Wightman v. Springfield Terminal Ry. Co., Civ. A. No. 95-11143-RGS.

Decision Date16 February 1996
Docket NumberCiv. A. No. 95-11143-RGS.
Citation915 F. Supp. 503
PartiesDouglas T. WIGHTMAN, et al. v. SPRINGFIELD TERMINAL RAILWAY COMPANY, United Transportation Union.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts

Shelley B. Kroll, Segal, Roitman & Coleman, Boston, MA, Harold A. Ross, Ross & Kraushaar, Cleveland, OH, Michael S. Wolly, Zwerdling, Paul, Leibig, Kahn, Thompson & Wolly, P.C., Washington, DC, for Plaintiffs.

John R. Nadolny, North Billerica, MA, Springfield Terminal Railway Company.

James F. Freeley, III, Freeley & Freeley, Boston, MA, Norton N. Newborn, Cleveland, OH, for United Transportation Union.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

STEARNS, District Judge.

The Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers (BLE) and four of its members, Douglas Wightman, John Pollock, Daniel Barnett, and James Adams, brought this Complaint against a sister union, the United Transportation Union (UTU) and the unions' mutual employer, Springfield Terminal Railway Company. The Complaint alleges that Article 21 of an April 2, 1995 collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between the UTU and Springfield Terminal violates four provisions of the Railway Labor Act (RLA), 45 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. The BLE represents workers employed as engineers by Springfield Terminal, while the UTU represents the train service craft which includes conductors, brakemen and trainmen. Both defendants have filed motions for summary judgment.1 Plaintiffs, in part, oppose the motion.2

The undisputed material facts are as follows. Under the RLA, Springfield Terminal is a "carrier" and the BLE and the UTU are qualified organized labor representatives. As a condition of employment, workers at Springfield Terminal must be members of a national labor organization recognized by the RLA. Under Section 2 Eleventh (c) of the RLA (45 U.S.C. § 152) membership in either the BLE or UTU satisfies this requirement.

On April 2, 1995, Springfield Terminal and the UTU entered into a new CBA. Under Article 21 of that agreement,3 employees working as engineers can pay dues either to the BLE, or to the UTU, or both. Engineers who pay the UTU's seniority maintenance fee (dues) continue to accrue seniority in the train service craft. Those who refuse forfeit any train service seniority accrued prior to their promotion to an engineer's position.

During negotiations with Springfield Terminal, the BLE was offered a seniority maintenance agreement similar to Article 21. The BLE rejected it.4 On March 23, 1995, the BLE entered into a CBA with Springfield Terminal which contained a sideletter agreement allowing the BLE to continue to negotiate the seniority maintenance issue. The BLE contends that Article 21 of the UTU's agreement will inevitably deplete the ranks of BLE members and that to remain viable it will be forced to either raise the dues of its remaining members or to negotiate a seniority maintenance fee of its own with Springfield Terminal. Since the implementation of Article 21, two members of the BLE have resigned and joined the UTU.5

In Count III, plaintiffs contend that Article 21 violates Section 2 Eleventh (c) of the RLA. Subsection (c) is dependent on subsections (a) and (b) which authorize a carrier and labor organization:

(a) to make agreements, requiring, as a condition of continued employment, that within sixty days following the beginning of such employment, or the effective date of such agreements, whichever is the later, all employees shall become members of the labor organization representing their craft or class ...
(b) to make agreements providing for the deduction by such carrier or carriers from the wages of its or their employees in a craft or class and payment to the labor organization representing the craft or class of such employees, of any periodic dues, initiation fees, and assessments (not including fines and penalties) uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or retaining membership....

45 U.S.C. § 152 Eleventh (a) & (b).

Congress added subsection (c) to Section 2 Eleventh to prohibit carriers and unions from requiring membership in more than one union as a precondition for an employee's movement among railroad crafts. Subsection (c) states that:

the requirement of membership in a labor organization in an agreement made pursuant to subparagraph (a) of this paragraph shall be satisfied, as to both a present or future employee in engine, train, yard, or hostling service ... if said employee shall hold or acquire membership in any one of the labor organizations, national in scope, organized in accordance with this chapter and admitting to membership employees of a craft or class in any of said services; and no agreement made pursuant to subparagraph (b) shall provide for deductions from his wages for periodic dues, initiation fees, or assessments payable to any labor organization other than that in which he holds membership.... Provided, further, That nothing herein or in any such agreement or agreements shall prevent an employee from changing membership from one organization to another organization admitting to membership employees of a craft or class in any of said services.

