Wichers v. Hatch
| Decision Date | 15 February 2000 |
| Docket Number | (SC 16010) |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Parties | THOMAS J. WICHERS ET AL. v. WILLIE HATCH ET AL. |
Borden, Norcott, Katz, Palmer, Callahan, Ronan and Wollenberg, Js. Linda L. Morkan, with whom was Erin K. O'Brien, for the appellants (defendants).
Jill H. O'Connor, with whom, on the brief, was Laura A. Goldstein, for the appellees (plaintiffs).
Steven D. Ecker filed a brief for the Connecticut Trial Lawyers Association as amicus curiae.
This case presents the issue of whether the trial court necessarily must set aside the verdict when, pursuant to General Statutes § 52-572h,1 the jury returns a verdict awarding the plaintiff economic damages but zero noneconomic damages. This case also affords us an opportunity to decide what, if anything, should remain of this court's holding in Johnson v. Franklin, 112 Conn. 228, 152 A. 64 (1930), that an award of greater than nominal damages equaling the exact amount of medical expenses and lost wages claimed, with no allowance for substantial noneconomic damages, was inadequate as a matter of law, in light of this court's more recent decision in Childs v. Bainer, 235 Conn. 107, 121-22, 663 A.2d 398 (1995), which held that an award of economic damages need not be accompanied always by an award of noneconomic damages. When faced with the jury's award of zero noneconomic damages, the trial court in this case, relying on Johnson, invoked a per se rule to grant the plaintiffs motion for an additur. We conclude that a jury verdict awarding economic but not noneconomic damages to a tort claimant is not improper as a matter of law, and we expressly overrule that portion of Johnson that held otherwise.
The record discloses the following relevant facts. On August 15, 1994, an automobile driven by the named defendant, Willie Hatch (defendant), struck the automobile driven by the named plaintiff, Thomas J. Wichers (plaintiff), causing damage to both vehicles.2 Following the accident, the plaintiff drove his car home for lunch and then returned to work that afternoon. The plaintiff did not go to the hospital and never consulted a physician. That night, the plaintiff consulted his chiropractor, who had been treating him since 1987. The parties stipulated before trial that the defendant was responsible for the collision, leaving for the jury the sole issue of what damages to award the plaintiff for the injuries that he allegedly had sustained.
At trial, the parties hotly contested the extent of the plaintiff's injuries. The plaintiff claimed that, as a result of the accident, he had suffered an acute cervical strain, a cervical subluxion, a 5 percent permanent impairment of the cervical spine, headaches, fatigue, physical impairment and depression. The plaintiff testified to an impaired range of motion in that he could not move his head completely to the left. His chiropractor, George Lentini, testified that the plaintiff, whom he had treated for four months as a result of the accident, suffered a 5 percent permanent impairment of his cervical spine. Lentini assessed this impairment rating based upon the plaintiff's claimed restricted range of motion.
Prior to the 1994 accident, the plaintiff had a neck impairment and, in fact, had been receiving treatment by Lentini as part of a monthly maintenance program since 1987. Prior to that, the plaintiff had received treatment from two other chiropractors. Additionally, since at least 1991, the plaintiff had been suffering from an arthritic condition in his neck, which had resulted in a reduced range of motion. He also suffered from a degenerative condition, known as spondylosis, which had exhibited its symptoms as early as 1993. Lentini testified that the plaintiff's restricted range of motion could have been caused by arthritis, spondylosis, normal wear and tear or aging.
The plaintiff had been involved in two other motor vehicle accidents, one in 1991 and another in 1993, both of which resulted in a neck injury. The 1993 accident required the plaintiff to undergo eight months of treatment with Lentini. Unfortunately, despite that treatment, the plaintiff failed to regain his pre-1993 range of motion.
