Wilcha v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co.
| Decision Date | 22 November 2005 |
| Citation | 887 A.2d 1254 |
| Parties | Michael WILCHA and Sharon Wilcha, Individually and as Parents and Natural Guardians of Michael Wilcha, Jr., Appellants v. NATIONWIDE MUTUAL FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY and Phyllis Arnold and Kenneth Arnold, Appellees. Michael Wilcha and Sharon Wilcha, Individually and as Parents and Natural Guardians of Michael Wilcha, Jr., Appellees v. Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Company, Appellant v. Phyllis Arnold and Kenneth Arnold. |
| Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
Before: HUDOCK, BOWES and BECK, JJ.
OPINION BY HUDOCK, J.:
¶ 1 Michael and Sharon Wilcha (the Wilchas) and Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Company (Nationwide) have filed consolidated cross-appeals to the trial court's order finding that Nationwide had a duty to defend in only one of the above actions. The Wilchas contend that Nationwide has a duty to defend both actions, while Nationwide asserts that it has no duty to defend in either action. We hold that Nationwide does not have a duty to defend the Wilchas in either action.
¶ 2 The pertinent facts and procedural history are not disputed. The Wilchas were insured under a homeowner's policy issued by Nationwide, which was in effect on June 3, 2002. On that date, the Wilchas' thirteen-year-old son, Michael Wilcha, Jr. (Michael Jr.), was operating a 1999 Honda CR-80 dirt bike on Mine Fire Road in Carbondale when it collided with a vehicle driven by Phyllis Arnold (Mrs. Arnold) at or near the intersection of Mine Fire Road and Erie Street. Two lawsuits arose from this collision. In the first, Michael and Sharon Wilcha, as parents and natural guardians of Michael Jr., instituted suit against Mrs. Arnold for injuries allegedly sustained by Michael Jr.
¶ 3 In her answer, Mrs. Arnold essentially denied the Wilchas' allegations, and, in her new matter, raised affirmative defenses to the complaint and claims that Michael Jr. was negligent. In her additional new matter pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 2252(d), Mrs. Arnold joined Michael and Sharon Wilcha as additional defendants. She then averred that the "negligence, carelessness and recklessness of Michael and Sharon Wilcha was a proximate cause of the accident and the injuries allegedly sustained" by Michael Jr. Additional New Matter, 5/13/03, at ¶ 34. More specifically, Mrs. Arnold alleged that the "negligence, carelessness and recklessness of" Michael and Sharon Wilcha consisted of negligently: 1) entrusting the dirt bike to their son; 2) failing to supervise their son in his use and operation of the dirt bike; 3) failing to properly train their son or secure proper training on the proper use and operation of the dirt bike; 4) failing to advise their son of the applicable provisions of the Pennsylvania Vehicle Code; 5) failing to exercise control over their son and/or his use of a dangerous instrumentality, when they knew, or in the exercise of due care, should have known that injury to persons in the public would be the direct and proximate result of their failure to exercise such control; and 6) permitting their son to have and use a dangerous instrumentality. Id. at ¶ 35. In addition, Mrs. Arnold averred that the Wilchas were negligent, careless and reckless in "then and there failing to exercise due care under all of the circumstances." Id.
¶ 4 On the same date she responded to the Wilchas' complaint, Mrs. Arnold, along with her husband, Kenneth (the Arnolds), instituted a personal injury action against the Wilchas. In this action, the Arnolds alleged negligent operation of the dirt bike by Michael Jr. The complaint also contained identical claims of negligence as to the Wilchas as was raised in her additional new matter in the Wilchas' lawsuit.
¶ 5 The Wilchas submitted both claims to Nationwide under their homeowners' policy. The policy provided the following with regard to Section II — Liability Coverages:
COVERAGE E — PERSONAL LIABILITY
We will pay damages the insured is legally obligated to pay due to an occurrence.
We will provide a defense at our expense by counsel of our choice. We may investigate and settle any claim or suit. Our duty to defend a claim or suit ends when the amount we pay for damages equals our limit of liability.
Elite II Homeowners Policy, 6/25/03, at 12. Nationwide filed an answer and new matter to the declaratory judgment complaint, in which it maintained that the described loss was excluded from coverage pursuant to the following exclusion from personal liability coverage:
COVERAGE E — PERSONAL LIABILITY
... [does] not apply to bodily injury or property damage:
* * * * * *
(e) arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of:
* * * * * *
(2) a motor vehicle owned or operated by, or rented or loaned to an insured.
Id. at 13. After the pleadings were closed, Nationwide filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings and the Wilchas, joined by the Arnolds, filed cross-motions for judgment on the pleadings. Following the submission of briefs and oral argument, the trial court issued its decision in which it concluded that Nationwide was only obligated to provide a defense to the Wilchas in their suit against Mrs. Arnold, even though identical claims of negligence were raised against the Wilchas in both actions. Both Nationwide and the Wilchas have filed an appeal to this Court, and they were consolidated. In their appeal, the Wilchas raise the following issue:
Whether the Court below erred in issuing an inconsistent and erroneous decision, in that it correctly required Nationwide to defend [them in the suit they filed against Mrs. Arnold], while not requiring it to defend them in [the Arnolds' suit], even though the allegations against [them] were essentially identical in both underlying actions?
