Wickersham v. Ford Motor Co.

• Decision Date: 13 May 2022
• Docket Number: 9:14-cv-00459-DCN,9:13-cv-01192-DCN
• Parties: CRYSTAL L. WICKERSHAM, Plaintiff, v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY, Defendant. CRYSTAL L. WICKERSHAM, as personal representative of the estate of John Harley Wickersham, Jr. Plaintiff, v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina

CRYSTAL L. WICKERSHAM, Plaintiff, v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY, Defendant.

CRYSTAL L. WICKERSHAM, as personal representative of the estate of John Harley Wickersham, Jr. Plaintiff, v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY, Defendant.

Nos. 9:13-cv-01192-DCN, 9:14-cv-00459-DCN

United States District Court, D. South Carolina, Beaufort Division

May 13, 2022

ORDER

DAVID C. NORTON, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

The following matter is before the court on defendant Ford Motor Company's (“Ford”) motion for judgment as a matter of law, ECF No. 166.^[1] For the reasons set forth below the court denies the motion.

I. BACKGROUND

Decedent John Harley Wickersham, Jr. (“Wickersham”) was a pharmacist with a history of depression, bipolar disorder and suicidal thoughts. On February 3, 2011, during a rainstorm, Wickersham drove his 2010 Ford Escape (the “Escape”) through a Tintersection going roughly forty-two miles per hour, hit a ten-inch curb, went airborne hit the ground, and crashed into a tree forty-five feet from the road. Wickersham suffered significant facial injuries-which required multiple surgeries, including one to remove his left eye-and the loss of his ability to smell or chew food.

After his accident, Wickersham had difficulty controlling his pain, despite many visits to pain specialists, surgeons, and doctors. He also continued to suffer from depression and was voluntarily hospitalized for severe depression and suicidal thoughts on April 6, 2012. On June 6, 2012, Wickersham began receiving nerve treatments at an Emory University pain clinic. When his Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act insurance expired, Wickersham became concerned he would be unable to afford the out-of-pocket costs of treatment. Because he could not be on pain medication while working as a pharmacist, Wickersham struggled to maintain employment after his accident, causing his family a great deal of financial hardship. On July 21, 2012-almost a year and a half after his accident-Wickersham died by suicide after consuming a lethal dose of methadone.

Wickersham's widow, Crystal Wickersham (“plaintiff”), filed two separate actions against Ford-one in her individual capacity and one as personal representative of Wickersham's estate. In the action brought in her individual capacity, plaintiff alleged a loss of consortium cause of action. In the action brought in her capacity as personal representative of Wickersham's estate, plaintiff alleged wrongful death and survivorship causes of action. Both actions additionally alleged three products-liability claims based on negligence, strict liability, and breach of express warranty and the implied warranty of merchantability. The claims asserted that the airbag system in Wickersham's Escape was defective, relying upon the crashworthiness doctrine. That doctrine permits recovery for enhanced injuries caused by a car company's failure to design cars that account for the risks inherent to car crashes. See Donze v. Gen. Motors, LLC, 800 S.E.2d 479, 480-81 (S.C. 2017).

At trial, Wickersham asserted that the defective airbag caused his severe facial injuries, and that if the airbag had either not deployed in this crash or not deployed so late, he would not have suffered these injuries. Ford argued that Wickersham was out of position when the airbag deployed, and his injuries were caused when his face impacted the gearshift lever. On August 26, 2016, the jury found in plaintiff's favor as to all claims and awarded $4.65 million in damages. Specifically, the jury awarded (1) $1, 250, 000 to Wickersham's estate for Wickersham's pain and suffering between the time of the accident and the time of his death; (2) $650, 000 to plaintiff, in her individual capacity, for loss of consortium during the same time period; (3) $1, 375, 000 to Wickersham's beneficiaries for his wrongful death; and (4) $1, 375, 000 to plaintiff, in her individual capacity, for her loss of consortium following Wickersham's wrongful death. In total, the jury awarded $2.75 million in damages in connection with plaintiff's wrongful death claims and $1.9 million in damages in connection with plaintiff's survival claims. The jury also found Wickersham was thirty percent at fault for his injuries but was instructed by the court not to reduce damages on this basis.

