Whitman v. Gray

• Decision Date: 19 May 2021
• Docket Number: 5:19-cv-1818
• Parties: RICHARD STANTON WHITMAN, Petitioner, v. DAVID W. GRAY, Warden, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Ohio

RICHARD STANTON WHITMAN, Petitioner, v. DAVID W. GRAY, Warden, Respondent.

No. 5:19-cv-1818

United States District Court, N.D. Ohio, Eastern Division

May 19, 2021

JAMES S. GWIN, JUDGE

REPORT & RECOMMENDATION

Thomas M. Parker United States Magistrate Judge

On November 28, 2016, Richard Stanton Whitman - while sitting on his bed in a house he shared with his sister - shot and killed David Eadie. Stanton claimed self-defense. A Stark County, Ohio, jury disagreed and found him guilty of murder with a firearm specification and having weapons while under disability. And Whitman was sentenced to 21 years to life imprisonment. Whitman, pro se, now seeks a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, claiming his convictions in State v. Whitman, Stark Cty. Ct of Common Pleas Case No. 2016CR2255, violated his federal constitutional rights.^[1] ECF Doc. 1.

Because all of Whitman's claims are non-cognizable, procedurally defaulted, and/or meritless, I recommend that all of Whitman's claims be DISMISSED and that his petition for writ of habeas corpus be DENIED. I further recommend that Whitman not be granted a certificate of appealability.

I. State Court Procedural History

A. Trial Court

On January 23, 2017, Whitman was indicted by a Stark County, Ohio, grand jury with one count of murder with a firearm specification and one count of having weapons while under disability. ECF Doc. 8-1 at 6-7. The indictment specifically alleged that Whitman had a firearm while being - among other things - a chronic alcoholic and that he shot and killed Eadie. Id. Whitman pleaded not guilty. ECF Doc. 8-1 at 11-12.

Whitman filed four pretrial motions in limine, one of which is relevant in this case: an April 13, 2017 motion to exclude evidence of his prior arrests and convictions and of an heated dispute between him and Eadie that happened at the Kalahari Resort. ECF Doc. 8-1 at 13-27. The state, in turn, moved in limine to exclude evidence of Eadie's alleged prior bad acts.^[2] ECF Doc. 8-1 at 28. The trial court indicated both prior bad acts motions would be granted or both denied. The parties agreed they should be denied.. ECF Doc. 8-2 at 5-6, 10.

Whitman also moved for a self-defense jury instruction, including an instruction under Ohio Rev. Code § 2901.09 that one does not have a duty to retreat in his home (also known as the “Castle Doctrine”). ECF Doc. 8-1 at 35-36; State v. Lewis, 976 N.E.2d 258, 261 (Ohio Ct. App. 2012). The trial court held these motions in abeyance until after hearing opening statements and some of the evidence. ECF Doc. 8-2 at 8. The trial court issued its ruling after the close of the state's case and just before Whitman called his second - and last - witness. ECF Doc. 8-3 at 123-27. The court granted in part Whitman's motion for a self-defense jury instruction, declining to instruct the jury on the Castle Doctrine. ECF Doc. 8-3 at 125-27, 133-34. The trial court reasoned that Castle Doctrine instructions were inapplicable because Whitman was only a temporary resident at his sister's, Janeann Whitman (“Janeann”), residence. ECF Doc. 8-3 at 126-27, 129-30, 182.

The jury convicted Whitman on both counts and on the firearm specification. ECF Doc. 8-1 at 37-42. On May 4, 2017, the trial court sentenced Whitman to serve an aggregate 21-year to life sentence, consisting of: (1) a 15-year to life prison term on the murder conviction; (2) a mandatory consecutive 3-year prison term on the firearm specification; and (3) a consecutive 36-month prison term for the having weapons while under disability. ECF Doc. 8-1 at 43-44.

B. Direct Appeal

On May 17, 2017, Whitman appealed his convictions to the Ohio Court of Appeals. ECF Doc. 8-1 at 49. Through new counsel, Whitman filed a merits brief, asserting four assignments of error:

1. The trial court erred by overruling appellant's request for a “no duty to retreat/defense or residence or vehicle” jury instruction.

2. The trial court erred by overruling appellant's objections to testimony regarding appellant's prior acts.

3. Appellant's murder conviction was against the manifest weight of the evidence.

4. The trial court erred by not stating on the record, or in its sentencing entry, its grounds for imposing consecutive prison sentences, as required by R.C. 2929.14(C)(4).

