Whitley v. Newman
| Decision Date | 28 February 1911 |
| Docket Number | 2,482,2,483. |
| Citation | 70 S.E. 686,9 Ga.App. 89 |
| Parties | WHITLEY v. NEWMAN (two cases). |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Syllabus by the Court.
When it is questionable whether words alleged to be slanderous impute a crime, or whether the facts and circumstances attending the utterance of the words render the communication a matter of privilege, the question should be submitted to the jury.
The office of an innuendo is merely to explain the ambiguity where the precise meaning of terms employed in an alleged slanderous statement may require elucidation. The true scope and meaning of the statement cannot be enlarged or restricted by innuendo.
The statement that one is "short" in his accounts does not necessarily impute to him the crime of larceny after trust, where, according to the true meaning of the statement and the language accompanying it, the offense would not be complete unless there had been a refusal to pay for or deliver the property which it might be inferred had been appropriated. The word "short" does not of itself imply a crime. It is a term of common use in the stock and produce markets. To say that one is "short," in the vernacular of the exchanges, only implies that one has less of a commodity than may be necessary to meet demands and obligations. It does not imply that the commodity cannot or will not be supplied upon demand.
Statements in response to inquiries as to another person, when the inquirer is one naturally interested in his welfare, are privileged. They are statements made in the performance of a private moral duty, within the purview of Civ. Code 1910, § 4436, par. 2. Likewise, statements not influenced by malice which are made in good faith to effect the collection of an indebtedness justly due, are privileged, under Civ. Code 1910, § 4436, par. 3.
Under the circumstances stated in the petition, a demand and refusal to pay for or deliver goods intrusted to the plaintiff would have been necessary, to constitute the offense of larceny after trust; and nothing was said by the defendant from which it could fairly be implied that there had been a criminal conversion of the property, or a refusal upon demand, to account for its proceeds. The alleged slanderous statement was cautionary, rather than incriminatory.
In order for one to impute a crime to another, in such a sense as that the imputation is actionable as slander, it is not necessary that the descriptive averments or essential ingredients by which the nature of the crime is defined should be stated with that distinctness requisite in an indictment. But, on the other hand, it is not enough that the party to whom the remark is addressed may unwarrantably reach the conclusion, from the language used, that a crime is being imputed to the person to whom the speaker refers. For a defamatory oral utterance to be slanderous as imputing a crime, the statement must not only be such as may convey to the auditor the impression that the crime in question is being charged, but it must be couched in such language as might reasonably be expected to convey that meaning to any one who happened to hear the utterance.
Even if the communications in this case alleged to be slanderous were not privileged, they did not necessarily impute a crime, no special damage was alleged, and the court did not err in sustaining the general demurrers and dismissing the petitions.
(Additional Syllabus by Editorial Staff.)
In the parlance of the stock and produce exchange, to say that one was "long on cotton" means that he had too much cotton.
Error from City Court of Americus; Chas. R. Crisk, Judge.
Actions by C. R. Whitley against I. A. Newman. Judgments for defendant, and plaintiff brings error. Affirmed.
W. P. Wallis and Maynard & Hooper, for plaintiff in error.
J. A. Ansley, Hardeman, Jones, Callaway & Johnston, and Shipp & Sheppard, for defendant in error.
Whitley brought two actions against Newman for slander. Both were dismissed upon demurrer, and exception is taken to this disposition of the cases. In one of the petitions Whitley alleges that the slanderous words were used to his wife, and in the other case that Newman was speaking to him in the presence of one Kaehm. In the petition in which it is alleged that the slanderous words were spoken to his wife, the statement is as follows: Mrs. Whitley asked, "What will you do if I don't secure it?" Newman replied, "I will have him (meaning your petitioner) arrested and put in jail." Mrs. Whitley asked, "What good will that do?" Newman replied, "It will be an example," and stated, in the same connection, that he (Newman) "had already had a young man arrested in South Georgia for the same cause." In the action based upon the alleged slanderous words used in the presence of Kaehm, it is asserted that the defendant slandered the plaintiff by saying to him in the presence of Kaehm: With the exception of the variation in the language of the alleged slanders, the petitions in the two cases are substantially the same. With the amendments which were allowed by the court each petition makes about the following case: Newman was a representative of Morris & Co., who were engaged in the business of packers and provisioners, and, as their representative, he remained in Americus about 10 days, and during that time was engaged in negotiations with reference to the transactions between them on the one hand, and Whitley and the Standard Grocery Company on the other. That Whitley, as a broker, had for two or three years sold goods for Morris & Co. on commission; Morris & Co. shipping the goods to Whitley in car load lots to be sold by him to the Standard Grocery Company, which, as Newman and Morris & Co. well understood, was the only customer for the goods shipped to Whitley, and the goods so received by the Standard Grocery Company (which was a wholesale house) were sold to its customers. Newman, while in the city of Americus, had been negotiating with Whitley with a view of discontinuing the relationship which had previously existed between them, and had checked up Whitley's account and received back all the goods on hand, and had the book which had been kept by Whitley showing the disposition of the produce of Morris & Co. The difference between what had been shipped and what had been returned was due by the Standard Grocery Company, and this fact was known to Newman; yet Newman demanded that Whitley should pay the difference in cash or return the goods. This claim of Newman was denied by Whitley, who claimed that the difference was due by the Standard Grocery Company. It is further alleged that, after this demand and refusal, Newman made several visits to see Mrs. Whitley (the plaintiff's wife), and asked her to pay the difference in the accounts as claimed by Newman; and, upon her refusal to pay the claim made by Newman, or to secure the balance claimed by Morris & Co., by giving a mortgage upon her house and lot, Newman made the statements to which we first referred.
The allegations in the second petition vary from the first only in asserting that the second alleged slander, which we have quoted, was made to the plaintiff himself in the presence of Kaehm. In both cases the plaintiff alleges that the language imputed to him the offense of larceny after trust, and impliedly conveyed this meaning to those who heard it, and that, when Newman said that the plaintiff was short, he meant that the plaintiff had, on demand, failed to account for or pay money with which he had been intrusted; and by innuendo it is sought to explain that, when Newman said he had another party arrested for being short, he intimated, and intended to impress upon those who heard him, that the plaintiff was guilty of larceny after trust, and might share the same fate as the party he referred to as having been put in jail. It is alleged that the charge made by Newman in the presence of Kaehm and of Mrs. Whitley is absolutely false, and that this was well known to Newman at the time that he uttered the slanderous and defamatory words. The petition did not allege that the language alleged to have been slanderous was maliciously uttered, but it did aver that the purpose of Newman in speaking the words was to force the plaintiff to secure a debt of the ...
To continue reading
Request your trial