Whitsell v. State
| Decision Date | 29 January 1965 |
| Docket Number | No. 30617,30617 |
| Parties | Robert Eugene WHITSELL, James Hester, Appellants, v. The STATE of Indiana, Appellee. |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
John G. Bunner, Evansville, for appellant.
Edwin K. Steers, Atty. Gen., Carl E. Van Dorn, Deputy Atty. Gen., for appellee.
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Vanderburgh Circuit Court convicting the appellants Whitsell and Hester of the offense of second degree burglary. Error is claimed in the overruling of the motion for a new trial on the ground that the verdict was not sustained by sufficient evidence and was contrary to law.
The primary contention here is that the 'breaking' into the property was not coupled with a specific intention to commit a felony, and therefore the crime of second degree burglary was not proved.
A brief review of the evidence shows that the appellants, Robert Eugene Whitsell and James Hester, along with an accomplice, John Morally, and Margaret Whitsell, sell, were driving around in Morally's car. Morally stated that they were desperately in need of money, '* * * enough to try to do something drastic like break into a place, * * *' Eventually they drove up to the wholesale electronics store of Hutch & Sons, Inc. Someone in the group had said they had broken into the place before, and knew how entry could be made. Appellant Whitsell suggested that Morally ram the door of the building with his automobile. This was done and the door was sprung open, as one of them stated, far enough to get inside. Interesting to state, at this time the four left the scene for a 'coffee-break'. It is by this intermission that the appellants now attempt to show that there was no attempt to enter the building at the time the door was smashed. This is the first time this Court has been confronted with evidence of a 'coffeebreak' during the commission of a crime. After the group had had coffee, Morally and appellants Hester and Robert Whitsell returned to the building, entered the same and took out seven radios, a tape recorder, a phonograph and other property found therein and loaded them into the car. About that time a police car drove up and the appellants, with Margaret Whitsell, jumped out of the car and fled. Morally was apprehended before he could get entirely away from the scene of the alleged crime.
We must agree with appellants' contention that there must be an intent to break in to commit a felony or take property in order to constitute burglary. However, it might reasonably be inferred that the parties intended to commit the felony even though a 'coffee-break' intervened between the employment of force used to create an opening and the actual entering later on. This is a...
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McGill v. State
...the rule that intent to commit a specific criminal act can be presumed from the voluntary commission of that act. Whitsell v. State, (1965), 246 Ind. 175, 203 N.E.2d 832; Wojcik v. State (1965), 246 Ind. 257, 204 N.E.2d 866; Tait v. State (1963), 244 Ind. 35, 188 N.E.2d 537; Coffer v. State......
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Word v. State, 569S120
...from the facts shown. This is a question of fact which the trier of fact can conclude from the related evidence. Whitsell v. State (1965), 246 Ind. 175, 203 N.E.2d 832. The evidence to establish this element is that the appellant, without permission, broke into a car belonging to another, a......