Whyte v. Tompkins Cnty. Sheriff
| Decision Date | 14 August 2020 |
| Docket Number | 9:20-CV-284 (LEK/CFH) |
| Parties | CORBIN WHYTE, Plaintiff, v. TOMPKINS COUNTY SHERIFF, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of New York |
The Clerk has sent to the Court for review a complaint filed by pro se plaintiff Corbin Whyte pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, together with an application to proceed in forma pauperis ("IFP"). Dkt. Nos. 1 ("Complaint"); 2 ("IFP Application"). Plaintiff alleges that the following defendants violated his constitutional rights while he was incarcerated in the Tompkins County Jail: Tompkins County Sheriff Peter Meskill; Tompkins County Assistant District Attorney Andrew McElwee; Correction Officer Griffen; Correction Officer Nate Tompkins; Correction Officer Daniel Bomysoad; Correction Officer Boda; Correction Sergeant Garden Hanes; Correction Sergeant Tom Walpoole; and Tompkins County (the "County"). Compl. at 2-4. Plaintiff is currently incarcerated at Cayuga Correctional Facility and has not paid the filing fee for this action.
"28 U.S.C. § 1915 permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in a federal court without prepayment of the filing fee that would ordinarily be charged." Cash v. Bernstein, No. 09-CV-1922, 2010 WL 5185047, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 26, 2010).1 "Although an indigent, incarcerated individual need not prepay the filing fee at the time of filing, he must subsequently pay the fee, to the extent he is able to do so, through periodic withdrawals from his inmate accounts." Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b); Harris v. City of New York, 607 F.3d 18, 21 (2d Cir. 2010).
Based upon his IFP Application, Plaintiff has demonstrated sufficient economic need and may commence this action without prepayment of the filing fee. Plaintiff has also filed the inmate authorization form required in this District. Dkt. No. 3 ("Inmate Authorization Form"). Accordingly, the Court grants Plaintiff's IFP Application.
When a plaintiff seeks to proceed IFP, "the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action . . . (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).2 Thus, even if a plaintiff meets the financial criteria to commence an action IFP, it is the court's responsibility to determine whether theplaintiff may properly maintain the complaint before permitting the plaintiff to proceed IFP. See id.
Likewise, a court must review any "complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity" and must "identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint . . . is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or . . . seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915A; see also Carr v. Dvorin, 171 F.3d 115, 116 (2d Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (); Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007) ().
At the §§ 1915 and 1915A review stage, a court should not dismiss a complaint if the plaintiff has stated "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Although the court should construe the factual allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, "the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions." Id. "Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). "[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged-but it has not 'show[n]'-'that the pleader is entitled to relief.'" Id. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).Rule 8 "demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Thus, a pleading that only "tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement" will not suffice. Id. (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).
Finally, the court has a duty to show liberality toward pro se litigants, see Nance v. Kelly, 912 F.2d 605, 606 (2d Cir. 1990) (per curiam), and should exercise "extreme caution . . . in ordering sua sponte dismissal of a pro se complaint before the adverse party has been served and both parties (but particularly the plaintiff) have had an opportunity to respond," Anderson v. Coughlin, 700 F.2d 37, 41 (2d Cir. 1983) (internal citations omitted).
In his Complaint, Plaintiff asserts claims arising out of his confinement at Tompkins County Jail. See generally Compl. Plaintiff alleges the following facts in his Complaint.
On December 6, 2010, Plaintiff was arrested by Tompkins County Sheriff Peter Meskill and transported to the Tompkins County Sheriff's Department. Compl. at 5. On or about December 7, 2010, Plaintiff was charged and arraigned on one count of murder in the second degree. Id. Thereafter, Plaintiff was transferred to the Tompkins County Jail and placed in general population. Id.
Later that month, a Tompkins County Grand Jury returned an indictment against Plaintiff charging one count of second degree murder (principal actor), one count of second degree murder (accomplice), one count of first degree robbery, and one count of first degree tampering with physical evidence. Id. at 5-6. Thereafter, Plaintiff was appointed counsel and exercised his right to a jury trial. Id. at 6.
Between 2011 and 2013, Plaintiff had three jury trials, all of which were prosecuted by Assistant District Attorney Andrew McElwee. Id. at 6. The first and second trials ended in mistrials. Id. After the second mistrial, McElwee dropped one of the murder charges. Id.
At each trial, McElwee presented Zsatia Perkins as a witness. Id. Perkins testified that Plaintiff had told her to dispose of the boots he was wearing at the time of the crime. Id. McElwee also proffered evidence that Plaintiff disposed of the jacket he wore at the time of the crime. Id.
In the third trial, the jury found Plaintiff guilty of one count of tampering with physical evidence. Id. at 6-7. Plaintiff was acquitted of the first degree robbery charge, and a mistrial was declared as to the remaining murder charge and the lesser included charge of attempted robbery in the first degree. Id. Plaintiff was subsequently sentenced to two to four years of imprisonment for tampering with physical evidence. Id. at 7.
In November 2016, the guilty verdict was reversed by the New York Appellate Division, Third Department. Id. at 7-8. The Appellate Division remanded the matter for a new trial because the trial court had failed to charge the jury with an instruction that Zsatia Perkins was an accomplice as a matter of law and, therefore, Plaintiff could not be convicted on Perkins' testimony absent corroborative evidence. See id.; see also People v. Whyte, 144 A.D.3d 1393, 1395 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016). Following this ruling, McElwee moved to dismiss the tampering with physical evidence charge. Id. at 8. By the time the charge was dismissed, Plaintiff had served a total of approximately three years, three months, and nineteen days of the two-to-four year prison sentence. Id.
On or about September 11, 2014, while Plaintiff was confined at the Tompkins County Jail, Correction Officers Griffen,3 Tompkins, Bomysoad, and Boda, and Correction Sergeants Hanes4 and Walpoole—all named defendants—entered Plaintiff's cell and ordered him to kneel on his bed. Compl. at 8. Plaintiff complied with the instruction, after which he was assaulted by Griffen, Tompkins, Bomysoad, and Boda while Hanes and Walpoole looked on. Id. at 8-9. Plaintiff's arm was dislocated during the assault. Id. at 9-10.
Construed liberally, the Complaint asserts the following claims against the named defendants: (1) Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claims against Meskill, McElwee, and the County; and (2) Eighth Amendment excessive force and failure-to-protect claims against Griffen, Thompson, Bomysoad, Boda, Hanes, Walpool, and the County.5 Compl.
Plaintiff seeks monetary damages. Id. at 11. A complete statement of Plaintiff's claims can be found in the Complaint.
Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to § 1983. Compl. "42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a civil claim for damages against any person who, acting under color of state law, deprives another of a right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States." Thomas v. Roach, 165 F.3d 137, 142 (2d Cir.1999). Section 1983 does not create any substantive rights; it provides civil litigants a procedure to redress the deprivation of rights established elsewhere. Id. (citing City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 816 (1985)). "To prevail on a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must establish that a person acting under the color of state law deprived him of a federal right." Id.
Municipal liability is limited under § 1983 by Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978)....
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