Wilcox v. Batiste

• Decision Date: 21 December 2018
• Docket Number: NO: 2:17-CV-122-RMP,: 2:17-CV-122-RMP
• Citation: 360 F.Supp.3d 1112
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Washington
• Parties: Jade WILCOX, Plaintiff, v. John BATISTE and John Does 1-300, Defendant.

360 F.Supp.3d 1112

Jade WILCOX, Plaintiff,

v.John BATISTE and John Does 1-300, Defendant.

NO: 2:17-CV-122-RMP

United States District Court, E.D. Washington.

Signed December 21, 2018

James Richard Sweetser, Marcus Sweetser, Sweetser Law Office, Thomas G. Jarrard, Law Office of Thomas G. Jarrard, Spokane, WA, for Plaintiff.

Shelley Anne Williams, Washington State Attorney General's Office, Olympia, WA, for Defendant.

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

ROSANNA MALOUF PETERSON, United States District JudgeBEFORE THE COURT is Defendant Chief John R. Batiste's Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 35. Chief Batiste moves for summary judgment on all claims made by Plaintiff Jade Wilcox, who opposes Chief Batiste's motion, ECF No. 56. The Court has considered the parties' arguments, briefings, and the record, and is fully informed.

BACKGROUND

In the state of Washington, the Washington State Patrol ("WSP") creates Police Traffic Collision Reports ("PTCRs") when responding to the scene of a car accident. ECF No. 3-6. The PTCRs include, among other things, the name, address, driver's license number, telephone number, and other identifying information about the drivers involved in the car accidents, as well as the names and information of any witness to the accident. Id. The WSP creates the PTCRs using a program called SECTOR. ECF No. 5-4 at 2. SECTOR is a program installed on a WSP officer's computer that works by scanning the bar code on a driver's license or motor vehicle registration to auto-populate the information into the PTCR. Id. ; see also ECF No. 22-3 at 2.

The WSP allows public access to PTCRs on the Washington Requests for Electronic Collision Reports website. ECF No. 5-1 at 2. This website allows members of the public to search through PTCRs and request access to them for a fee of $ 10.50 for each collision report. Id. If the requestor was not an involved party or a representative of an involved party, the WSP would redact birth date and driver's license numbers from the report, but otherwise would leave uncensored the rest of the document, including the parties' names, addresses, and telephone numbers. Id.

Ms. Wilcox was involved in a car accident on July 9, 2016. ECF No. 3-1 at 2. Five days later, Ms. Wilcox received a letter from a law firm in Spokane soliciting her business for its automobile injury practice. Id. at 2–3. The letter explained that the law firm obtained Ms. Wilcox's information from the PTCR public records request process. Id. at 3. The Collision Records Manager for the WSP later confirmed that the WSP disclosed Ms. Wilcox's July 9, 2016, PTCR to the law firm pursuant to a request on the Washington Requests for Electronic Collision Report website. ECF No. 5-1 at 2–3. The WSP redacted Ms. Wilcox's birth date and driver's license number, but otherwise left Ms. Wilcox's name, address, and telephone number uncensored. Id.

Following these events, Ms. Wilcox filed this class action complaint against Chief Batiste, the head of the WSP, and 300 John Does. ECF No. 1. Ms. Wilcox alleged that Chief Batiste's policies with the WSP violated the Driver's Privacy Protection Act ("DPPA"), 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721 – 2725, because he knowingly disclosed personal information from motor vehicle records of Ms. Wilcox and others by providing uncensored PTCRs to third parties. Id. at 28. Ms. Wilcox also alleged that Chief Batiste violated her and others' constitutional right to privacy and committed the common law tort of invasion of privacy. Id. at 33–39. Ms. Wilcox later re-alleged these claims in an amended complaint. ECF No. 39. Ms. Wilcox seeks monetary damages and permanent injunctive relief. Id. at 37–38.

Ms. Wilcox also moved for a preliminary injunction. ECF No. 3. In her motion for a preliminary injunction, she argued that Chief Batiste violated the DPPA and that she and the class would suffer irreparable harm if the disclosure policies were not enjoined because their personal information could be dangerously disseminated. Id. Chief Batiste opposed the motion. ECF No. 5. Following a hearing, ECF No. 13, this Court instituted a preliminary injunction, finding that Ms. Wilcox and the putative class were likely to succeed on the merits, that they would suffer irreparable harm without an injunction, and that the balance of equities and the public interest weighed in favor of granting the injunction. ECF No. 14. The Court ordered Chief Batiste to redact addresses, driver's license numbers, dates of birth, information about sex, height, and weight from PTCRs before distribution to third parties. Id. at 10.