ECF Doc. 8-1 at 51. First, Whitman argued that the trial court's failure to give Castle

Doctrine instructions made the jury instructions incomplete because there was sufficient evidence to show that he lived in Janeann's home, and the instructions would have changed the jury's verdict. ECF Doc. 8-1 at 65-66. And second, Whitman argued that evidence of the “Kalahari incident” was more prejudicial than probative - and therefore inadmissible - because it served only to illustrate that Whitman previously had acted aggressively towards Eadie. ECF Doc. 8-1 at 67-68. Whitman also contended that the court's ruling lacked sound reasoning when it simply created a “quid pro quo” to allow both parties to bring in evidence to which the other objected. ECF Doc. 8-1 at 68.

The state filed an appellee brief, conceding that Whitman resided at Janeann's residence and that Castle Doctrine instructions would have been appropriate, but arguing that Whitman had not been prejudiced by the lack of instructions. ECF Doc. 8-1 at 106, 119-26. On July 23, 2018, the Ohio Court of Appeals sustained Whitman's fourth assignment of error, thus affirming, in part, and reversing, in part, the judgment of the trial court and remanding for the limited purpose of resentencing. ECF Doc. 8-1 at 140-71.

In denying relief on Whitman's first assignment of error, the Ohio Court of Appeals stated that because failure to properly instruct was not in most instances a structural error, “the harmless-error rule of Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 . . . (1967) applies; failure to properly instruct the jury does not necessarily render a trial fundamentally unfair or an unreliable vehicle for determining guilt or innocence.” ECF Doc. 8-1 at 151-52. The court found that that although Castle Doctrine instructions would have been appropriate, the trial court's failure did not affect Whitman's substantial rights, contribute to his conviction, or result in structural error. ECF Doc. 8-1 at 158 (citing Chapman). The court reasoned:

{¶64} [T]he relative statuses of Eadie and [Whitman] in the home, and [Whitman's] duty to retreat or lack thereof, were not debated questions of fact at trial. The issues were whether [Whitman] was at fault in creating the affray and whether he reasonably believed shooting Eadie was his only choice to avoid great bodily harm or death. Despite [Whitman's] self-serving trial testimony, the evidence established [Whitman] resolved to shoot Eadie as Eadie was on his way back up the stairs, and he laughed about doing so as his sister was still on the phone with 911. [Whitman] did not tell police in the immediate aftermath of the shooting that he feared Eadie was going to throw him out a window. Instead, he admittedly was thinking at the time, “God, don't make me shoot this asshole;” he had been “pushed” enough and didn't need to see whether Eadie had a weapon or not.

{¶65} The jury simply rejected [Whitman's] theory of self-defense. . . . Had the jury been instructed upon the Castle Doctrine, it would have had no effect on the inescapable conclusion drawn from the evidence: [Whitman] did not act in self-defense and did not present evidence which, if believed by a properly-instructed jury, would have supported an acquittal. . . . The error in omitting the Castle Doctrine instruction was therefore harmless.

[. . .]

{¶68} . . . The evidence established that [Whitman] was at fault in creating the situation that led to the shooting and he was not in danger of death or great bodily harm from Eadie.

{¶69} We therefore conclude that even if the trial court erred by not giving the jury Castle Doctrine instruction[s], we cannot say, and [Whitman] has not demonstrated, that any such error was prejudicial. . . . There is nothing in the record to suggest that the jury instruction probably misled the jury in a matter materially affecting [Whitman's] substantial rights . . . or otherwise resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice.

ECF Doc. 8-1 at 159-61 (alterations, citations, and quotation marks omitted).

In denying Whitman's second assignment of error, the Ohio Court of Appeals concluded that, in light of the limited nature of the “Kalahari incident” and the “overwhelming evidence otherwise adduced at trial, ” the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of the “Kalahari incident” and Whitman did not suffer any material prejudice as a result. ECF Doc. 8-1 at 162-63.

On July 23, 2018, Whitman filed a pro se appeal to the Ohio Supreme Court. ECF Doc. 8-1 at 172. His memorandum in support of jurisdiction asserted two propositions of law:

1. Whether the trial court's removal of the Castle Doctrine from appellant's jury instructions affected appellant's substantial rights or contributed to his conviction?

2. Whether one still has a duty to retreat when he retreats to his own bedroom and has shown that he has retreated or withdrawn from the situation?

ECF Doc. 8-1 at 175. Whitman contended that the denial of Castle Doctrine instructions deprived him of a fair trial and violated his right to due process. ECF Doc. 8-1 at 176. He argued that (i) his case was distinguishable from the state court case relied on by the Ohio Court of Appeals, (ii) the court's decision was contrary to Ohio Supreme Court precedent, and (iii) the lack of instructions deprived him of a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense. ECF Doc. 8-1 at 178-81, 183. Whitman argued that the Ohio Court of Appeals failed to put itself in his position...