Wilcox v. Wilcox
| Decision Date | 25 March 1966 |
| Citation | 406 S.W.2d 152 |
| Parties | Alberta WILCOX (now Alberta Sullivan), Movant, v. Garland WILCOX, Respondent. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky |
Hatcher & Lewis, Elizabethtown, for appellant.
James N. Scudder, John L. Arnett, Faurest & Collier, Elizabethtown, for appellee.
The facts in the case at bar are not in dispute. On November 14, 1951, a divorce action was instituted between Alberta Wilcox (now Alberta Sullivan) and Garland Wilcox, and judgment was entered on November 24, 1951. The custody and control of their infant child, Brenda Sue Wilcox, was awarded to the wife, and the husband, Garland Wilcox, was ordered and directed by the court to pay child-maintenance payments until the child reached the age of majority or became self-supporting. This order was made pursuant to a contract of the parties settling their rights and obligations and was approved and made a part of tahe judgment.
At the time this action was instituted, the child had reached the age of eighteen and was a full-time college student and was not self-supporting.
In 1951 when the agreement was made between the parties and approved by the court, the age of majority was twenty-one. However, the age of majority was changed by the legislature effective January 1, 1965, and reduced to eighteen. The applicable statute, KRS 2.015, provides:
'Persons of the age of eighteen years are of the age of majority for all purposes in this Commonwealth except for the purchase of alcoholic beverages and for purposes of care and treatment of handicapped children, for which twenty-one years is the age of majority.'
The husband moved the court that he be relieved of further payments after the child had reached the age of eighteen. The court found that the support payments per previous order of the Hardin Circuit Court were $40 a month and that the amount in controversy was $1440 (36 months). The court further found as a matter of law that the age of majority was reduced from twenty-one to eighteen years by the legislature and that there was no obligation of support on the husband after the child's eighteenth birthday unless the child was still in high school in which event it was the court's policy to continue maintenance payments through high school graduation.
We cannot agree with the finding of the court that there was no obligation of support on the husband after the child's eighteenth birthday. At the time the parties entered into the...
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...contractual interpretation is to identify the parties' intent at the time of the contract formation." Id. (referencing Wilcox v. Wilcox, 406 S.W.2d 152, 153 (Ky. 1966). But, insituations where the contract is ambiguous, "the court must determine the parties' intent from the contract as a wh......
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Monticello v. Monticello
...majority was lowered in 1964, Kirchner v. Kirchner, 465 S.W.2d 299 (Ky.1971); Collins v. Collins, 418 S.W.2d 739 (Ky.1967); Wilcox v. Wilcox, 406 S.W.2d 152 (Ky.1966); 6 see also Springstun v. Springstun, 131 Wash. 109, 229 P. 14 (1924) (support decree directing payments 'during the minorit......
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Waldron v. Waldron
...has considered the exact question that faces us; and it held that the father was not relieved of his duty of support. In Wilcox v. Wilcox, (Ky.1966), 406 S.W.2d 152, it was held that a father was not entitled to relief from a decree directing him to pay child support until his child reached......
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Brown v. Indiana Ins. Co., No. 2004-SC-0065-DG.
...of interpreting a policy of insurance is to determine and carry out the original intentions of the parties. Wilcox v. Wilcox, 406 S.W.2d 152 (Ky.1966). It is also to interpret the terms used in the light of the usage and understanding of an average person. Fryman v. Pilot Life Ins. Co., 704......