Donze v. Gen. Motors, LLC
| Decision Date | 17 May 2017 |
| Docket Number | Appellate Case No. 2016-001437,Opinion No. 27719 |
| Citation | 420 S.C. 8,800 S.E.2d 479 |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
| Parties | Reid Harold DONZE, Plaintiff, v. GENERAL MOTORS, LLC, Defendant. |
Ronnie L. Crosby and Austin H. Crosby, both of Peters, Murdaugh, Parker, Eltzroth & Detrick, of Hampton; Bert G. Utsey, III, of Peters, Murdaugh, Parker, Eltzroth & Detrick, of Walterboro; S. Kirkpatrick Morgan, Jr. and Charles T. Slaughter, both of Walker & Morgan, LLC, of Lexington; and Kathleen C. Barnes, of Barnes Law Firm, LLC, of Hampton, all for Plaintiff.
Joel H. Smith, Angela G. Strickland and Kevin J. Malloy, all of Bowman & Brooke, LLP, of Columbia; David G. Owen, of Law Center, of Columbia; John M. Thomas and Jill M. Wheaton, both of Dykema Gossett, of Ann Arbor, Michigan; and Michael P. Cooney, of Dykema Gossett, PLLC, of Detroit, Michigan, all for Defendants.
Henry B. Smythe, Jr. and Dana W. Lang, both of Womble Carlyle Sandridge & Rice, LLP, of Charleston, for Amicus Curiae, The Products Liability Advisory Council, Inc..
Steve A. Matthews, of Haynsworth Sinkler Boyd, PA, of Columbia; Phil Goldberg and Victor E. Schwartz, both of Shook, Hardy & Bacon, LLP, of Washington, DC, for Amicus Curiae, Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers, Inc..
CERTIFIED QUESTION
This case concerns the applicability of comparative negligence to strict liability and breach of warranty claims in a crashworthiness case brought by Plaintiff Reid Harold Donze against Defendant General Motors ("GM"). District Judge Timothy M. Cain of the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina certified two questions to this Court addressing the defenses available to a manufacturer in crashworthiness cases brought under strict liability and breach of warranty theories. We hold the defense of comparative negligence does not apply in crashworthiness cases, and that South Carolina's public policy does not bar a plaintiff, allegedly intoxicated at the time of the accident, from bringing a crashworthiness claim against the vehicle manufacturer.
In November of 2012, Donze and his friend, Allen Brazell, were driving around Greenville County in Donze's 1987 Chevrolet pickup truck. Although in dispute, there is evidence—including deposition testimony from Donze himself—indicating Brazell and Donze had been smoking synthetic marijuana earlier that morning. While Brazell was driving,1 they came to an intersection controlled by a stop sign. Brazell failed to stop and pulled directly in front of a Ford F-350 truck towing a horse trailer. Unable to stop, the Ford struck Donze's truck on the driver's side, and the truck burst into flames. Brazell died as a result of the fire, and Donze suffered severe burns to eighty percent of his body.
Donze filed this crashworthiness action against GM, alleging a defect in the truck's design—specifically, the placement of the gas tank outside of the truck's frame—caused the fire, and seeking damages only for his enhanced burn injuries.2 GM filed a motion for summary judgment arguing Donze should be barred from recovery pursuant to South Carolina's public policy against driving while impaired. In the alternative, GM asserted comparative negligence should apply to limit Donze's recovery. Judge Cain denied GM's motion and certified two questions to this Court.
When a certified question raises a novel question of law, this Court is free to answer the question "based on its assessment of which answer and reasoning would best comport with the law and public policies of the state as well as the Court's sense of law, justice, and right." Drury Dev. Corp. v. Found. Ins. Co. , 380 S.C. 97, 101, 668 S.E.2d 798, 800 (2008).
