Whitmore v. French

• Decision Date: 04 September 1951
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: WHITMORE et ux. v. FRENCH et ux. L. A. 21928.

Page 3

235 P.2d 3

37 Cal.2d 744

WHITMORE et ux. v. FRENCH et ux.

L. A. 21928.

Supreme Court of California, in Bank.

Sept. 4, 1951.

Thomas P. Menzies, Harold L. Watt and James O. White, all of Los Angeles, for appellants.

Parker, Stanbury, Reese & McGee and White McGee, all of Los Angeles, for respondents.

GIBSON, Chief Justice.

Plaintiffs, husband and wife, brought this action to recover damages for personal injuries sustained by them in an accident in Yosemite National Park while they were riding in an automobile owned by defendants, Mr. and Mrs. French, and driven by Mr. French. The jury returned a verdict for plaintiffs, and defendants have appealed from the judgment.

The sole question to be decided is whether the trial court erred in refusing to give instructions requested by defendants as to their liability under section 403 of the Vehicle Code, ¹ commonly known as the 'guest law.' It is clear that the statute is operative within Yosemite National Park, which is located entirely within the State of California. Congress has provided that in an action to recover for personal injuries sustained in a national park 'the rights of the parties shall be governed by the laws of the State within the exterior boundaries of which it may be.' 16 U.S.C.A. § 457. There was no evidence that the accident resulted from the intoxication or wilful misconduct of the driver, and accordingly, we must determine whether the evidence established as a matter of law that plaintiffs gave compensation for the transportation furnished them by defendants.

The parties, who had been friends for many years, were taking an extended vacation trip from Missouri to the Pacific Coast. They visited the Royal Gorge in Colorado and other places of interest, and on the sixth day they had reached Yosemite National Park where the accident occurred. They had planned to go to Lake Tahoe and Oregon before returning home. In making arrangements for the trip, the parties agreed that they would be accompanied by defendants' two sons, 12 and 14 years old, that defendants would furnish the car, and that each couple would contribute an equal amount to a common fund, out of which all expenses, such as gasoline, oil, meals, lodging, and sightseeing, would be paid. Each couple put $100 into the common fund as an initial contribution. Mr. French did all of the driving, and Mr. Whitmore procured maps and made suggestions as to the route to be followed.

The designations 'passenger' and 'guest' have been adopted for the purpose of distinguishing a person who has given compensation within the meaning of section 403 of the Vehicle Code from one carried gratuitously. Kruzie v. Sanders, 23 Cal.2d 237, 241, 143 P.2d 704. A person who accepts a ride does not cease to be guest and become a passenger merely by extending customary courtesies of the road, such as paying bridge or ferry tolls (see Rest., Torts, § 490, Comment a), and it has been held that the sharing of expenses does not destroy the host and guest relationship if nothing more is involved than the exchange of social amenities and reciprocal hospitality. McCann v. Hoffman, 9 Cal.2d 279, 70 P.2d 909. Where, however, the driver receives a tangible benefit, monetary or otherwise, which is a motivating influence for furnishing the transportation, the rider is a passenger and the driver is liable for ordinary negligence. See Kruzie v. Sanders, 23 Cal.2d 237, 143 P.2d 704; Druzanich v. Criley, 19 Cal.2d 439, 122 P.2d 53; Whitechat v. Guyette, 19 Cal.2d 428, 122 P.2d 47; Walker v. Adamson, 9 Cal.2d 287, 70 P.2d 914; Kerstetter v. Elfman, 327 Pa. 17, 192 A. 663, 664-666. This is, of course, true whether the trip is for the joint pleasure of the participants or is of a nonsocial nature.

In the present case the evidence is without substantial conflict, and in our opinion the trial judge, who the record shows gave careful consideration to the problem, correctly determined that the only reasonable inference that could be drawn from the evidence was that plaintiffs gave compensation for their transportation. It is obvious that something more was involved in the arrangements for the trip than a mere exchange of social amenities, and it cannot be disputed that plaintiffs made a substantial contribution toward the cost of the journey. The financial arrangements were definite and businesslike and resulted in a tangible benefit to defendants, a cash payment was made into the common fund by plaintiffs before the commencement of the journey, and in addition to sharing the cost of the operation of the car and the expenses of the two couples, plaintiffs obligated themselves to pay one-half the cost of the food, lodging, the sightseeing for defendants' two sons on an extended trip which might last two or three weeks. The evidence establishes as a matter of law that plaintiffs compensated defendants for the ride, and the requested instructions were, therefore, properly refused.

The judgment is affirmed.

SHENK, CARTER, TRAYNOR and SPENCE, JJ., concur.

SCHAUER, Justice (dissenting).

I dissent. In my view the evidence does not establish as a matter of law that plaintiffs compensated defendants for the trip in question. The majority opinion does not expressly state that it is departing from the general precepts, announced in McCann v. Hoffman (1937), 9 Cal.2d 279, 286, 70 P.2d 909, that 'where a special tangible benefit to the defendant was the motivating influence for furnishing the transportation, compensation may...