Wiggins v. Williams

• Decision Date: 04 January 1896
• Parties: WIGGINS et al. v. WILLIAMS.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

18 So. 859

36 Fla. 637

WIGGINS et al. v. WILLIAMS.

Florida Supreme Court

January 4, 1896

Appeal from circuit court, Suwannee county; John F. White, Judge.

Bill by Robert Williams against Wiggins & Johnson. From decrees for plaintiff, defendants appeal. Affirmed in part, and in part reversed.

Syllabus by the Court

SYLLABUS

1. Where several interlocutory orders are made in a case, and only certain ones specified are appealed from, the appellate court will be confined to the orders mentioned in the appeal.

2. Constitutional provisions similar to that contained in the third section of the bill of rights of our constitution were designed to preserve and guaranty the right of trial by jury in proceedings according to the course of the common law as known and practiced at the time of the adoption of the constitution.

3. The guaranty of the right of trial by jury was intended to provide for the future as well as the past, and to secure the right of such trial in all cases, whether then or thereafter arising, which would properly fall within those classes of rights to which by the course of the common law the trial by jury was secured.

4. The legislature may create new rights unknown to the common-law procedure of trial by jury, and may organize new tribunals without common-law powers to adjudicate such rights without a jury, but a mere change in the form of an action will not authorize the submission of common-law rights in the trial of which, according to the course of the common law, a jury was employed, to a court in which no provision is made to secure a jury trial.

5. Courts of chancery are not strictly courts according to the course of the common law, and the constitutional guaranty of trial by jury has no reference to such courts in their recognized sphere of equity jurisdiction, nor does such guaranty extend to all cases at law, as there are proceedings in many inferior courts and many summary proceedings in nisi prius courts in which a jury was never employed.

6. Prior to the enactment of chapter 3884, Acts 1889, the court of chancery in this state had no jurisdiction to enjoin a mere trespass upon land, and the boxing and scraping the trees thereon for the purpose of making turpentine, or the removal of turpentine therefrom, where no other element of irreparable injury or recognized ground of equity jurisdiction was alleged.

7. Prior to the adoption of our first constitution, in 1839 securing and continuing the right of trial by jury, the court of chancery in this state did not exercise jurisdiction to enjoin the mere cutting and removal of the ordinary growth on timbered lands; but, in order to give the court jurisdiction in such cases, it had to be further shown that the injury was irreparable in the sense that full and adequate relief could not be obtained at law, or that the trespass went to the destruction of the property in the character in which it had been enjoyed, or that it was necessary to prevent a multiplicity of suits.