Plaintiffs argue in essence that the punitive terms of Article 21, which strips BLE members of their previously earned train craft seniority status, compel railroad workers either to belong to both unions, or to opt for membership in the UTU.6 While plaintiffs acknowledge that Article 21 does not on its face condition continued employment on dual union membership, they argue that Article 21, in effect, mandates that result because a trainman given a "forced" promotion to an engineer's position might otherwise find himself unemployed if he is subsequently demoted or transferred back to the train service craft.

As noted in this court's opinion denying plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, this claim has been litigated and decided adversely to the BLE by the Seventh and Eighth Circuit Courts of Appeals in almost identical fact situations. See Dempsey v. Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Co., 16 F.3d 832 (7th Cir.1994) and Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers v. Kansas City Southern Railway Co., 26 F.3d 787 (8th Cir. 1994).

Plaintiffs argue that these cases are distinguishable because under the agreements litigated in Dempsey and Kansas City Southern, engineers who refused to pay dues to the UTU were permitted to retain their train service craft seniority (although losing accrual rights). Article 21, by contrast, extinguishes all seniority rights for members of the train service craft who accept positions as engineers and refuse to pay UTU dues.

This distinction, however, does not impeach the underlying analysis. Section Two Eleventh (c) prohibits compelled membership in two unions as a condition of employment. Nothing in Article 21 requires a railway worker to pay dues to the UTU to keep an engineer's job. Membership in either the BLE or UTU satisfies the RLA's requirement of union membership. Article 21 simply makes it more attractive for an engineer who has little seniority in that craft to join the UTU as a short term hedge in the event that a demotion or reduction in force requires him to return to the train service craft. As the Eighth Circuit observed in Kansas City Southern, "the Railway Labor Act does not prohibit a union representing one craft from negotiating terms with the employer that may render membership in that union more attractive to some employees than membership in another union for which those employees may be eligible." 26 F.3d at 793.

Article 21 does not require that an employee chose between dual membership or unemployment. The choice put to an engineer is whether he wants to continue accruing seniority in the train service craft. If he does, he has to pay UTU dues for the privilege, which is itself unremarkable. He may not be compelled to do so as a condition of continued employment. But that is as far as the RLA goes. The Act grants no entitlement to accrued seniority. "Barring some legislative pronouncement to the contrary, seniority rights only arise out of the collective bargaining agreement entered into between the employer and the union." Dempsey, 16 F.3d at 839. Thus, summary judgment will be granted in the defendants' favor as to Count III.

Plaintiffs argue in Count II of their Amended Complaint that Article 21 violates Section 2 Third and Section 2 Fourth of the RLA. Section 2 Third states in pertinent part that no party "shall in any way interfere with, influence or coerce" the rail employer or its employees in their choice of representation. Section 2 Fourth further states that

it shall be unlawful for any carrier to interfere in any way with the organization of its employees, or to use the funds of the carrier in maintaining or assisting or contributing to any labor organization, labor representative, or other agency of collective bargaining, or in performing any work therefor, or to influence or coerce employees in an effort to induce them to join or remain or not to join or remain members of any labor organization, or to deduct from the wages of employees any dues, fees, assessments, or other contributions payable to labor organizations, or to collect or to assist in the collection of any such dues, fees assessments, or other contributions. ...7

As the First Circuit Court of Appeals has aptly stated:

in a post-certification controversy such as the one here, judicial intervention under Section 2 Third and Fourth is
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2 cases
  • Wightman v. Springfield Terminal Ry. Co.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit
    • October 7, 1996
    ...The district court denied the injunction and granted summary judgment for UTU and ST on BLE's complaint. Wightman v. Springfield Terminal Ry. Co., 915 F.Supp. 503, 507 (D.Mass.1996). BLE now The RLA governs labor and collective bargaining arrangements between carriers, or employers, and uni......
  • Delvecchio v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 96-CV-7875.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Western District of New York
    • December 23, 1998
    ...at 199, 65 S.Ct. 226. Bowman v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 744 F.2d 1207, 1211 (6th Cir.1984). It was in Wightman v. Springfield Terminal Ry. Co., 915 F.Supp. 503, 504 (D.Mass.1996), that the BLE argued it would be forced to either "raise the dues of its remaining members or to negotiate a......

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