Ford appealed the judgments to the Fourth Circuit. As relevant here, Ford argued that this court had misapprehended South Carolina law on proximate cause in wrongful death cases involving death by suicide. This court determined that plaintiff could prevail on the wrongful death claims if she proved that Ford's actions led Wickersham to take his life due to an “uncontrollable impulse”-an exception to the general rule that suicide breaks the causal chain in wrongful death claims. Essentially, this court held that

Wickersham could prevail if the injuries sustained in the accident as a result of the defective airbag caused chronic pain that led to an uncontrollable impulse to commit suicide. Ford believed this interpretation of South Carolina law to be legal error that caused this court to both improperly deny its motion for judgment as a matter of law and improperly instruct the jury. Ford additionally sought a new trial as to the remaining claims based on the prejudicial effect of evidence concerning Wickersham's death. The Fourth Circuit certified a question to the South Carolina Supreme Court on this issue:

Does South Carolina recognize an “uncontrollable impulse” exception to the general rule that suicide breaks the causal chain for wrongful death claims? If so, what is the plaintiff required to prove is foreseeable to satisfy causation under this exception-any injury, the uncontrollable impulse, or the suicide?

Wickersham v. Ford Motor Co., 738 Fed.Appx. 127, 129 (4th Cir. 2018) (“Wickersham I”).

After the South Carolina Supreme Court answered the certified question, the case returned to the Fourth Circuit. The appellate court summarized the South Carolina Supreme Court's decision as follows:

[T]here is no presumption in South Carolina that a death by suicide is unforeseeable as a matter of law. Accord [Scott v. Greenville Pharmacy, 48 S.E.2d 324, 328 (S.C. 1948)] (“Each case must be decided largely on the special facts belonging to it.”). But “[i]n cases involving wrongful death from suicide, [South Carolina] courts have consistently decided legal cause as a matter of law.” [Wickersham v. Ford Motor Co., 853 S.E.2d 329, 332 (S.C. 2020) (“Wickersham II”)]. Accordingly, the district court must first decide whether Wickersham's suicide was “unforeseeable as a matter of law.” Id. at 333. If not, “the jury must consider foreseeability” as well as causation-in-fact. Id. Wickersham v. Ford Motor Co., 997 F.3d 526, 534 (4th Cir. 2021) (“Wickersham III”).

In other words, the Fourth Circuit instructed that “not only does South Carolina law not recognize an ‘uncontrollable impulse' exception to the general rule, but also it does not apply the general rule that death by suicide precludes foreseeability as a matter of law.” Id. at 533. Instead, the South Carolina Supreme Court interpreted its past precedent to apply the state's traditional proximate cause requirements to wrongful death actions involving death by suicide. Moreover, the Fourth Circuit noted that the South Carolina Supreme Court announced one key difference from South Carolina's usual foreseeability analysis. Typically, “the plaintiff need not prove that the defendant should have contemplated the particular event which occurred. But, in cases involving wrongful death by suicide, the death by suicide must be specifically foreseeable.” Id. at 533-34 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis in original).

With the legal framework defined, the Fourth Circuit turned to its application in this case. First, it found that this court's analysis in denying Ford's Rule 50(b) motion as to plaintiff's wrongful-death action “differ[ed] in crucial respects from the proximatecause framework that the Supreme Court of South Carolina announced.” Id. at 534. Specifically, the Fourth Circuit found that this court had not applied the correct proximate cause framework of causation-in-fact and foreseeability. Id. “[A]lthough the court stated that it would consider whether Ford's conduct proximately caused Wickersham's uncontrollable impulse [to commit suicide], South Carolina law requires an analysis of whether Ford's conduct proximately caused Wickersham's death by suicide.” Id. (emphasis in original). The Fourth Circuit thus concluded that “[b]ecause the court rejected traditional proximate-cause principles and does not appear to have explicitly analyzed the foreseeability of Wickersham's death by suicide, [the Fourth Circuit] cannot be certain that the district court's analysis comports with South Carolina law.” Id. at 535.

The Fourth Circuit therefore “remand[ed] for the district court-familiar as it is with the facts and record-to reconsider its Rule 50(b) motion under the proper legal framework.” Id. at 535.

Second the Fourth Circuit considered whether this court abused its discretion in denying Ford's motion for a new trial under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a). The Fourth Circuit agreed with Ford that the erroneous jury instructions required a new trial on the wrongful death claims because the instructions permitted the jury to find Ford liable without determining the foreseeability of Wickersham's death by suicide. Id. at 535-538. Because “the instruction allowed the jury to find for Wickersham without considering the most crucial and difficult-to-establish component of proximate cause, ” the improper instruction seriously prejudiced Ford, requiring vacatur of the wrongful-death judgments. Id. at 538. The Fourth Circuit accordingly instructed that “[i]...