Wiechman v. Huddleston

• Decision Date: 15 April 2016
• Docket Number: No. 110,656.,110,656.
• Citation: 370 P.3d 1194
• Parties: Byron T. WIECHMAN, Appellee, v. Mark HUDDLESTON, Appellant.
• Court: Kansas Supreme Court

370 P.3d 1194

Byron T. WIECHMAN, Appellee,
v.
Mark HUDDLESTON, Appellant.

No. 110,656.

Supreme Court of Kansas.

April 15, 2016.

Stanford J. Smith, Jr., of Martin, Pringle, Oliver, Wallace & Bauer, L.L.P., of Wichita, argued the cause, and Teresa L. Adams, of the same firm, was with him on the briefs for appellant.

Ron D. Beal, of Lenexa, argued the cause, and Robert D. Wiechman, Jr., of Wichita, was with him on the brief for appellee.

The opinion of the court was delivered by BILES, J.:

This is an interlocutory appeal challenging a district court's decision to set aside a dismissal order in a personal injury lawsuit more than 4 years after that order was entered and the case was closed. The

370 P.3d 1196

threshold question is whether a common-law exception to our statutory jurisdictional requirements remains valid, giving us the ability to decide this question. See Brown v. Fitzpatrick, 224 Kan. 636, 585 P.2d 987 (1978). The Court of Appeals dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction, determining Brown was no longer viable in light of more recent caselaw from this court. Wiechman v. Huddleston, No. 110,656, 2014 WL 4996205, at *5 (Kan.App.2014) (unpublished opinion).

We agree with the panel and overrule Brown to the extent it endorsed a judicially created appeal right in a civil case outside of those created by statute. See Board of Sedgwick County Comm'rs v. City of Park City, 293 Kan. 107, 111, 260 P.3d 387 (2011) (holding in a civil case that appellate courts have no authority to fashion equitable exceptions to statutory limitations on appellate jurisdiction). This appeal must be dismissed because it was not brought in accordance with the statute governing interlocutory appeals. See K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 60–2102(c) ; see also Supreme Court Rule 4.01 (2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 29).

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This litigation began in September 2007, when Byron Wiechman sued Mark Huddleston for negligence after sustaining injuries in a September 2005 car accident. Huddleston's insurer paid Wiechman's insurer $7,135.15 for reimbursement of Personal Injury Protection (PIP) benefits. In March 2008, Huddleston's insurer, through its third party administrator, Claims Professionals Inc., sent a letter stating "today wherein we agreed to extend out insured's policy limit of $25,000 to you on behalf of your client." The letter also indicated a release for all claims against Huddleston was enclosed, and "[u]pon receipt of the properly executed release, we will issue payment in the amount of $25,000 and consider this matter resolved."

In August 2008, Wiechman's attorney accepted the $25,000 offer and returned the completed release of claims form. In September, Wiechman's attorney notified the district court the case had settled. Nothing additional occurred in the case file until the court dismissed the litigation for lack of prosecution in December 2008.

More than 4 years later, Wiechman filed a motion to set aside the dismissal order. He alleged that although he had accepted the settlement offer, he never received payment. He also filed a separate contract lawsuit alleging breach of the settlement agreement. These disputes were not consolidated and have been on separate tracks through the judicial system.

On the motion to reinstate the original negligence action, the parties disputed whether the district court had jurisdiction to set aside the 2008 dismissal order. K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 60–260(b), which is the applicable statute, gives district courts discretion to relieve a party from a final judgment for the following reasons:

"(1) Mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect;

"(2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under subsection (b) of K.S.A. 60–259, and amendments thereto;

"(3) fraud, whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic, misrepresentation or misconduct by an opposing party;

"(4) the judgment is void;

"(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released or discharged; it is based on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or applying it prospectively is no longer equitable; or

"(6) any other reason that justifies relief." K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 60–260(b).

Different time limitations apply depending on the reason invoked. A motion under subsection (b) must be made within a reasonable time, but for reasons under paragraphs (b)(1), (2), and (3) a movant must bring the motion no more than 1 year after the entry of the judgment or order or the date of the proceeding. See K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 60–260(c).

At the motion hearing, Huddleston argued Wiechman's claim fit within paragraph (b)(1) or (3), so he asserted the motion was untimely because it was not filed within 1 year of

370 P.3d 1197

dismissal. But Wiechman argued the motion was governed by paragraph (b)(6), which was not subject to the 1–year limitations period. When asked by the court why the effort to reopen the lawsuit was not filed sooner, counsel acknowledged: "I probably should have filed it earlier but, you know, I thought we could get something worked out."

At the conclusion of the hearing, the district court granted Wiechman's motion to set aside the dismissal. But in doing so, it did not address K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 60–260 or whether the 4–year delay in bringing the motion was reasonable. Instead, the court focused on what it saw as the insurer's unfairness in not paying the settlement.

Later, at a hearing on a motion to reconsider, the district court reaffirmed its decision to set aside the 4–year–old dismissal order. Ruling from the bench, the district court suggested it was unnecessary to analyze the motion under the requirements of K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 60–260(b) because the dismissal order was administrative in nature, apparently because it was based on a lack of prosecution. The district court held Wiechman had established "good cause" for setting aside the dismissal because he reasonably relied on the insurer's documents and phone conversations when his attorney told the court the case had settled. The district court again did not discuss whether the 4–year delay was reasonable.

Huddleston filed this interlocutory appeal, arguing the district court lacked jurisdiction to set aside the dismissal order because Wiechman's motion was untimely under K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 60–260(c). Huddleston did not seek certification for his interlocutory appeal under K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 60–2102(c) and Supreme Court Rule 4.01 (2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 29). Instead, he argued a common-law jurisdictional exception permitted an appeal from an order setting aside a final judgment, citing Brown.

In dismissing the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals acknowledged the jurisdictional exception recognized in Brown would arguably apply but questioned whether Brown was still good law. Wiechman, 2014 WL 4996205, at *4. Citing our reasoning in Park City, the panel held that judicially created exceptions conferring appellate jurisdiction absent statutory authority were no longer valid. Wiechman, 2014 WL 4996205, at *5.

Huddleston petitioned for this court's review, which was granted. See K.S.A. 20–3018(b). Jurisdiction is proper under K.S.A. 60–2101(b) (review of Court of Appeals decisions).

MOOTNESS

At the outset, we must consider a suggestion made for the first time during oral argument by Wiechman's counsel that this appeal has become moot because he prevailed in the separate breach of contract lawsuit after the district court reinstated...