Whitman v. Whitney

• Decision Date: 05 July 1917
• Parties: WHITMAN v. WHITNEY et al.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

228 Mass. 18

116 N.E. 893

WHITMAN

v.WHITNEY et al.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Middlesex.

July 5, 1917.

Appeal from Supreme Judicial Court, Middlesex County.

Petition by Edmund A. Whitman against William L. Whitney and others, for instructions; the beneficiaries for life under testamentary trusts having died after the remaindermen. From the decree, certain respondents appeal. Affirmed.

Hartley F. Atwood and Elias Field, both of Boston, for respondents Wm. L. Whitney and others.

Fred T. Field, of Boston, for respondents Sawyer.

Fred'k. P. Cabot, of Boston, for Radcliffe College.

Jas. A. Lowell, of Boston, for Mass. Soc. for Prevention of Cruelty to Children and Meadville Theological School.

CROSBY, J.

The will of Susannah Whitney was duly proved and allowed in the probate court for the county of Middlesex on February 24, 1868. Under the eighth and eleventh clauses thereof certain trusts were created, and as the last surviving life tenant has deceased, the trust estates are now determined, and the time has come for the final distribution of the estates held thereunder. The petitioner, who is the trustee under the will, brings this petition for instructions to determine to whom the estate in his hands and possession is to be distributed and in what proportions.

1. The will in clause 8 contains the following provision:

‘And if both my said daughters shall die leaving no child which shall attain the age of twenty-one years, then the whole of said deceased sisters shares I give, devise and bequeath to my said sons Augustus Anson and Benjamin White, to have and to hold the same to them their heirs and assigns forever.’

Under this clause Augustus Anson Whitney and Benjamin White Whitney took at the death of their mother, the testatrix, remainders in a trust fund which was vested, and the share of each was transmissible and descendible as property, under the statutes regulating the descent and distribution of intestate estates. We do not understand that any contention is made to the contrary. Whitman v. Whitney, 225 Mass. 213, 114 N. E. 318;Whitman v. Huefner, 221 Mass. 265, 108 N. E. 1054;Springfield Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Dwelly, 219 Mass. 65, 106 N. E. 554;Bosworth v. Stockbridge, 189 Mass. 266, 75 N. E. 712.

2. At the hearing before the single justice the appellants, William L. Whitney, Lucy A. Whitney and Julia A. Wright, made certain offers of proof which were in substance that the life tenants, Abigail W. Howe and Susan E. W. Brackett, were of the opinion and believed that they had no title or interest in the trust property which they had power to dispose of by will, and that they were so advised by their attorney; that they never intended by their wills, respectively, to dispose of any part of the trust property. These appellants contend that under these circumstances, the interests of Mrs. Howe and Mrs. Brackett in the trust fund did not pass by their wills, but as to each their respective interests in the trust estate was intestate property; and that if such trust property did pass to the legatees named in their wills, there is a resulting trust in favor of their respective heirs at law; and that with reference to the will of Mrs. Howe there was in express trust.

The single justice rightly excluded the evidence offered. The mistaken belief of Mrs. Howe and Mrs. Brackett that they owned only a life estate in the trust fund, which they did not intend to dispose of by will, cannot be shown to affect the validity of the bequests thereunder. Polsey v. Newton, 199 Mass. 450, 454, 85 N. E. 574,15 Ann. Cas. 139.

It follows that no part of the trust estate which vested in Mrs. Brackett and in Mrs. Howe was left undisposed of by their wills, but that their respective shares therein became vested in the legatees named in their wills.

[3] 3. Augustus Anson Whitney owned a vested interest in one-half of the trust estate under the eighth and eleventh clauses of the will of his mother, Susannah Whitney. He also inherited from his brother Benjamin W. Whitney, who died intestate and unmarried, one-eighth of the trust estate, so that upon his (Augustus') death in 1891, he owned five-eighths of the trust fund. He died intestate without issue, and left a widow, Evelyn A. Whitney.

An important question to be determined is, Did the widow take as statutory heir of her husband any part of the trust estate? It is agreed in writing by the parties ‘that Augustus Anson Whitney referred to in the petition left personal estate at his death exceeding ten thousand (10,000) dollars in value in excess of debts and expenses of administration and exclusive of any interest in the trust fund created by the will of Susannah Whitney.’

The contention is made by the respondents, Ellen M. and Martha E. Sawyer, who are the heirs at law and next of kin of Evelyn A. Whitney, that upon the death of Augustus A. Whitney, inestate and without issue, a future interest in one-half of the personal property belonging to the trust became vested in his widow under the eleventh clause of the will.

It is the contention of certain of the respondents that the widow of Augustus never became entitled to any part of the trust fund; that as the eighth clause of the will created a trust which related solely to real estate, and as the interest of Augustus therein was a vested remainder in property held in trust, his widow did not take as statutory heir. Watson v. Watson, 150 Mass. 84, 22 N. E. 438;Baker v. Baker, 167 Mass. 575, 46 N. E. 391.

The eleventh clause of the will created a trust in a portion of ‘the residue of my estate, both real, personal and mixed,’ to hold ‘upon the same trusts and subject to the same mediate and final disposal as expressed in the eighth clause of this my will.’

It is contended that the language quoted shows that the testatrix intended that the trust property included in the eleventh clause and consisting of real and personal property should be finally disposed of in accordance with the eighth clause, and that under the latter clause the estate consisting wholly of real estate went to the heirs at law of the sons to the exclusion of any right of the son's widow. In other words, it is the...