Whiting v. Rubinstein
Citation | 7 Wn.2d 204,109 P.2d 312 |
Decision Date | 20 January 1941 |
Docket Number | 28145. |
Parties | WHITING v. RUBINSTEIN et al. |
Court | United States State Supreme Court of Washington |
Department 2.
Action by E. P. Whiting, as receiver of Suryan's Incorporated against Carl Rubinstein and another, copartners, doing business under the firm name of Rubinstein & Caraco, to recover the value of canned salmon allegedly received by defendants as preferred creditors. From a judgment of dismissal, plaintiff appeals.
Affirmed.
Appeal from Superior Court, King County; Howard M. Findley, judge.
C. E H. Maloy and Julian O. Matthews, both of Seattle, for appellant.
Skeel McKelvy, Henke, Evenson & Uhlmann, of Seattle, for respondents.
The receiver of Suryan's Inc., a corporation, brought this action to recover the value of canned salmon alleged to have been received by defendants as preferred creditors of Suryan's, Inc., an insolvent corporation.
The complaint contained allegations to the effect that Suryan's was a corporation; that it had been insolvent since the beginning of the year 1938; and that plaintiff was the receiver of the insolvent corporation.
It was further alleged that:
In their amended answer defendants denied generally the allegations of the complaint and set up three affirmative defenses.
The first affirmative defense alleged the execution and delivery of a financing agreement, dated March 5, 1938, entered into between Suryan's Inc., and defendants Rubinstein & Caraco, by the terms of which defendants agreed to assist Suryan's in was alleged that by the terms of the contract the 1938 pack of salmon was pledged the 1938 pack of salmon was pledged and assigned to respondents as of March 5, 1938, for the purpose of insuring repayment of all advances made to Suryan's. It was then alleged that the parties agreed that the creation of the 1938 pack would be made possible only by reason of the financial assistance to be provided by defendants, and that the delivery of the salmon when packed was made to defendants pursuant to the agreement.
The second affirmative defense was that advances made by defendants pursuant to the terms of the contract for supplies, materials and credits, wages, freight and other items, exceeded the value of the canned salmon, and that defendants had a right to offset against the sum sought to be recovered by the receiver all sums paid after the receipt of the salmon.
The third affirmative defense was that, even disregarding the agreement of March 5, 1938, the defendants had received the pack more than four months prior to the appointment of the receiver without knowledge of insolvency and that the receiver was not entitled to have the transfer set aside as a preference.
The reply put in issue the allegations contained in the answer.
Trial was had to the court, which entered a judgment of dismissal. Plaintiff has appealed.
The assignments of error are that the court erred in dismissing appellant's action, in denying appellant's motion for a new trial, and in entering a decree in favor of respondent Rubinstein & Caraco.
The facts involved in the appeal now Before us are in brief as follows: Suryan's Inc. was engaged in the business of fishing for and canning salmon in Alaskan waters. Respondents were partners whose business was that of salmon packers and brokers. In the early part of 1938 the officers of Suryan's, having found that they did not have sufficient funds to care for their fishing and canning operations for the season of 1938, appealed to respondents for financial assistance. As the result of several conferences respondents decided to underwrite the 1938 fishing and canning operations of Suryan's Inc., and entered into a contract to that effect.
The contract was dated March 5, 1938, and contained, among others, the following provisions: Paragraph one appointed respondents as agents of Suryan's for the purpose of handling and selling the 1938 pack. Respondents were authorized to use their own judgment in making sales. Paragraph two provided allowances for swells, cash discount, labelling, brokerage, etc., to which respondents were entitled. By the terms of paragraph three Suryan's agreed to carry on their operations to the best of their ability and gave the right to respondents to take over all the property and equipment and continue the operations under certain circumstances and conditions.
It was also agreed:
The fourth paragraph provided for commissions to be paid respondents.
Paragraph five provided: '* * * sell the merchandise on hand to reimburse them for the amount then owing them, and in the event of any termination of this contract, Second Parties shall have the immediate right to possession of all of the consigned cans and the contents thereof, together with all other materials, supplies and merchandise furnished.'
Paragraph six provided: ...
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