff having been awarded by the decree, and more than ninety days having passed since the defendant employee's discharge by the plaintiff, it was error to include the provision for an injunction;

(5) The decree was ordered modified by eliminating the provision as to an injunction.

BILL IN EQUITY, filed in the Superior Court on March 9, 1932, brought by a corporation engaged in the business of buying, selling and distributing milk and milk products in Boston and vicinity against a former employee and his new employer and seeking the relief described in the opinion.

The suit was referred to a master. Material facts found by the master are described in the opinion. In the Superior Court, the suit was heard on the master's report by Whiting, J., by whose order there were entered an interlocutory decree confirming the master's report and a final decree described in the opinion. The defendants appealed from the final decree.

C. A. Parker, for the defendant Lyndonville Creamery Association.

E.

L. Twomey, for the plaintiff.

LUMMUS, J. The defendant Grondin was a member of Milk Wagon Drivers and Creamery Workers Union Local No. 380, and as such was employed by the plaintiff as a driver delivering milk at wholesale under a written agreement between the Union and the plaintiff of which art. 10 was as follows: "Each man employed under this agreement covenants and agrees with the employer that should such man's employment cease for any reason during the term of this agreement and for ninety (90) days thereafter, he will not, by himself, by...