Wight v. Wight

• Decision Date: 05 July 1930
• Citation: 272 Mass. 154,172 N.E. 335
• Parties: WIGHT v. WIGHT.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

272 Mass. 154

172 N.E. 335

WIGHT

v.WIGHT.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Middlesex.

July 5, 1930.

Appeal and Report from Probate Court, Middlesex County; Joseph R. McCoole, Judge.

Libel for devorce by Izola F. Wight against Arthur B. Wight. From a decree of the probate court dismissing the libel, the libelant appeals, and case was reported.

Reversed.

M. Jenckes, of Boston, and D. D. Swain, of Cambridge, for appellant.

D. B. Jefferson, of Boston, for appellee.

RUGG, C. J.

This libel for divorce comes before us on appeal from a decree entered in a probate court dismissing the libel. A finding of material facts was filed. It appears that prior to the filing of the present libel the libellant had filed a libel in another probate court in this Commonwealth setting out the same cause for divorce. No contention is made as to the identity of the parties, the identity of the cause for divorce, or the jurisdiction of the court. That libel was dismissed by the court pursuant to a petition signed by the libelant stating that she desired that her libel be dismissed, to which was appended an assenting statement signed by the libellee. There was no hearing on the merits of the prior libel; the petition for its dismissal was mailed to the register of probate and neither libellant nor libellee ever appeared personally or by counsel before the court. There was no recital in the decree dismissing that libel to the effect that it was so dismissed without hearing, or by consent, or without prejudice, or in any other manner indicating that there was no adjudication on the merits. The trial judge ruled that the decree dismissing the prior libel was a bar to the maintenance of the pending libel and entered a decree dismissing it on that ground. The question for decision is whether this was erroneous in law.

It is plain that the former libel was not dismissed after a hearing, or on its merits, or after an adjudication by any judge upon the issues thereby raised. The proceeding in each case was in a probate court. Under the present statutes the course of proceedings in divorce, unless otherwise specifically prescribed, may conform to that in ecclesiastical courts or in courts of equity. As a practical matter it is usually in accord with equity practice. Drew v. Drew, 250 Mass. 41, 43, 144 N. E. 763, and cases cited. G. L. c. 208 § 33; St. 1922, c. 532, § 7; Field v. Field, 264 Mass. 549, 163 N. E. 177. In effect the libellee contends that the decree of dismissal in the earlier libel is a bar to the maintenance of the present libel on the ground of res judicata. That doctrine has been frequently stated. Although variously phrased, in sustance it is that an adjudication on the merits in an earlier action, suit or proceeding is a bar as to every issue which in fact was or in law might have been litigated to a later action, suit or proceeding upon the same cause between the same parties. The dismissal of an action at law has come to signify in many instances that it is not a decision on the merits. That is commonly expressed by judgment for one party or the other. Farnum v. Brady (Mass.) 168 N. E. 165, and cases cited. Hall v. Maloney (Mass.) 168 N. E. 724;Guild v. Cohen (Mass.) 168 N. E. 725. Dismissal frequently has the same meaning in equity. Donovan v. Danielson, 263 Mass. 419, 161 N. E. 807. The entry of a decree of bill dismissed in equity often and perhaps prima facie means a decision on the merits. Foote v. Gibbs, 1 Gray, 412;Corbett v. Craven, 193 Mass. 30, 35, 78 N. E. 748. That is true also of decree dismissing a libel for divorce. Thurston v. Thurston, 99 Mass. 39;Roach v. Roach, 190 Mass. 253, 76 N. E. 651. But that is not an inflexible and unyielding rule of law to be followed in the face of facts where its application would work a manifest injustice and would be contrary to the underlying principle on which the doctrine of res judicata rests. That principle is that it is in the interests of the public and of the parties that a case once tried should be treated as settled and not further litigated. It may apply to judgments and decrees entered on a default. But it does not apply where there has been no trial and no final adjudication. It is open...