Chief Batiste now moves this Court for summary judgment on all of Ms. Wilcox's and the putative class's claims. ECF No. 35. Chief Batiste argues that he is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity and qualified immunity. Id. Additionally, he argues that the three claims all fail on the merits.¹ Id.

LEGAL STANDARD

A court may grant summary judgment where "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact" of a party's prima facie case, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) ; accord Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 322-33, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). A genuine issue of material fact exists if sufficient evidence supports the claimed factual dispute, requiring "a jury or judge to resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth at trial." T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass'n , 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987). A key purpose of summary judgment "is to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims." Celotex , 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548.

The moving party bears the burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, or in the alternative, the moving party may discharge this burden by showing that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's prima facie case. Id. at 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548. The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to set forth specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial. See id. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548. The nonmoving party "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided ... must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Id. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548 n.3 (internal quotations omitted).

The Court will not infer evidence that does not exist in the record. See Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n , 497 U.S. 871, 888–89, 110 S.Ct. 3177, 111 L.Ed.2d 695 (1990) (court will not presume missing facts). However, the Court will "view the evidence in the light most favorable" to the nonmoving party. Newmaker v. City of Fortuna , 842 F.3d 1108, 1111 (9th Cir. 2016). "The evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

DISCUSSION

Defendant's Claims of Immunity

A. Eleventh Amendment Sovereign Immunity

Chief Batiste argues that he is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity from both equitable and monetary relief, but Ms. Wilcox argues that the Eleventh Amendment does not apply because she is suing Chief Batiste in his official capacity for injunctive relief and in his personal capacity for monetary damages. ECF No. 35 at 4–9; ECF No. 56 at 8–14.

The Eleventh Amendment restricts the ability of individuals to bring suits against states in federal court. U.S. Const. amend. XI. Under the Eleventh Amendment, "an unconsenting State is immune from suits brought in federal courts by her own citizens as well as by citizens of another State." Emps. Of Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare, Mo. v. Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare, Mo. , 411 U.S. 279, 280, 93 S.Ct. 1614, 36 L.Ed.2d 251 (1973).

However, the Eleventh Amendment does allow lawsuits against state officials. Citizens may sue state officials in their official capacities if the citizens seek only prospective, injunctive relief from an ongoing violation of federal law. Ex parte Young , 209 U.S. 123, 159, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908). Additionally, citizens may seek monetary damages from state officials in their personal capacities if the state is not the real party at interest. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman , 465 U.S. 89, 101, 104 S.Ct. 900, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984).

1. Eleventh Amendment Immunity for Chief Batiste in his Official Capacity from Injunctive Relief

The Ex parte Young doctrine is an exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity that is designed to provide a remedy for continuing violations of federal law. Green v. Mansour , 474 U.S. 64, 68, 106 S.Ct. 423, 88 L.Ed.2d 371 (1985). The legal fiction of the Ex parte Young action allows citizens to enjoin state action that violates federal law notwithstanding the protections of the Eleventh Amendment. Id. An action against a state official in his or her official capacity under Ex parte Young is a suit not against an individual, but against the official's office, which is no different than a suit against the state itself. Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police , 491 U.S. 58, 71, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989). Where Congress has provided a detailed remedial scheme in a statute, the Ex parte Young exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity may not be applicable to enforcing that statute against a state official. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida , 517 U.S. 44, 74, 116 S.Ct. 1114, 134 L.Ed.2d 252 (1996).

Chief Batiste and Ms. Wilcox dispute whether the DPPA precludes Ex parte Young actions. ECF No. 35 at 5; ECF No. 56 at 8. Chief Batiste claims that the DPPA precludes Ex parte Young actions because it already provides a detailed remedial scheme for enforcement. ECF No. 35 at 6. The DPPA allows the Attorney General of the United States to impose a civil penalty on a State department of motor vehicles for each day of substantial noncompliance with the Act. 18 U.S.C. § 2723(b). It also allows civil enforcement of the Act by...