At trial, the plaintiff argued that, although he had a preexisting condition, the defendant's negligence exacerbated that condition. He claimed pain and suffering and sought compensation. With regard to economic damages, the plaintiff asked the jury to award him $3377 in damages, representing the total cost of medical expenses that he had incurred to the date of the trial. He also asked the jury to consider the fact that he would "probably continue maintenance treatment or wellness care for thirteen and one-half years" with his chiropractor. The plaintiff did not, however, introduce any evidence regarding the cost of that future treatment, nor did he suggest a specific dollar amount for this anticipated treatment.3
The defendant argued that the plaintiffs condition resulted, not from the 1994 accident with the defendant, but rather, from the plaintiff's arthritis and spondylosis, both degenerative conditions. Therefore, according to the defendant, because the plaintiffs condition would have continued to deteriorate regardless of the accident, he had failed to demonstrate a causal connection between the accident and the injuries allegedly suffered.
The trial court instructed the jury that it first had to determine whether there was a causal relationship between the accident and the injuries claimed by the plaintiff and, if so, what amount to award as fair, just and reasonable damages. Specifically, the trial court instructed the jury: "If you find that the plaintiff complains about an injury which would have occurred even in the absence of the defendant's conduct, then you must find that the defendant did not proximately cause that injury." The trial court further instructed the jury that, if it chose to award damages, it could "give the plaintiff only such damages as were proven to be the proximate consequence of the defendant's action which resulted in [the plaintiffs] claimed injuries." Regarding noneconomic damages, the trial court instructed the jury that the plaintiff
The jury returned a verdict of $3377 in economic damages and zero noneconomic damages. Thereafter, pursuant to General Statutes § 52-228b,4 the plaintiff filed a motion to have the verdict set aside and for the court to order an additur. The sole basis of the plaintiff's motion was that the verdict was inconsistent in that "if the jury believed [he] was injured so as to require treatment and incur medical bills, it is inconsistent to find that these same injuries did not cause pain and suffering and a five (5%) percent permanent impairment to his cervical spine." In his memorandum in support of his motion, the plaintiff cited Johnson v. Franklin, supra, 112 Conn. 228. The defendant objected, citing Childs v. Bainer, supra, 235 Conn. 107, as support for his position that it is permissible for a jury to return a plaintiffs verdict awarding economic damages without also awarding noneconomic damages. On June 27, 1997, the trial court granted the plaintiff's motion and ordered the defendant to pay an additur of $7500 in noneconomic damages and further ordered that, if the defendant did not accept the additur, a new trial would be held limited to the issue of damages.
Thereafter, the defendant sought and obtained an articulation of the trial court's decision. In its articulation, the trial court cited to the jury's award of $3377 in economic damages, "the exact amount of his economic damages," and concluded therefrom that the "jury had to find that the plaintiff was injured in this accident." The trial court concluded that the "verdict was inconsistent and inadequate as a matter of law."
The defendant did not accept the additur and appealed to the Appellate Court. Thereafter, pursuant to Practice Book § 65-2, he filed a motion to transfer the appeal to this court, which we granted.5 Subsequently thereto, the defendant filed a second motion for articulation to clarify whether the trial court had considered the failure of the jury to award future medical damages in its conclusion that the jury had awarded the plaintiff "the exact amount" of the plaintiffs claimed economic damages. The trial court responded to the defendant's inquiry articulating that it had not considered the jury's failure to award future medical costs. Rather, it had considered "only the fact that the jury had awarded the plaintiff the exact amount of his present economic damages to the penny, [and that] therefore, in awarding the plaintiff `zero' noneconomic damages, the verdict was inconsistent and justified the court's granting an additur in favor of the plaintiff." The defendant claims that the trial court improperly failed to exercise its discretion in deciding whether to grant the plaintiffs motion for an additur based upon its belief that Johnson mandated that result. Specifically, the defendant makes two arguments. First, he argues that the per se rule of Johnson should not have been invoked in this case because the jury, having failed to award the plaintiff the damages he sought for future medical expenses, had not awarded the plaintiff "the exact amount" of his claimed damages. Second, the defendant claims that, should this court determine that Johnson does indeed control the present case, it should be overruled because it is not fruitful to attempt to reconcile Johnson and Childs so that each may be applied in a workable manner.
We agree with the defendant that the departure in Childs from what was perceived to be the Johnson per se rule, has left trial judges in...
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