Wilberg v. Yakima County

• Decision Date: 05 January 1925
• Docket Number: 18828.
• Citation: 132 Wash. 219,231 P. 931
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: WILBERG et al. v. YAKIMA COUNTY et al.

231 P. 931

132 Wash. 219

WILBERG et al. v. YAKIMA COUNTY et al.

No. 18828.

Supreme Court of Washington

January 5, 1925

Department 2.

Appeal from Superior Court, Yakima County; Nichoson, Judge.

Suit by Bert Wilberg and another against Yakima County and others. From a judgment for plaintiffs, defendants appeal. Affirmed.

Sydney Livesay, of Yakima, for appellants.

Geo. F McAulay, of Yakima, for respondents.

MACKINTOSH, J.

The facts in this case are stipulated, and are that Baldoser, on March 1, 1921, was the owner and operator of a retail grocery business in Yakima county, the assessor of which county assessed the stock of goods and fixtures as of that date for taxation for the year 1921; that Baldoser continued to own and operate the business from March 1, 1921, to November 16 of the same year, when he sold the building, including the stock and fixtures, to the respondents, who took possession and continued to operate the grocery business; that pursuant to the assessment a tax was levied against the stock of goods and fixtures, which tax became due on March 15, 1922; that Baldoser did not pay this tax nor was it paid by the respondents; that after the delinquency, and on October 31 1922, the appellant, as sheriff of Yakima county, levied a distraint upon the goods and fixtures then owned by the respondents in their grocery, for the purpose of collecting the taxes above referred to; that the stock and fixtures owned by Baldoser on March 1, 1921, were 'continually depleted and removed in the ordinary course of said retail grocery business, and it is admitted that at the time of the distraint at the time hereinafter mentioned the entire stock of goods had been changed in the conduct of such retail grocery business by said Baldoser and these plaintiffs' and that the fixtures had been replaced by more expensive ones.

The respondents brought this action to restrain Yakima county from the enforcement of the collection of the taxes, for the reason that the goods and fixtures were not the same as those originally purchased from Baldoser, nor the same that were originally assessed. Upon the issuance of the injunction Yakima county appealed.

Section 11272, Rem. Comp. Stat., reads as follows:

'The taxes assessed upon personal property shall be a lien upon all the real and personal property of the person assessed, from and after the date upon which such assessment is made, and no sale or transfer of either real or personal property shall in any way affect the lien for such taxes upon such property.'

Section 11283, Rem. Comp. Stat., reads:

'When it becomes necessary, in the opinion of the county treasurer, to charge the tax on personal property against real property, in order that such personal property tax may be collected, such county treasurer shall select for that purpose some particular tract or lots of real property owned by the person owing such personal property tax, and in his tax roll and certificate of delinquency shall designate the particular tract or lots of real property against which such personal property tax is charged, and such real estate shall be chargeable therewith. * * *'

The appellant relies upon the case of Mills v. Thurston County, 16 Wash. 378, 47 P. 759, where taxes for personal property assessed against A., who was the owner at the time of the assessment, were attempted to be collected from B., who had purchased the stock of goods after the assessment and who was the owner at the time that the collection of the taxes was attempted. B. tried to restrain the collection of the tax from him, on the ground that sales had been made from the original stock assessed and new goods had been intermingled, and that it was impossible to segregate from the stock then on hand any that was in existence and in the hands of A. at the time of the assessment. B., however, was compelled to pay the tax, it appearing to the court that out of the original stock in the hands of A. at the time of the assessment there was 'enough remaining * * * from which to collect the amount of the taxes, penalties, etc.' But the facts in the case here distinguish it from the Mills Case, for here, according to the stipulation, there was in the hands of the respondents at the time of the distraint none of the original property assessed against Baldoser. This case must therefore be decided in the same way as were decided the cases of Scandinavian American Bank v. King County, 92 Wash. 650, 159 P. 786, Raymond v. King County, 117 Wash. 343, 201 P. 455, and Pennington v. Yakima County, 127 Wash. 538, 221 P. 326, which cases laid down the rule that the personal property tax is a personal obligation of the owner of the chattel and also a lien upon the specific chattel assessed. It is not the personal obligation of one acquiring the property subsequently to the assessment, but may be a lien upon the specifically assessed personal property in the hands of such purchaser. In the case at bar there is no such specific property in the hands of the respondents, and it not being their personal obligation, they are not liable to pay. In the case of Raymond v. King County, supra, this court said:

'The statutes relating to the assessment and collection of taxes upon personal property are somewhat complicated, and to a certain extent confusing. While they perhaps contain no specific provision to that effect, they evidently contemplate that an assessment upon personal

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