The Wilchas' Brief at 4. Nationwide raises the following issue in its appeal:
When [sic] the injuries and damages complained of [in both actions] resulted from the use of a motor vehicle and, if so, whether liability coverage and defense of the same are properly excluded from [Nationwide's] Homeowner's Policy?
Nationwide's Brief at 1. We will address these claims together.
¶ 6 As this Court has summarized:
A motion for judgment on the pleadings should be granted only where the pleadings demonstrate that no genuine issue of fact exists, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Pa.R.C.P. 1034[.] Thus, in reviewing a trial court's decision to grant judgment on the pleadings, the scope of review of the appellate court is plenary; the reviewing court must determine if the action of the trial court is based on a clear error of law or whether there were facts disclosed by the pleadings which should properly go to the jury. An appellate court must accept as true all well-pleaded facts of the party against whom the motion is made, while considering against him only those facts which he specifically admits. Neither party can be deemed to have admitted either conclusions of law or unjustified inferences. Moreover, in conducting its inquiry, the court should confine itself to the pleadings themselves and any documents or exhibits properly attached to them. It may not consider inadmissible evidence in determining a motion for judgment on the pleadings. Only where the moving party's case is clear and free from doubt such that a trial would prove fruitless will an appellate court affirm a motion for judgment on the pleadings.
Consulting Engineers, Inc. v. Insurance Company of North America, 710 A.2d 82, 83-84 (Pa.Super.1998) (citations and quotation marks omitted).
¶ 7 "An insurer's duty to defend and indemnify the insured may be resolved via declaratory judgment actions." Erie Insurance Exchange v. Claypoole, 449 Pa.Super. 142, 673 A.2d 348, 355 (1996) (en banc). "In such actions, the allegations raised in the underlying complaint alone fix the insurer's duty to defend." Id. As this Court has summarized:
The duty to defend is a distinct obligation, separate and apart from the insurer's duty to provide coverage. Moreover, the insurer agrees to defend the insured against any suit arising under the policy even if such suit is groundless, false, or fraudulent. Since the insurer agrees to relieve the insured of the burden of defending even those suits which have no basis in fact, the obligation to defend arises whenever the complaint filed by the injured party may potentially come within the coverage of the policy. In order to determine whether a claim may potentially come within the coverage of the policy, we must first ascertain the scope of the insurance coverage and then analyze the allegations in the complaint.
Britamco Underwriters, Inc. v. Grzeskiewicz, 433 Pa.Super. 55, 639 A.2d 1208, 1210 (1994) (citations and quotation marks omitted). "This duty to defend, however, is not activated by every allegation raised against the insured." Claypoole, 673 A.2d at 355. "[O]nly allegations contained within the underlying complaint pertaining to injuries which are either actually or potentially within the scope of the insurance policy obligate the insurer to defend the insured." Id.
¶ 8 Thus, the express language of the insurance policy must be reviewed. The standards applied when doing so are well settled. As our Supreme Court has summarized:
Where an insurer relies on a policy exclusion as the basis for its denial of coverage and refusal to defend, the insurer has asserted an affirmative defense and, accordingly, bears the burden of proving such a defense. To determine whether [the insurer] has met its burden of proof we rely on well-settled principles of contract interpretation.
The task of interpreting [an insurance] contract is generally performed by a court rather than by a jury. The goal of that task is, of course, to...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Wolfe v. Ross
...recovery on the facts herein. The trial court concluded that it did, based on this Court's decision in Wilcha v. Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Company, 887 A.2d 1254 (Pa.Super.2005). Administratrix alleges that the exclusion is ambiguous and inapplicable on the facts herein, and that Wi......
-
Countryway Ins. Co. v. Slaugenhoup
...owned or operated by or rented or loaned to any Insured, ...." 522 A.2d at 1366 (emphasis added). See also Wilcha v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 887 A.2d 1254 (Pa.Super.2005) (excluding coverage for bodily injury arising out of ownership, maintenance, or use in a negligent entrustment In......
-
Ace Am. Ins. Co. v. Axiom Constr. & Design Works, LLC
...Fed. Appx. 62 (3d Cir. 2003); Pulleyn v. Cavalier Ins. Corp, 351 Pa. Super. 347, 505 A.2d 1016 (1986); Wilcha v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 2005 Pa. Super. 395, 887 A.2d 1254 (2005); Erie Ins. Exchange v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 352 Pa. Super. 78, 507 A.2d 389 (1986); Motorists Mut. Ins.......
-
Treesdale, Inc. v. TIG INSURANCE COMPANY
...an affirmative defense, and, accordingly, bears the burden of proving such a defense." Id. at 962 (citing Wilcha v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 887 A.2d 1254,1258 (Pa.Super.2005)). The Court finds that the Defendant has sustained that 2. The Parties' Positions Resolution of the Motion fo......