Wilcox v. Ford

• Decision Date: 20 December 1985
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 84-78-VAL.
• Citation: 626 F. Supp. 760
• Parties: E.K. WILCOX, Jr., Petitioner, v. J. Paul FORD, Warden, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Georgia

626 F. Supp. 760

E.K. WILCOX, Jr., Petitioner, v. J. Paul FORD, Warden, Respondent.

Civ. A. No. 84-78-VAL.

United States District Court, M.D. Georgia, Valdosta Division.

December 20, 1985.

James Wyatt, Bobby Lee Cook, Summerville, Ga., for petitioner.

Mary Beth Westmoreland, Atlanta, Ga., for respondent.

OWENS, Chief Judge:

Federal law provides that "a district court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(a) (West 1977) (emphasis added). Pursuant to this law, E.K. Wilcox, Jr. has filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus contending that in violation of his rights derived from the United States Constitution he was convicted of murder and concealing a death. This court is required to determine whether or not the State of Georgia unconstitutionally convicted and imprisoned petitioner Wilcox.

On January 14, 1982, petitioner was convicted by a jury in the Lowndes County Superior Court for murdering and then concealing the death of Hellen Hanks. These convictions were affirmed on direct appeal. Wilcox v. State, 250 Ga. 745, 301 S.E.2d 251 (1983). Petitioner has sought and been denied relief in a state habeas action by an order dated November 17, 1983, from the Superior Court of Muscogee County. The Supreme Court of Georgia declined to review this decision by denying petitioner's application for a certificate of probable cause to appeal on April 25, 1984. The respondent has stipulated that petitioner has exhausted his state remedies on all issues raised. Thus, this action is in a posture to be considered on the merits.

Paraphrasing this court's instructions to criminal juries, it is important to remember that this is an important case. The fact that any person convicted of a crime has the right to have his conviction reviewed to determine whether he received a fair trial under the Constitution, is of supreme and profound significance in the life of our nation and in the life of each one of us individually.

Whenever true justice is done all of us grow in strength and in spirit and whenever any violence is done to the administration of justice or injustice is dealt to any person, we are all, to that extent, weakened. The court's important function today is to determine justice under the law in this particular case and thereby to sustain the validity of the ideal of justice under the law for all.

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence Standard

In his opening statement to the jury the prosecuting attorney said that the state had no evidence to prove the cause of Hellen Hanks' death. (Trial transcript at 7). As promised, the state produced no such evidence at trial. In spite of that lack of evidence, the jury found petitioner guilty of murder and of concealing a death.

One allegation of error made by petitioner is that the evidence adduced at trial is insufficient to support his convictions under the standards set forth by the Supreme Court of the United States in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). Specifically, petitioner asserts that the state failed to prove that Hellen Hanks' death was the result of criminal agency and that the evidence was wholly insufficient to show that petitioner committed the murder.

This issue was addressed by the Georgia Supreme Court on direct appeal, Wilcox v. State, 250 Ga. 745, 752-53, 301 S.E.2d 251, 257-58 (1983). The state court's factual findings are entitled to a presumption of correctness. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d) (West 1977); Sumner v. Mata, 455 U.S. 591, 102 S.Ct. 1303, 71 L.Ed.2d 480 (1982). However, this court too has its responsibility. Application of the Jackson standard is a mixed question of law and fact and is thus not entitled to the § 2254(d) presumption. See Grizzell v. Wainwright, 692 F.2d 722, 725 (11th Cir.1982). "A judgment by a state appellate court rejecting a challenge to evidentiary sufficiency is of course entitled to deference by the federal courts.... But Congress in § 2254 has selected the federal district courts as precisely the forums that are responsible for determining whether state convictions have been secured in accord with federal constitutional law." Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 323, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2791, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). Petitioner's claim has been properly presented and is therefore entitled to review. See generally Brown v. Wainwright, 772 F.2d 780 (11th Cir.1985).

