Whittenton Mfg. Co. v. Staples
Decision Date | 04 October 1895 |
Citation | 164 Mass. 319,41 N.E. 441 |
Parties | WHITTENTON MANUF'G CO. v. STAPLES. |
Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
A.M Alger, for plaintiff.
G.E Williams, for defendant.
The parties have agreed upon all the facts deemed to be material. The Taunton Manufacturing Company built the reservoir dam on land owned by it in 1832, at a time when it was the owner of five mill privileges on the stream below, all of which were then in operation. This dam was for the sole use of the mills upon said mill privileges, and was essential to the reasonable enjoyment of all of the water powers, as the natural flow of the stream during much of the year would be inadequate for furnishing power. Under this state of things the corporation, in the first place, on August 12, 1833, conveyed to the Bristol Print-Works Company the two lowest mills, the land being described by metes and bounds, "together with all the buildings thereon, and all the rights, privileges, easements, and appurtenances to the said land in any wise appertaining or belonging, and all the streams and water rights and power thereof, also the dam and force of water." On September 6, 1833, the corporation conveyed the next lowest mill to Charles Richmond, under whom, through mesne conveyances, the defendant claims. This deed conveyed the land and buildings "and the water power, dam, and all the appurtenances and privileges thereto belonging," and contained further provisions as follows: The defendant contends that the above deed conveyed no right in the reservoir, and that the clause requiring Richmond and his heirs and assigns to pay one-fifth of the damages for flowing is not binding on subsequent owners; and these are the principal questions which have been argued in the case. It is not disputed that the title and rights of the Taunton Manufacturing Company to the upper mill and privilege have come through mesne conveyances to the plaintiff.
If the construction of a deed is doubtful, the practical construction put upon it by the parties and their successors may be looked at in connection with the deed itself and the circumstances existing at the time of its execution. Reynolds v. Rubber Co., 160 Mass. 240, 35 N.E. 677, and cases there cited. Until recently, the parties in interest have assumed and have acted on the theory that Richmond and his heirs and assigns had an interest in the additional water power created by the reservoir, and were bound to pay one-fifth of the damages for flowing. This is shown by the following facts: On July 15, 1835, the Taunton Manufacturing Company conveyed to James K. Mills and others the upper mill and privilege on the stream, "with the dams and water privileges thereon, together with all the right which said Taunton Manufacturing Company have to flow the land between the premises hereby conveyed and the bridge where the old road to Boston crosses Canoe river; the dams, water privileges, and rights of flowage hereby intended to be granted and reserved being fully set forth in and subject to an agreement by and between the grantor and grantees, bearing even date with, and to be referred to always as a part of these presents." The said agreement provided, among other things, as follows: etc.
The defendant derived his title as follows: The title of Richmond passed to Galen Hicks, under the foreclosure of a mortgage dated October 4, 1833, in which reference was made to the deed of the Taunton Manufacturing Company to Richmond. On March 1, 1848, Hicks conveyed to Dean & Morse with a similar reference; and they, in like manner, on April 1, 1849, conveyed to the Dean Cotton & Machine Company, which in its turn, on November 28, 1874, conveyed to the Taunton Cotton & Machine Company the land and water privileges, "together with all the rights of flowage appurtenant to said estate, and all the right, title, and interest of the grantor in the reservoir and flowage company [this company will be hereinafter described], and subject to all the liability on account of such rights; and, in relation thereto, reference may be made to an agreement between the Taunton Manufacturing Company and James K. Mills and others, dated July 15, 1835, and to the award," etc. On June 1, 1880, the Taunton Cotton & Machine Company conveyed the property to Park Mills, a corporation, with this provision: "This conveyance shall also include whatsoever rights, title, and interest, with the liabilities thereon, said corporation has in the Taunton Reservoir & Flowage Co." On July 19, 1889, the Park Mills conveyed to Staples, the defendant, with a similar provision. On the same day, the Taunton Cotton & Machine Company also executed a deed of the same premises to the defendant, etc.
The reservoir and flowage company referred to in some of the above deeds was established as follows: In 1852, the owners of the several mills, all being corporations, associated together as a voluntary association, under the name of the Taunton Reservoir & Flowage Company, "for the purpose of aiding in the supplying themselves with water by the reservoir dam," and appointed Willard Lovering, one of the owners of the Whittenton mills, their agent, from time to time, as the damages for flowing should become due, to collect their proportions thereof, and to pay the same to the owners of lands flowed. The annual damages for flowing were in the same year fixed by agreements at $1,842.89, and have not since been changed. These damages are fair and reasonable. From that time to the present, Lovering (who died in 1875) and the successive owners of the Whittenton mills have continued without objection, in behalf of the owners, from time to time, of the several mills, under the name of the Taunton Reservoir & Flowage Company, to collect from said mill owners and to pay out said damages for flowing, and to repair the reservoir dam, and to draw water from the reservoir, and to collect from the several mill owners their respective shares of the expense thereof. The defendant, however, without assenting thereto or dissenting therefrom, otherwise than is herein stated, refused from time to time, as said charges accrued, to pay any part thereof, on the ground that he...
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