Wiedemer v. People, 88SA384
| Decision Date | 04 December 1989 |
| Docket Number | No. 88SA384,88SA384 |
| Parties | Gary L. WIEDEMER, Petitioner-Appellant, v. The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Respondent-Appellee. |
| Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
Gary L. Wiedemer, Denver, pro se.
Duane Woodard, Atty. Gen., Charles B. Howe, Chief Deputy Atty. Gen., Richard H. Forman, Sol. Gen., John Milton Hutchins, First Asst. Atty. Gen., and Terrence A. Gillespie, Asst. Atty. Gen., Human Resources Section, Denver, for respondent-appellee.
This is an appeal of a denial of a petition for writ of habeas corpus and we have jurisdiction pursuant to section 13-4-102(1)(e), 6A C.R.S. (1987). The appellant, Gary L. Wiedemer, seeks his unconditional release from the custody of the Department of Corrections (the Department). First, Wiedemer argues that his good time and earned time credits are irrevocable and thus preclude his reincarceration for a parole violation. Second, Wiedemer claims that he should have been discharged because he did not receive an answer to his petition for writ of habeas corpus within the twenty days required by statute. Third, Wiedemer claims that he should have been credited with prehearing time served prior to the revocation of his parole. We rejected Wiedemer's first argument in a companion case to this case, Bynum v. Kautzky, 784 P.2d 735 (Colo.1989). We also reject Wiedemer's other arguments and affirm the decision of the district court.
On October 10, 1985, Wiedemer was sentenced to a term of four years in the custody of the Colorado Department of Corrections, plus a period of parole, following his plea of guilty to the unlawful distribution, manufacturing, dispensing, sale or possession of a Schedule 5 controlled substance, a class 5 felony, committed on November 21, 1984. On July 10, 1987, Wiedemer was paroled for a period of three years. On January 21, 1988, he was arrested and charged with third-degree burglary. Bond was set at $7,500 and a parole hold placed on him in the Denver County Jail. On January 28, 1988, Wiedemer was charged on a parole revocation complaint with the violation of a condition of his parole, based on the underlying criminal offense of burglary. On February 25, 1988, a hearing was held on the revocation complaint and Wiedemer was found guilty of violating the conditions of his parole. The parole was revoked for a period of one year. On May 2, 1988, Wiedemer was ordered re-paroled effective August 25, 1988, to the Denver detainer for a period of three years. Wiedemer remains on parole. However, he apparently is being held in Denver County Jail on pending charges.
Wiedemer filed his petition for writ of habeas corpus on July 6, 1988, claiming that his reincarceration for violating his parole was illegal. On July 20, 1988, Wiedemer filed a motion seeking credit for time served between his arrest on January 21, 1988, and the revocation of his parole on February 25, 1988. The district court consolidated that motion with the petition for writ of habeas corpus and denied both on August 10, 1988. Wiedemer appealed both decisions.
Wiedemer claims that the district court should have granted his petition for writ of habeas corpus for several reasons. First, he argues that by their plain meaning the statutes governing parole and sentencing preclude the reincarceration of an inmate whose time actually served, together with vested good time and earned time credits, equals the sentence originally imposed. We considered and rejected that argument in Bynum v. Kautzky, which is dispositive of Wiedemer's first claim.
Wiedemer also claims that he should have been discharged because he did not receive a timely return to his petition for a writ of habeas corpus within twenty days as required by section 13-45-101(2), 6A C.R.S. (1987). However, Wiedemer misunderstands the return requirement of section 13-45-101(2). The "return" referred to in that section is the return of the writ, not the return of the petition for the writ. People v. Calyer, 736 P.2d 1204, 1206 (Colo.1987). That provision is only applicable if the court issues the writ. Section 13-45-101(1) requires the court to issue the writ unless the petition or supporting documents indicate that no relief is available. Id. Here, the court did not issue the writ, thus Wiedemer had no right to a return of the writ.
Wiedemer also alleges that the trial court should...
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Jones v. Martinez, 89SA406
...as such credits "vest" only for the purpose of determining parole eligibility. Id. at 739. Bynum was reaffirmed in Wiedemer v. People, 784 P.2d 739, 740 (Colo.1989). In Williamson v. Jordan, 797 P.2d 744 (Colo.1990), this court again determined the accumulation of good time and earned time ......
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Grenemyer v. Gunter
...See also Jones v. Martinez, 799 P.2d 385, 387-88 (Colo.1990); Williamson v. Jordan, 797 P.2d 744, 747-48 (Colo.1990); Wiedemer v. People, 784 P.2d 739, 740 (Colo.1989). Petitioner contends that application of these decisions to him violates the Due Process Clause of the United States The Ex......
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People v. Norton
...based its reasoning on the "interplay" between section 18-1.3-405 and section 17-22.5-203 and this court's decision in Wiedemer v. People, 784 P.2d 739 (Colo.1989). Norton, 49 P.3d at 346. The court determined that section 17-22.5-203, as interpreted and applied by this court in Wiedemer, r......
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Chitwood v. Davis
...However, he could have sought review of the Chaffee County District Court order in the Colorado Supreme Court. See Widemerv. People, 784 P.2d 739 (Colo. 1989) (reviewing district court denial of a habeas corpus petition). But Mr. Chitwood did not seek review of the Chaffee County District C......