Whitlock v. Greenlee

• Decision Date: 03 December 2013
• Docket Number: 1:10CV958
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of North Carolina
• Parties: JAMES SMITH WHITLOCK, III, Plaintiff, v. JARED GREENLEE (in his individual capacity), Defendant.

JAMES SMITH WHITLOCK, III, Plaintiff, v. JARED GREENLEE (in his individual capacity), Defendant.

1:10CV958

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

December 3, 2013

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND RECOMMENDATION

OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Plaintiff, pro se, filed a Complaint against Defendant Jared Greenlee ("Defendant"), a Chapel Hill, NC police officer, on or about November 15, 2010, alleging civil rights violations pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and several state law claims as a result of an alleged unreasonable search and seizure. Before the court is Defendant's motion for summary judgment (Docket Entry 45) pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. Plaintiff filed a response in opposition to this motion (Docket Entry 52). A hearing was held on this motion on November 20, 2013. For the following reasons, it is recommended that the Court deny in part and grant in part Defendant's motion for summary judgment.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In his amended complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant conducted an unreasonable search of his person, an unreasonable search of his vehicle, and an unreasonable seizure of his handgun in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and in violation of the common law torts of false imprisonment and trespass to personal property. (See generally Am. Compl. (hereinafter "Compl."), Docket Entry 39.) Insupport of his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges the following facts. On November 16, 2007, Plaintiff drove to Carrboro, North Carolina at approximately 10:00 p.m. to investigate an entity known as Starpoint for a "separate matter involving a lawsuit" against the company. (Id. ¶ 12.) Prior to the investigation, Plaintiff ate dinner in Chapel Hill, North Carolina. (Id. ¶ 14.) After completing his investigation of Starpoint at approximately 2:00 a.m. on November 17, 2007, Plaintiff alleges that he "began to feel extremely tired and decided to spend the night in Chapel Hill, rather than drive back to Raleigh." (Id. ¶ 16.) Plaintiff parked his four-door BMW vehicle on the 100 block of East Franklin Street in Chapel Hill and fell asleep in the backseat. (Id.)

At approximately 4:30 a.m. on November 17, 2007, Plaintiff was awakened by a loud knocking on the window by Defendant. (Id. ¶ 17.) Upon request, Plaintiff presented his driver's license to Defendant. (Id. ¶¶ 17-18.) Plaintiff alleges that he also informed Defendant that he had a permit to carry a concealed weapon and that "he had a pistol." (Id. ¶ 18.) Thereafter, Defendant asked Plaintiff to exit the vehicle, whereupon Defendant instructed another officer (who had just arrived on the scene) to handcuff and frisk Plaintiff. (Id. ¶¶ 18, 20.) In his affidavit, Plaintiff states that he told Defendant that the pistol was located in the trunk of his vehicle. (Pl. Aff. ¶ 8, Docket Entry 53.) Defendant then asked Plaintiff if he had been drinking or using drugs and Plaintiff stated that "he had not consumed any alcohol or drugs." (Compl. ¶ 24.)

Plaintiff alleges that, without his consent, Defendant and other officers on the scene searched the passenger compartment of the vehicle and the trunk for approximately one hour. (Id. ¶¶ 34-36, 39.) Defendant retrieved the pistol from Plaintiff's vehicle. (Id. ¶ 27.)Defendant told Plaintiff that "he was keeping Plaintiff's pistol and that Plaintiff could retrieve his pistol from the Chapel Hill Police Department on the following Monday, November 19, 20[07]." (Id. ¶ 44.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant did not explain why he was keeping Plaintiff's pistol. (Id. ¶ 45.)

Approximately 6:50 p.m. that evening (November 17, 2007), Plaintiff spoke with Defendant, and Defendant stated again when and how Plaintiff could retrieve his gun. (Id. ¶ 47.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant informed him that no charges would be filed against him. (Id.) On Monday, November 19, 2007, Plaintiff went to the Chapel Hill Police Department, and his pistol was returned to him. (Id. ¶ 49.) Plaintiff asserts that on November 26, 2007, Magistrate John Stokes issued a warrant for Plaintiff's arrest for possession of a pistol while consuming alcohol or having previously consumed alcohol on November 17, 2007. (Id. ¶ 50.) Officers of the Raleigh Police Department arrested Plaintiff on December 29, 2007. (Id. ¶ 53.) Plaintiff was detained approximately six hours before being released on a secured bond. (Id. ¶¶ 54-55.) The charge against Plaintiff was dismissed on February 18, 2008, after Plaintiff's agreement to destroy the gun and to refrain from applying for a concealed weapon permit for six months. (Id. ¶ 57; see also Def. Aff. ¶ 19; Pl.'s Criminal Court File at 13-14, Docket Entry 46-4.)

