Wikstrom v. Preston Mill Co.

• Decision Date: 06 January 1908
• Citation: 93 P. 213,48 Wash. 164
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: WIKSTROM v. PRESTON MILL CO.

93 P. 213

48 Wash. 164

WIKSTROM v. PRESTON MILL CO.

Supreme Court of Washington

January 6, 1908

Appeal from Superior Court, King County; Arthur E. Griffin, Judge.

Action by Oscar Wikstrom against the Preston Mill Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Shauk & Smith, for appellant.

Higgins Hall & Halverstadt, and Walter S. Fulton, for respondent.

RUDKIN J.

On the 2d day of February, 1906, the plaintiff was injured while operating a cut-off saw in the defendant's shingle mill at Preston, in King county. This action was instituted to recover damages for the injuries thus received, and from a judgment in favor of the plaintiff the defendant has appealed.

The negligence charged in the complaint is that the respondent was young and inexperienced, and was unfamiliar with the operation of cut-off saws; that the appellant, well knowing these facts, negligently ordered the respondent to operate a cut-off saw, without instructing him as to the proper use of the saw, or warning him against the dangers incident thereto that the shingle bolts supplied were too large for the saw that the saw was dull, rusty, unguarded, etc. The answer consisted of a denial of the negligence charged, and a plea of contributory negligence. The shingle bolts in question were approximately 4 feet in length, and it was the duty of the respondent to cut them into blocks 16 inches in length by means of the cut-off saw. In the progress of this work the respondent had cut two blocks off a bolt, and was engaged in cutting the stub end off the third block, with his right hand on the stub, which was from 6 to 9 inches in length, when the saw kicked back, and his hand in some manner came in contract therewith, causing the loss of the greater part of the hand including the thumb and first two fingers. There was a conflict of testimony on all material facts in issue, and we must assume that the jury found that the respondent was inexperienced and was not instructed as to the proper use of the saw or warned against the dangers incident to such use. The appellant meets the respondent on this broad ground, and contends that the dangers incident to the use and operation of the cut-off saw were open and apparent to any person of common understanding, and that neither experience, instruction, or warning was necessary. This in a measure is true. Every person who has attained years of discretion knows that a saw will...