Whittington v. State
| Decision Date | 01 July 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 2591,2591 |
| Parties | KEVIN WHITTINGTON v. STATE OF MARYLAND |
| Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
Fourth Amendment > Search > GPS Tracking
We hold that a court order issued under CP § 1.203.1, meets the requisites of a warrant under Fourth Amendment Law. The statute requires that an order be signed by a neutral and detached magistrate, based on probable cause, and supported by oath or affirmation. It must also identify, with reasonable particularity, the technology to be employed and the person about whom location information is being sought. Such order is limited, unless certain exceptions apply, to 30 days, after which notice of the order must be delivered to the subject of the order.
Fourth Amendment > Search > GPS Tracking
In this age of rapidly advancing surveillance technology, that CP § 1-203.1 incisively requires that an application for an order, such as the GPS Order in this case, be limited to 30 days and describe with reasonable particularity the type of electronic device to be employed by law enforcement.
Fourth Amendment > Orders
We reject any categorical proposition that an "order" issued by a neutral magistrate cannot serve as the functional equivalent of a "warrant" issued by a neutral magistrate. We recognize that formal labels are necessary to organize the ontology of the law, but, in this case, as in most, the label is not dispositive.
Fourth Amendment > Search > Warrants > GPS Tracking
In United States v. Jones, the Supreme Court held that a GPS device affixed by law enforcement on a suspect's vehicle to monitor his movements constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment. 565 U.S. 400, 404 (2012). Although the Supreme Court in Jones did not specifically address whether police must obtain a warrant before installing a GPS tracking device on a suspect's vehicle, we accept that the "Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches is generally satisfied when law enforcement officers obtain a warrant authorizing the search in question." State v. Copes, 454 Md. 581, 618 (2017) (citing Riley v. California 573 U.S. 373, 382 (2014)).
Fourth Amendment > Searches > Warrants > Burden
In warrantless-search and-seizure cases, the State bears the burden of overcoming the presumption that a warrant was required. Eusebio v. State, 245 Md. App. 1, 22 (2020) (citation omitted). In the instant case, the State had the burden of establishing that the order issued pursuant to CP § 1-203.1 met the requirements of a warrant.
Fourth Amendment > Searches > Warrants > Particularity > Surveillance Technology
In our effort to stay apace with scientific advances, we have recognized that in order for a neutral magistrate to "particularly describe[e] the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized," the application for a warrant or order must identify, among other things, what type of tracking device law enforcement intends to use. See State v. Andrews, 227 Md. App. 350, 376 (2016).
Statutes > Statutory Interpretation > Plain Language
To determine Legislative intent, we turn first to the plain meaning of the statute. Berry v. State, 244 Md. App. 234, 244 (2019). "Even if the plain meaning is clear and unambiguous, we often look to legislative intent and purpose to determine if they ratify our analysis and interpretation of a statute." Hammonds v. State, 436 Md. 22, 44 (2013).
Statutes > Statutory Interpretation > Plain Language
The plain language of CP § 1.203.1 shows that the statute embodies all of the warrant requirements inhering in the Fourth Amendment. Subsection b provides, in pertinent part, that a court may issue an order that allows law enforcement to obtain location information "after determining[,] from an application described in paragraph (2) of this subsection[,]" that "there is probable cause to believe that . . . a misdemeanor or felony has been, is being, or will be committed . . . by the individual about whom location information is being sought[.]" CP § 1-203.1(b)(1)-(1)(i). Paragraph (2) requires a written application that is "signed and sworn to by the applicant" and is "accompanied by an affidavit that[] . . . sets forth the basis for probable cause . . . and [] contains facts within the personal knowledge of the affiant." CP § 1-203.1(b)(2).
Statutes > Statutory Interpretation > Plain Language
In light of the particularity requirement, the statute requires that any order issued pursuant to it must "describe with reasonable particularity[] . . . the type of electronic device associated with the location information being sought"; "the user of the electronic device, if known, or the identifying number of the electronic device about which location information is sought"; and "the grounds for obtaining the location information[.]" CP § 1-203.1(b)(3).