Donze argues comparative negligence is inapplicable in crashworthiness cases where the plaintiff is only seeking recovery of the enhanced injuries caused by the alleged defect. In particular, Donze asserts that in crashworthiness cases, the damages from the initial collision and those caused by the alleged design defect are divisible. In other words, according to Donze, the enhanced injuries are a subsequent and separate event, the sole cause of which is the manufacturer's defective design. Therefore, any negligence on the part of the plaintiff in causing the initial collision is irrelevant. We agree for the reasons set forth below, and therefore answer this first certified question, "no."
This Court first adopted the crashworthiness doctrine in Mickle v. Blackmon , 252 S.C. 202, 243, 166 S.E.2d 173, 192 (1969). In Mickle we recognized the high frequency of roadway accidents is common knowledge such that "an automobile manufacturer knows with certainty that many users of his product will be involved in collisions, and that the incidence and extent of injury to them will frequently be determined by the placement, design and construction of [the vehicle's] components...." 252 S.C. at 230, 166 S.E.2d at 185. Therefore, we held vehicle manufacturers have a duty "to take reasonable precautions in the light of the known risks, balancing the likelihood of harm, and the gravity of harm if it should happen, against the burden of feasible precautions which would tend to avoid or minimize the harm." Id. at 243, 166 S.E.2d at 192.
Although South Carolina has not yet addressed whether comparative negligence may be raised as a defense in crashworthiness cases, a number of other jurisdictions have considered this question and reached differing results. We are aware of twenty-two states which have resolved this issue either statutorily or through case law. Of those, sixteen states permit a comparative fault analysis to reduce a plaintiff's recovery in crashworthiness cases and six do not.3
Most states espousing the majority view have statutes which require application of comparative fault analysis in all personal injury actions, regardless of the cause of action or the theory of liability under which they are brought. See, e.g. , Fla. Stat. Ann. § 768.81 (); Bishop v. Tariq, Inc. , 384 S.W.3d 659, 663–64 (Ark. Ct. App. 2011) (citing Ark. Code Ann. § 16-64-122 (West 2016) ) ( the comparative fault defense would be available in enhanced injury cases because Arkansas's comparative-fault statute "provides that, in all actions for personal injuries or wrongful death in which recovery is predicated on fault , liability shall be determined by comparing the fault chargeable to a claiming party with the fault chargeable to the party from whom he seeks to recover," where fault is defined "to include[ ] any act, omission, conduct, risk assumed, breach of warranty, or breach of any legal duty which is a proximate cause of any damages sustained by any party" (emphasis in original)); Meekins , 699 A.2d at 344–45 ().
However, some state courts have themselves extended comparative fault principles to crashworthiness claims. For example, the Supreme Court of California held in Daly v. General Motors Corporation that comparative negligence principles apply in strict products liability actions such that evidence of a plaintiff's intoxicated misuse of a vehicle was admissible in a crashworthiness case. 20 Cal.3d 725, 731–38, 144 Cal.Rptr. 380, 575 P.2d 1162 (1978). Specifically, the court reasoned that the policies supporting strict liability—permitting claimants to recover without having to prove a specific act of negligence on the part of the manufacturer and incentivizing the safe and responsible design and manufacturing of goods—would not be thwarted by the application of comparative principles, and that the evolving nature of tort law requires "new remedies [to be] judicially created, and old defenses judicially merged," in order to achieve equitable results. Id. at 736–38, 144 Cal.Rptr. 380, 575 P.2d 1162. The Supreme Court of Tennessee has also held a comparative fault analysis applies in strict products liability actions, including crashworthiness claims. Whitehead v. Toyota Motor Corp. , 897 S.W.2d 684, 693, 694 (Tenn. 1995). In particular, the court held "[t]he respective fault of the manufacturer and of the consumer should be compared with each other with respect to all damages and injuries for which the fault of each is a cause in fact and a proximate cause." Id. at 694.
On the other hand, a minority of states have declined to recognize comparative negligence as a defense in strict liability crashworthiness cases. In some states the legislature resolved the question. See, e.g. , Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-2509 (); Shipler , 710 N.W.2d at 829–30 (). Still other jurisdictions, including Nevada, New Jersey, and the District Court for the District of South Carolina, have...
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