Plaintiff's complaint further alleges facts about his history with the Chapel Hill Police Department to establish Plaintiff's claim that Defendant's actions were retaliatory. (Id. ¶¶ 58-65.) The Chapel Hill Police Department hired Plaintiff as an officer in 2003. (Id. ¶ 60.) Plaintiff alleges that he reported the inappropriate behavior of fellow officers to Chief Gregg Jarvis ("Chief Jarvis") and subsequently resigned because Chief Jarvis told Plaintiff, "[he]should not report other police officers and that the police department was a 'brotherhood'." (Id. ¶ 61.) Plaintiff thereafter resigned from the Chapel Hill Police Department in fear of retaliatory actions against him. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that another employee of the Chapel Hill Police Department informed Defendant about Plaintiff's history with the department. (Id. ¶ 62.) After becoming aware of this information, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant "was instructed, encouraged, or decided on his own to use the events of November 17, 2007 as a pretense for retaliating against [him]." (Id. ¶ 63.)

II. DISCUSSION

Pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment shall be granted "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); See Zahodnick v. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., 135 F.3d 911, 913 (4th Cir. 1997). "Facts are 'material' when they might affect the outcome of the case, and a 'genuine issue' exists when the evidence would allow a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party." News Observer Publ'g Co. v. Raleigh-Durham Airport Auth., 597 F.3d 570, 576 (4th Cir. 2010) (citing Anderson v. Liberty hobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Temkin v. Frederick County Comm'rs, 945 F.2d 716, 718 (4th Cir. 1991) (citing Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)). Once the moving party has met its burden, the non-moving party must then affirmatively demonstrate that there is a genuine issue of material fact that requires trial. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). There is no issue for trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the non-moving party for a fact-finder to return a verdict for that party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250; Sylvia Dev. Corp. v. Calvert County, Md, 48 F.3d 810, 817 (4th Cir. 1995).

A self-serving affidavit, however, will not be sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Nat'l Enterprises, Inc. v. Barnes, 201 F.3d 331, 335 (4th Cir. 2000). "Similarly, genuine disputes of material facts are not demonstrated by the bald statements of a non-moving party in affidavits or depositions." Jones v. Mullins Police Dep't, CIV. A. 9:07-0497-JFA-GCF, 2008 WL 269503 at *4 (D.S.C. Jan. 29, 2008) aff'd, 355 F. App'x 742 (4th Cir. 2009). When making the summary judgment determination, the court must view the evidence, and all justifiable inferences from the evidence, in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Zahodnick, 135 F.3d at 913; Halperin v. Abacus Tech. Corp., 128 F.3d 191, 196 (4th Cir. 1997). Accordingly, in considering Defendant's motion for summary judgment, the court must view the evidence and all justifiable inferences in favor of Plaintiff.

1. Unlawful Arrest

Plaintiff claims that Defendant falsely arrested him (or initiated a false arrest against him) in violation of Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. (Compl. ¶ 69.) Defendant moves for summary judgment on grounds that probable cause existed to arrest Plaintiff, or at the very least, Defendant is entitled to prevail based upon qualified immunity. (See Def.'s Mem. in Support of Mot. for Summ. J. at 14, Docket Entry 48.) Plaintiff's unlawful arrest claim against Defendant rests heavily on whether probable cause existed to obtain an arrest warrant. To reach this probable cause determination, the court must "examine the totality of the circumstances known to the officer at the time of arrest." Taylor v. Waters, 81 F.3d 429, 434 (4th Cir. 1996) (citing UnitedStates v. Al-Talib, 55 F.3d 923, 931 (4th Cir. 1995)). "[W]here a law enforcement officer acts pursuant to a warrant, the critical question is whether the officer could have reasonably thought there was probable cause to seek the warrant." Wadkins v. Arnold, 214 F.3d 535, 539 (4th Cir. 2000) (emphasis added).

In analyzing probable cause, the Supreme Court has stated:

The probable-cause standard is incapable of precise definition or quantification into percentages because it deals with probabilities and depends on the totality of the circumstances. See ibid.; Brinegar, 338 U.S., at 175, 69 S.Ct. 1302. We have stated, however, that "[t]he substance of all the definitions of probable cause is a reasonable ground for belief of guilt," ibid. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted), and that the belief of guilt must be particularized with respect to the person to be searched or seized, Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91, 100 S.Ct. 338, 62 L.Ed.2d 238 (1979). In Illinois v. Gates, we noted:

"As early as Locke v. United States, 7 Cranch 339, 348, 3

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