Wilcox v. State

Decision Date11 June 1897
Citation28 S.E. 981,101 Ga. 563
PartiesWILCOX v. STATE.
CourtGeorgia Supreme Court

Syllabus by the Court.

Inasmuch as there can be no doubt that the words "domestic animals," as used in that clause of the constitution authorizing the general assembly to "impose a tax upon such domestic animals as, from their nature and habits, are destructive of other property," were intended to refer to dogs, it follows inevitably that the dog is classed by the fundamental law of the state as "a domestic animal"; and therefore an act of cruelty to a dog is indictable under section 703 of the Penal Code.

Error from superior court, Wilcox county; C. C. Smith, Judge.

B. F Wilcox was convicted of cruelty to a domestic animal, and brings certiorari. From judgment overruling the same, he brings error. Affirmed.

Cutts & Lawson, for plaintiff in error.

Tom Eason, Sol. Gen., and M. E. Land, for the State.

FISH J.

An accusation in the county court of Wilcox county charged B. F Wilcox with the offense of cruelty to a domestic animal under section 703 of the Penal Code, which provides that "every person who shall instigate, engage in, or do anything in furtherance of an act of cruelty to a domestic animal, shall be punished as for a misdemeanor." The animal alleged to have been cruelly treated was a dog. The accused demurred to the accusation on the ground that a dog is not a domestic animal. The demurrer was overruled, and this ruling was sustained upon certiorari, whereupon the accused excepted. The sole question made, therefore, is whether a dog is a domestic animal. There is some conflict in the decisions of the courts of different states on the subject, but the decided weight of authority seems to be that a dog is a domestic animal. Some of the leading cases so holding are State v. McDuffle, 34 N.H. 526; Hurley v. State, 30 Tex.App. 333, 17 S.W. 455; State v. Giles, 125 Ind. 124, 25 N.E. 159; Dodson v. Mack, 20 N.C. 146; and Shaw v Craft, 37 F. 317. The case of Patton v. State, 93 Ga. 111, 19 S.E. 734, is cited by counsel for plaintiff in error as authority that a dog is not a domestic animal. The sole question decided in that case was that section 729 of the Penal Code, which is in these words: "All other acts of willful and malicious mischief in the injuring or destroying any other public or private property not herein enumerated shall be a misdemeanor,"--does not apply to injuring or killing animals of any kind,...

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