COUNSEL

B. B. Blackwell, for appellants.

J. L Frazee and M. E. Broome, for appellee.

A bill in chancery filed in this case by appellee against appellants alleges, in substance, that the complainant and one Robert T. Hall, prior to the 20th day of September, 1890, were engaged in the business of producing and manufacturing naval stores, resin, and spirits of turpentine in Suwannee county, and became indebted to their commission merchants, Ellis, Young & Co., in a sum of money which they could not at the time pay, and, in order to pay and fully settle said indebtedness, conveyed to said Ellis Young & Co. the interest of complainant and Hall in certain lands that were boxed for turpentine purposes. The interest conveyed, it is alleged, was the yield of turpentine from the boxed trees on the lands, situated in said county and described in the bill, and containing about 100,000 boxes. It is averred that Hall was settled with and went out of the business, and that the settlement with Ellis, Young & Co. left the other turpentine lands and business of complainant unincumbered on account of any indebtedness to Ellis, Young & Co. or other parties in Savannab with whom complainant and Hall had traded; that, after the settlement with Ellis, Young & Co., which was on the 20th of September, 1890, complainant had, among lands boxed for turpentine, certain lands the trees on which had lately been boxed,--called 'virgin dips,'--containing about 4 1/2 crops, of 10,000 boxes to the crop; the lands containing the 4 1/2 crops being described in the bill. It is further alleged that complainant was the lessee of the turpentine timber and sole owner of the property described; that Ellis, Young & Co. sold and conveyed their said interest acquired from complainant and Hall to the defendants about the 20th of September, 1890, and a few days thereafter they entered upon, took possession of, and worked the 4 1/2 crops belonging to complainant, and had gathered the turpentine from the boxed trees thereon, carried it off the land, and appropriated it to their own use, and that they had continued to do so to the commencement of the suit; also that they had been distilling the turpentine into resin and spirits, with other turpentine from their own trees, and claim the whole as their own, and that they did so after being forbidden by complainant, and after they knew that they were not the boxed trees purchased from Ellis, Young & Co.; that defendants may claim that their purchase from Ellis, Young & Co. contains the land in section 32, which is true; but the same is township 3, range 11 S. and E., and not in section 32, township 2, range 11 S. and E., which contains the new boxes of complainant. The bill alleges the yield of the 4 1/2 crops, and states the value of the spirits and resin at $900 each dripping, and that the drippings should have commenced on the 20th of September, 1890, the boxes being then full, and continued monthly thereafter. It is further claimed that defendants should account to complainant for the turpentine so wrongfully taken from his crops, and that they should be enjoined from interfering with his turpentine lands. It is also stated on the belief of complainant that defendants had no property in the county except what they procured from Ellis, Young & Co., and their stock, fixtures, and what spirits and resin they had on hand gathered from their own and complainant's said crops. The prayer of the bill is for an injunction, an account, and for process. A demurrer to the bill was overruled.

The answer filed by defendants admits that complainant and Hall were engaged in the business stated; that they became indebted to Ellis, Young & Co., and, in order to settle with them, conveyed the property as alleged in the bill, upon which there were about 100,000 turpentine boxes. It is alleged that the property alleged to have been conveyed to Ellis, Young & Co. was not the only property sold and conveyed to them; but complainant and Hall failed in business, and conveyed their entire turpentine interest as copartners, consisting of turpentine still, wagons, mules, and all utensils and equipments belonging to said turpentine business, to Ellis, Young & Co., the purpose and intent of complainant and Hall being to surrender, without reservation, their entire copartnership interest in said business to Ellis, Young & Co.; that complainant and Hall, having become greatly indebted and insolvent, and being desirous of settling their indebtedness, transferred to Ellis, Young & Co. their entire turpentine interest, and by said transfer made a full settlement of their copartnership indebtedness to Ellis, Young & Co. Further, that it was not true that complainant was the owner of the property which he claims in his bill; that the land was held by lease by the firm composed of complainant and Hall, and the trees thereon had been boxed for turpentine purposes, and worked by them in their turpentine business, together with all the balance of their turpentine farm, which they conveyed to Ellis, Young & Co. in settlement of said indebtedness to them; and that it was the purpose and intent of complainant and Hall to convey their entire interest in the land to which complainant lays claim, and that said land was left out of the deed to Ellis, Young & Co. through inadvertence on the part of complainant; that complainant furnished the description of the property contained in the deed to Ellis, Young & Co., and his purpose and intent was to give a full and complete description of all property owned by him and Hall as partners, whether held in fee or by lease for years, and that when such description was given complainant represented that it embraced the entire copartnership property of himself and Hall. It is then alleged that defendants purchased the same property from Ellis, Young & Co., believing at the time, from representations of complainant, that they were purchasing the entire turpentine farm which had been owned and worked by complainant and Hall; and defendants allege that complainant himself believed at the time that the land which he now claims was described in the deed to Ellis, Young & Co.; that discovering, some time afterwards, the omission of the land from the description in the said deed, he set up a pretense that he had not conveyed it and still had title to the same; that said pretense and claim on the part of complainant were a fraud upon the rights of defendants, as they were led to believe by complainant and Hall that said land was conveyed to Ellis, Young & Co., and that they (defendants) had acquired by their said purchase the entire turpentine farm aforesaid. Also, that the purchase from Ellis, Young & Co. by defendants comprised the same property sold to them by complainant and Hall,...