Statutes > Constitutionality
We observe that CP § 1-203.1, tailored to address modern tracking technology, imposes time limitations and requires concise identification of the technology that law enforcement plans to employ in collecting location data—requisites that further aid in protecting citizens from indiscriminate government surveillance.
Fourth Amendment > Searches > Warrants > Sufficiency of the Warrant
CP § 1-203.1 imposes conditions and requisites on officers who seek to employ GPS tracking devices that meet the warrant requirements of the Fourth Amendment. The application in this case demonstrated that the order issued established a substantial basis upon which the issuing judge could find probable cause that a "misdemeanor or felony . . . [wa]s being . . . committed" and "the location information being sought . . . [wa]s evidence of, or w[ould] lead to evidence of, the misdemeanor or felony being investigated[.]" CP § 1-203.1(b).
Fourth Amendment > Exclusionary Rule > Good Faith Exception
We agree with the court's determination that the detectives in this case relied on the search warrant in good faith. We assume, without deciding, that the suppression court correctly determined that the district court judge did not have a substantial basis to find probable cause to issue the warrant. See Marshall v. State, 415 Md. 399, 402 (2010) ().
Fourth Amendment > Exclusionary Rule > Good Faith Exception
The United States Supreme Court and the Maryland Court of Appeals "have adopted a good faith exception to the warrant requirement, under which 'evidence seized under a warrant subsequently determined to be invalid may be admissible if the executing officers acted in objective good faith with reasonable reliance on the warrant.'" Carroll v. State, 240 Md. App. 629, 654 (2019) (citation omitted).
Fourth Amendment > Exclusionary Rule > Good Faith Exception
The exclusionary rule it is "not applied when law enforcement officials engage in 'objectively reasonable law enforcement activity,' even if that activity is later found to be a violation of the Fourth Amendment." State v. Copes, 454 Md. 581, 606 (2017) (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 919).
Fourth Amendment > Exclusionary Rule > Good Faith Exception
The detectives here could have reasonably believed that Appellant's criminal history, consistent association with a person of interest in a large-scale drug investigation, and suspicious driving behavior "related to a present and continuing violation of the law[.]" Patterson v. State, 401 Md. 76, 107 (2007).
Circuit Court for Baltimore County
Case No. 03-K-17-000239
REPORTED
Leahy, Shaw Geter, Vitale, Cathleen M. (Specially Assigned), JJ.
Opinion by Leahy, J.
Law enforcement's use of a Global Positioning System ("GPS") tracking device led to the arrest and conviction of Kevin Whittington, and ultimately, to the Fourth Amendment issues before us now. As a matter of first impression, we examine whether the court order that authorized police to install the GPS tracking device on Mr. Whittington's car, issued pursuant to a state criminal statute, satisfied the Fourth Amendment requirements of a warrant based on probable cause.
Mr. Whittington unwittingly garnered the attention of detectives in the Harford County Sheriff's Office in 2016 by associating with a suspected narcotics distributor named David Hall. The detectives wiretapped Mr. Hall's phone and discovered that Mr. Whittington was the most frequent caller. Then they observed the two men engaged in activity that was consistent with the distribution of controlled dangerous substances (CDS). The detectives applied for and obtained an "Electronic Device Location Information Order" (hereinafter "GPS Order") under Maryland Code (2018 Repl. Vol., 2019 Supp.), Criminal Procedure Article ("CP"), § 1-203.1.1 The GPS Order authorized the detectives to install a GPS mobile tracking device on Mr. Whittington's car for a 30-day period.
The detectives observed Mr. Whittington over a period of weeks with the help of the GPS tracking device. His pattern of movements further bolstered their assessment that he was engaged in CDS activity in and around Harford County, and that he maintained a residence at 4 Cloverwood Ct., Apt. 202, in Essex, Baltimore County. They then applied for and received a warrant to search Mr. Whittington's person, car, and apartment. The police found four baggies of cocaine totaling about eight grams in Mr. Whittington's car; and they found two bags of cocaine weighing approximately 145.9 grams, ten Alprazolam pills, and $1,222 in the apartment at 4 Cloverwood Ct. Officers apprehended Mr. Whittington at another location and found $1,406 and two cellular telephones on his person. Mr. Whittington was arrested and later indicted on January 18, 2017, in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, on...
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