Wierman v. Tunnell
Decision Date | 01 December 1941 |
Docket Number | 14979. |
Parties | WIERMAN et al. v. TUNNELL et al. |
Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
Rehearing Denied Jan. 5, 1942.
In Department.
Error to District Court, City and County of Denver; George F Dunklee, Judge.
Proceeding for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act by Roy J. Tunnell, employee, opposed by H. L. Wierman and another, co-partners doing business as the Summit Grain Company, employers, and the Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Company, insurance carrier. To review a judgment affirming an award of compensation by the Industrial Commission, the employers and insurance carrier bring error.
Judgment affirmed in part, and cause remanded, with directions as to amount to be awarded.
Lowell White and William K. Ris, both of Denver for plaintiffs in error.
Gail L Ireland, Atty. Gen., H. Lawrence Hinkley, Deputy Atty. Gen., and Morry M. Sterling, Asst. Atty. Gen., for defendant in error Industrial Commission of Colorado.
Lansford F. Butler, of Denver, for defendant in error Roy J. Tunnell.
Roy J Tunnell, defendant in error, presented a claim for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act, for personal injuries resulting from an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment June 10, 1938. Upon the date mentioned he was struck by some sacks of grain which fell from a handtruck used in his employer's warehouse. Thereafter he was in a hospital for about 18 days, where 'head traction' was immediately applied, followed by the installation of a cast. X-ray plates disclosed 'a small spicule of bone fractured off the anterior superior surface of the body of the seventh cervical vertebra.' After approximately ninety days he returned to work for the same employer. Early in July, 1940, the employer's warehouse was destroyed by fire, and, this part of its business being discontinued, claimant was discharged. A few days later he obtained employment at the Eagle Flour Mills in Denver. In November, 1938, he filed a claim for compensation with the Industrial Commission, describing his disability as a 'stiff neck and sleepiness in one foot and both hands.' At the subsequent hearing the evidence disclosed no permanent disability, but did show that he, as a working unit, had an industrial disability of five per cent, and that this disability would not continue beyond six or twelve months. The commission's award, December 5, 1938, upon which no petition for review was filed, allowed claimant's medical and hospital bills and compensation for total temporary disability up to the day of his return to work, plus temporary partial disability for one week thereafter. October 7, 1940, upon petition of claimant, the commission ordered the case reopened for the purpose of determining whether or not there was a changed condition in claimant's disability. After a full hearing, in which five medical experts testified as to his condition, the commission, November 30, 1940, found that, Upon this finding the commission awarded claimant $773.50 for permanent partial disability, to be paid at the rate of $12.50 per week. The trial court affirmed the award.
While counsel for plaintiffs in error set out 24 specification of points, only five grounds for reversal are urged in their brief. These are as follows:
'3. That it is clear that the claimant was not in November 1940 disabled in any wise as a result of the accident of June 10, 1938, and that
'4. The claimant has not sustained his burden of proving that the alleged injuries and disabilities now claimed were proximately caused by the accident and injury of June 1938, and that
Counsel for plaintiffs in error vigorously contend that there is no competent evidence showing a change in claimant's physical condition between November, 1938, and November, 1940, such as to satisfy the requirements of section 389, chapter 97, '35 C.S.A., and therefore, in granting the award here under consideration, the commission exceeded its powers. A careful perusal of the entire record leads us to a different conclusion. A portion of claimant's testimony given at a hearing November 18, 1940, is as follows:
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