The United States Constitution guarantees that no person shall be subjected to a criminal conviction "except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged." In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1073, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970). In Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), the Supreme Court developed a test designed to determine whether the record evidence adduced at trial could reasonably support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The question to be answered in reviewing the evidence is, "whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 319, 99 S.Ct. at 2789. The Jackson court, however, remained cognizant of the significance of the role played by the trier of fact. Findings of the trier of fact are to be given broad deference subject only to the review necessary to guarantee the fundamental protection of due process of law. Id.

It is this review that the petitioner seeks to have this court undertake. Petitioner alleges that based upon the evidence produced at his trial, no rational trier of fact could have found all the essential elements of the offenses for which he was convicted beyond a reasonable doubt. It thus becomes incumbent upon this court to determine whether the evidence produced at petitioner's trial satisfies the test of Jackson v. Virginia as to all the necessary elements of the offenses for which petitioner was convicted. Id.

A jury convicted the petitioner of murder and of concealing the death of another person. Georgia defines murder as follows:

(a) A person commits the offense of murder when he unlawfully and with malice aforethought, either express or implied, causes the death of another human being.

(b) Express malice is that deliberate intention unlawfully to take the life of another human being which is manifested by external circumstances capable of proof. Malice shall be implied where no considerable provocation appears and where all the circumstances of the killing show an abandoned and malignant heart.

O.C.G.A. § 16-5-1(a), (b) (1981). The critical elements of the offense of murder therefore are (1) unlawfully (2) causing the death of another human being (3) with malice aforethought. See Holloway v. McElroy, 474 F.Supp. 1363 (M.D.Ga.1979), aff'd, 632 F.2d 605 (5th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1028, 101 S.Ct. 3019, 69 L.Ed.2d 398 (1981). Likewise, the Georgia code provides "a person who, by concealing the death of any other person, hinders a discovery of whether or not such person was unlawfully killed is guilty of a misdemeanor." O.C.G.A. § 16-10-31 (1981). The critical elements of the offense of concealing a death therefore are (1) concealing the death of another (2) which results in hindering the discovery of whether or not that person was unlawfully killed. Id.

This court must now review the evidence to determine whether it was sufficient for any rational trier of fact to find that petitioner committed each of the above elements beyond a reasonable doubt. This evidence must be viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution.

II. The Evidence

The Georgia Supreme Court from the evidence found the facts to be as follows:

"On August 31, 1972, a Thursday, the victim, thirty-five year-old Hellen Hanks, disappeared. At that time, she was working as a bookkeeper and secretary for Wilcox Outdoor Advertising in Valdosta, a company owned by the appellant, E.K. Wilcox, Jr. and his father, E.K. Wilcox, Sr. Her body was discovered approximately eight years later, on November 24, 1980, by a logger clearing a wooded area.

On August 31, 1972, Hellen went to work as usual. She was wearing a dark green dress with a long strand of green beads. After work, she planned to have her hairpiece combed and her typewriter repaired. Jerry Davis, an employee of Wilcox Outdoor Advertising, testified that he saw her in the office at about 8:15 a.m. before he left on an assignment.

At about 5:00 p.m. that afternoon, James Hanks, the victim's husband, received a telephone call from the appellant. Hanks testified that the appellant told him that Hellen could not be found around the office, although her car was still there. Mr. Hanks then immediately drove to the Wilcox Outdoor Advertising office, arriving there at about 5:20 p.m. or 5:25 p.m. He testified that when he arrived, the appellant was going through Hellen's purse. He asked the appellant what he was doing, and he responded he was looking for some keys that Hellen would `not be needing ... any longer.'

At approximately 5:30 p.m. the Valdosta police and GBI agents, responding to the appellant's call, arrived at the Wilcox business. They unsuccessfully searched the office and warehouse for Hellen, but they did find her typewriter and hairpiece in the car and two completed applications for employment in her purse. Since they found no evidence indicating where Hellen might be, a missing person's report was filed.

The Valdosta police continued their investigation of Hellen's disappearance for several days before discontinuing it because neither Hellen nor any new evidence was found. Similarly, though the GBI investigation lasted longer, it was discontinued for lack of evidence....