Whitley v. Com.

• Decision Date: 03 November 2000
• Docket Number: Record No. 992394.
• Citation: 260 Va. 482,538 S.E.2d 296
• Parties: Mary L. WHITLEY, Administrator of the Estate of Joseph H. Jenkins, Deceased v. COMMONWEALTH of Virginia, et al.
• Court: Virginia Supreme Court

538 S.E.2d 296

260 Va. 482

Mary L. WHITLEY, Administrator of the Estate of Joseph H. Jenkins, Deceased v. COMMONWEALTH of Virginia, et al.

Record No. 992394.

Supreme Court of Virginia.

November 3, 2000.

Oldric J. LaBell, Jr., for appellant.

Michael E. Ornoff (Ornoff & Arnold, on brief), Virginia Beach, for appellees.

Present: All the Justices.

KEENAN, Justice.

In this appeal of a judgment entered in a wrongful death action, we consider whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment for the defendants on the grounds of collateral estoppel and sovereign immunity.

In March 1993, Mary L. Whitley, administrator of the estate of Joseph H. Jenkins, filed a motion for judgment against certain medical personnel (the individual defendants) at St. Brides Correctional Center (St. Brides) and against the Commonwealth. St. Brides is part of the Virginia Department of Corrections and is operated and maintained by the Commonwealth. Whitley alleged that the "gross negligence" and "deliberate indifference" of the individual defendants, acting within the scope of their employment, caused Jenkins's death while he was incarcerated at St. Brides. Whitley further alleged that the Commonwealth also was liable for Jenkins's death under the Virginia Tort Claims Act (Tort Claims Act), Code §§ 8.01-195.1 through 195.9, which imposes limited liability on the Commonwealth for "personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee while acting within the scope of his employment under circumstances where the Commonwealth ..., if a private person, would be liable to the claimant for such ... injury or death." Code § 8.01-195.3.

According to the motion for judgment, Jenkins was a mentally impaired person with an epileptic condition who required constant medication to prevent the onset of seizures. Jenkins was incarcerated in St. Brides from March 1988 until April 1991, when he died as a result of a seizure. The motion for judgment alleged that the individual defendants were grossly negligent in allowing Jenkins's medication levels to fall below the therapeutic minimum amounts appropriate for his condition, by failing to prescribe sufficient medication and to supervise Jenkins's receipt of the medication.

On the same date Whitley filed the circuit court action, she filed another action against the individual defendants in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia (federal district court), alleging claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986, and a wrongful death claim under Va. Code § 8.01-50. After dismissing the wrongful death claim and the claims brought under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985 and 1986, the federal district court granted summary judgment for the individual defendants on the claim brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Whitley v. Lewis (Whitley I), No. 2:93cv268, 1993 WL 625520 (E.D.Va. Oct. 6, 1993); Whitley v. Lewis (Whitley II), 844 F.Supp. 276 (E.D.Va. 1994). The federal district court ruled that Whitley failed to prove that the individual defendants acted with "deliberate indifference" to Jenkins's serious medical needs. Whitley II, at 279. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the federal district court's judgment. Whitley v. McWaters, No. 94-1452, 1995 WL 86443 (4th Cir. Mar. 3, 1995).

In granting the individual defendants' motion for summary judgment, the federal district court made the following factual determinations:

[T]he court concludes that the facts in the instant case could not lead a reasonable jury to conclude that any of the defendants acted with deliberate indifference to Jenkin[s's] medical condition. With regard to Dr. Ibarra, the record shows that he took active measures to monitor Jenkin[s's] condition. Dr. Ibarra monitored regular blood samples taken from Jenkins, counseled him about the importance of taking his medication and altered his regimen so as to make it easier for Jenkins to follow. While Jenkins suffered several seizures and showed low levels of medication in his blood, Dr. Ibarra considered Jenkin[s's] condition to have been stable. [Footnote omitted.] Dr. Ibarra further concluded that Jenkins had the mental capacity to continue following his daily regimen. Given Jenkin[s's] frequent visits for medical treatment, and his medication ingestion ratio (over an 85% average during his three years at St. Brides), such a conclusion does not appear to have been the product of deliberate indifference. While the plaintiff may disagree with Dr. Ibarra's assessment and treatment of Jenkins, such disagreement does not support a finding of deliberate indifference. [Case citations omitted.]

