Whitt v. State
| Decision Date | 08 April 1987 |
| Docket Number | No. 44035,44035 |
| Citation | 354 S.E.2d 116,257 Ga. 8 |
| Parties | WHITT v. The STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Clifton O. Bailey III, Atlanta, for Otis Whitt.
Lewis R. Slaton, Dist. Atty., Richard E. Hicks, Wendy Shoob, Asst. Dist. Attys., Atlanta, Michael J. Bowers, Atty. Gen., J. Michael Davis, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
A Fulton County jury found the appellant, Otis Whitt, guilty of the murder of Larry Floyd and of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Whitt raises three issues on appeal. We affirm. 1
Floyd went to Whitt's apartment on December 23, 1985, to discuss a debt. The two men began to argue, and Floyd left the apartment. As Floyd walked around the car in which he had arrived, Whitt fired a shot, fatally wounding Floyd. Whitt testified at trial that Floyd was walking towards him with a pistol at the time of the shooting. Others testified that Floyd did not have a gun prior to the shooting.
1. We find the evidence sufficient to support the jury verdict under the standard established in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).
2. Whitt claims that the trial court allowed inadmissible character testimony into evidence.
(a) Whitt testified that he had owed Floyd $350 for some time but that he had paid Floyd back. He asserted that Floyd's request for more money led to the argument that ultimately resulted in Floyd's death. When the prosecutor questioned Whitt about the nature of the debt, Whitt stated that he had paid Floyd $350 for an "eight ball" of cocaine which he resold for a profit. While the nature of the debt would not be independently relevant to the legal issues on this case beyond the obvious inference that Whitt is a criminal, we find that Whitt, in openly responding to the prosecutor's question, opened the door to testimony on the subject of the nature of the debt. See generally Phillips v. State, 254 Ga. 370, 329 S.E.2d 475 (1985).
(b) At another point in the trial, Whitt expressed his surprise and chagrin that he was in court as a defendant in a murder trial. He stated that he never believed that he would be faced with a charge like rape, murder, or child molestation. The prosecutor responded by asking him if he had not been in court for a number of other reasons. We find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in instructing the jury to disregard the prosecutor's remark rather than declaring a mistrial. Lewis v. State, 255 Ga. 681, 341 S.E.2d 434 (1986).
(c) During the testimony of Kenneth Kemp, the man who accompanied Floyd to Whitt's house, Kemp twice referred to Whitt's use of cocaine. Since Whitt did not request a mistrial at the time that he made his objection, he may not now claim that the trial court should have declared a mistrial at that time. Flynn v. State, 255 Ga. 415, 419, 339 S.E.2d 259 (1986).
3. Whitt finally contends that the...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Anthony v. State
...charge as a whole properly informed the jury of the State's burden of proof and the meaning of reasonable doubt. See Whitt v. State, 257 Ga. 8, 9(3), 354 S.E.2d 116 (1987) ; Jackson v. State, 214 Ga.App. 683, 683–684(1), 448 S.E.2d 763 (1994).Judgment affirmed.All the Justices concur.1 The ......
-
Flanders v. State
...by suggesting during opening statement that the detective believed the shooting to be accidental. See generally Whitt v. State, 257 Ga. 8(2)(a), 354 S.E.2d 116 (1987). Moreover, even if the trial court erred in admitting the statement of the detective, it was cumulative of earlier testimony......
-
Williams v. State
...that the erroneous statement of law was simply a misstatement or "slip of the tongue," which does not demand reversal. Whitt v. State, 257 Ga. 8(3), 354 S.E.2d 116 (1987); Holliman, supra at (1), 356 S.E.2d 886; Gober, supra at (3), 278 S.E.2d (b) After instructing the jury on the options o......
-
Brantley v. State
...272 S.E.2d 761; accord Terry v. State, 243 Ga. 11(1), 252 S.E.2d 429. Jury instructions must always be viewed as a whole (Whitt v. State, 257 Ga. 8(3), 354 S.E.2d 116), and the charge as a whole instructed the jury to consider the appellant's testimony the same as that of any other witness.......