Wigginton v. Com. ex rel. Caldwell, 87-CA-1851-DG

Citation760 S.W.2d 885
Decision Date04 November 1988
Docket NumberNo. 87-CA-1851-DG,87-CA-1851-DG
PartiesJohn S. WIGGINTON, Appellant, v. COMMONWEALTH of Kentucky ex rel. Dorothy CALDWELL, Appellee.
CourtCourt of Appeals of Kentucky

John A. McCrea, Louisville, for appellant.

Frederic J. Cowan, Atty. Gen., Frankfort, Sharon Whitaker, Rhonda Karen Richardson, Amy Garon Benovitz, Asst. Attys. Gen., Louisville, for appellee.

Before CLAYTON and WEST, JJ., and DUNN, Special Judge.

WEST, Judge.

This paternity action appears before this Court upon our grant of a motion for discretionary review. In allowing the motion, we limited review to two questions: (1) whether the trial court erred in ruling that appellant did not plead the defense of laches and (2) whether laches is a defense to an award of child support dating back to the 1971 date of birth, when the action was not brought until 1984.

On December 10, 1984, Dorothy Caldwell instituted this action alleging that John Wigginton was the father of an infant born out of wedlock on February 1, 1971. Appellant answered, denying all allegations and pleading "the Statute of Limitations has run on the plaintiff's claim and/or laches bars further action on this claim." Subsequently, appellant admitted he was the father of the child named in the complaint and signed an agreed judgment and order to pay $35.00 per week commencing in March 1986 until the child reaches majority. Thereafter, the appellee, through the County Attorney's Office, moved for a determination of arrearages from the child's date of birth.

Following a hearing, the court ordered arrearages from the date of birth to be paid at a rate of $35.00 per week in the total sum of $21,327.00. [$1,717.00 in arrearages to CHR, $19,610.00 in arrearages to the mother.] At that hearing, counsel for appellant argued:

"... she's entitled to something, but certainly not entitled to arrearages all the way back. She took no action for a period of ten years...."

Mr. Wigginton appealed from the order of arrearages to the Jefferson Circuit Court which affirmed by opinion and order of July 29, 1987. On appeal, that court stated that Mr. Wigginton failed to affirmatively plead laches in the trial court and thus, was barred from raising that defense for the first time on appeal. As we have previously stated, laches was affirmatively set forth in appellant's answer and, we believe, also sufficiently raised as a defense at the hearing. For that reason, the circuit court's ruling was erroneous. However, we must then determine whether laches is a valid defense to the court ordered arrearages.

As appellant has pointed out, the legislature has resolved this question in regard to cases decided after July 15, 1986, by the passage of KRS 406.031. That statute reads:

The determination of paternity under the provisions of KRS 406.021(1) shall be commenced within eighteen (18) years after the birth, miscarriage or stillbirth of a child. However, in such cases, liability for child support shall not predate the initiation of action taken to determine paternity ... if the action is taken four (4) years or more from the date of birth. (Emphasis added.)

Pursuant to the prior statute, held unconstitutional in May, 1986, appellee's paternity action would have been entirely barred by the four-year limitations period. Pursuant to the new statute, appellant would likewise not be liable for support prior to the initiation of the paternity action. The district court judgment awarding arrearages, however, was rendered during the two-month interim. The circuit court's opinion was entered after the new legislation became effective, but held KRS 406.031 could not be retroactively applied unless expressly provided for in the statute or unless there is clear legislative intent favoring retroactive application. KRS 446.080(3). As that is also the general policy expressed in case law on the issue, we have no problem with the court's decision to not apply KRS 406.031 retroactively.

However, the enactment of that statute does provide guidance in that it clearly evinces a legislative intent to limit liability for past...

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14 cases
  • Loomis, In re
    • United States
    • South Dakota Supreme Court
    • November 18, 1998
    ...the present case, the mother told the father the child was his while she was still pregnant. Id. at 428; see also Wigginton v. Commonwealth, 760 S.W.2d 885 (Ky.App.1988) (holding that a claim for support arrearages was barred by laches because a mother did not bring a paternity action for f......
  • Kuprion v. Fitzgerald
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky
    • November 23, 1994
    ... ... Cf. Commonwealth, ex rel Armstrong v. Collins, Ky., 709 S.W.2d 437 (1986); Smith v. Kentucky State Racing Com'n, Ky.App., 697 S.W.2d 153 (1985). "Since the budget is ... Appeals most recently applied this principle in Wigginton v ... Page 690 ... Com. Ex. Rel Caldwell, Ky.App., ... ...
  • Wood v. Wingfield, s. 89-SC-935-D
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky
    • June 6, 1991
    ...disadvantage, injury or change of position, laches presents no bar to enforcement of Wood's rights, Wigginton v. Commonwealth ex rel. Caldwell, Ky.App., 760 S.W.2d 885 (1988). Wingfield complains of several other trial errors, which were either insufficient to justify reversal of the verdic......
  • Rosenbalm v. Commercial Bank of Middlesboro, s. 90-CA-002546-M
    • United States
    • Kentucky Court of Appeals
    • May 29, 1992
    ...disadvantage or a change of position to the other party, will bar enforcement of that claimant's rights. Wigginton v. Commonwealth ex rel. Caldwell, Ky.App., 760 S.W.2d 885, 887 (1988). In the context of taxpayers' ... even though the governing authorities of a city, town, county, or other ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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