With regard to the defendant nurses, the record fails to support the plaintiff's assertions that they acted with deliberate indifference to Jenkin[s's] condition. The nurses['] primary contact with Jenkins occurred when they assisted Dr. Ibarra (and other physicians) in treating Jenkins and when they administered his medication at the pill window. Given the nurses['] limited contact with Jenkins, and their agreement with Dr. Ibarra that he was capable of following his seizure-preventing regimen, the plaintiff has failed to come forward with enough evidence to establish a triable issue of deliberate indifference on their part.

Whitley II, at 279-80. In affirming the federal district court's judgment, the United States Court of Appeals reached similar conclusions and held that the decedent "received adequate medical care." Whitley v. McWaters, No. 94-1452, slip op. at 3.

In March 1994, Whitley obtained a nonsuit in the original state court action and reified the same action the following day. In response, the individual defendants and the Commonwealth filed pleas of sovereign immunity, collateral estoppel, and res judicata, and moved for summary judgment on those grounds.

In a letter opinion, the trial court determined that the motion for summary judgment should be granted. The trial court held that the motion for judgment stated a claim of ordinary negligence, and concluded that since the federal district court did not address whether the facts alleged constituted ordinary negligence, Whitley was not precluded by collateral estoppel from raising an ordinary negligence claim in her motion for judgment. The trial court ultimately concluded that the ordinary negligence claims against both the individual defendants and the Commonwealth were barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity.

The trial court also held "that any claim asserted by plaintiff for gross negligence ... is barred under the doctrine of collateral estoppel." According to the trial court, under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, the dismissal of the federal action precluded Whitley from alleging gross negligence in the state court action. The trial court entered final judgment dismissing the motion for judgment against the individual defendants and the Commonwealth.

On appeal, Whitley first argues that her motion for judgment encompasses claims of both gross negligence and ordinary negligence. She asserts that the trial court erred in holding that the doctrine of collateral estoppel barred her from asserting a gross negligence claim against the individual defendants. Whitley contends that the issue in the federal action was whether the individual defendants were guilty of "deliberate indifference" to Jenkins's serious medical needs under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, rather than of gross negligence. She argues that in order for collateral estoppel to bar the present action against the individual defendants, the federal district court must have adjudicated the "precise same issue" presented in her motion for judgment.

Although we agree with Whitley that her motion for judgment states a claim of gross negligence, we find no merit in the balance of her argument because she has misconstrued the doctrine of collateral estoppel. The fact that "reckless indifference," as pled in support of the claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and "gross negligence" are distinct causes of action does not affect application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel. Unlike the doctrine of res judicata, the doctrine of collateral estoppel does not turn upon the issue whether a cause of action in a prior proceeding is the same as a cause of action brought in a later proceeding. See Bates v. Devers, 214 Va. 667, 670-71, 202 S.E.2d 917, 920-21 (1974)

.

The doctrine of collateral estoppel precludes the same parties to a prior proceeding from litigating in a later proceeding any issue of fact that actually was litigated and was essential to the final judgment in the first proceeding. Glasco v. Ballard, 249 Va. 61, 64, 452 S.E.2d 854, 855 (1995); Bates v. Devers, 214 Va. at 671, 202 S.E.2d at 921. This doctrine applies even when the later proceeding asserts a different claim for relief. Glasco, 249 Va. at 64, 452 S.E.2d at 855; Pickeral v. Federal Land Bank, 177 Va. 743, 750-51, 15 S.E.2d 82, 85 (1941). However, before the doctrine of collateral estoppel may be applied, four requirements must be met: (1) the parties to the two proceedings must be the same; (2) the factual issue sought to be litigated must have been actually litigated in the prior proceeding; (3) the factual issue must have been essential to the judgment rendered in the prior proceeding; and (4) the prior proceeding must have resulted in a valid, final judgment against the party to whom the doctrine is sought to be applied. Glasco, 249 Va. at 64, 452 S.E.2d at 855; Bates, 214 Va. at 671, 202 S.E.2d at 921.

In the present case, we conclude that all four of these requirements have been met with regard to Whitley's gross negligence claim against the individual defendants. First, the plaintiff and the individual defendants were parties to both actions.

Second, we conclude that the factual issues underlying Whitley's state court claim of gross negligence, regarding the medical care that the individual defendants provided to Jenkins,...