Wilder v. Bernstein
| Decision Date | 04 December 1989 |
| Docket Number | No. 78 Civ. 957(RJW).,78 Civ. 957(RJW). |
| Citation | 725 F. Supp. 1324 |
| Parties | Shirley WILDER, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Blanche BERNSTEIN, individually and as Administrator of the New York City Human Resources Administration, et al., Defendants, and Abbott House, et al., Intervenors. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
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Polier, Tulin, Clark & Zalk (Stephen Wise Tulin, of counsel), Webster & Sheffield (Donald J. Cohn, Seth M. Lahn, Joseph M. Heppt, Sharon A. Lewis, of counsel), New York City, for intervenors.
Peter L. Zimroth, Corp. Counsel of the City of New York, Norma Kerlin, Asst. Corp. Counsel, New York City, for defendant New York City.
Once again the Court is asked to decide a controversy stemming from the litigation concerning the provision of child care services by New York City (the "City") to those children requiring placement in institutions and foster homes. The litigation, which at its core revolves around the best interests of the children in the City's child care system, has occupied the courts of this Circuit for the past sixteen years, generating four published opinions prior to this decision.1 The main protagonists in this ongoing saga are (1) plaintiffs, who represent a class of black Protestant children in need of child care services out of their home, (2) the City and the municipal officials responsible for the City's child care system (collectively the "City defendants"), (3) a group of nineteen private child care agencies which intervened in this action (the "intervenors") and (4) a group of administrators of private, religiously affiliated, child care agencies (the "sectarian agencies"). This decision will revisit the history of this litigation in the context of the intervenors' motion for an award of attorneys' fees and costs against the City, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988. The City has cross-moved to dismiss the intervenors' application for fees.2 For the reasons that follow, the intervenors' motion is granted and the City's cross-motion is denied.
Plaintiffs challenged the City's child care system on several constitutional grounds, their final complaint alleging, in essence, that the child care system (1) operated to discriminate against children based on race and religion, (2) amounted to the establishment of religion and, (3) unduly burdened the free exercise rights of Protestant children. They also claimed that defendants had denied the plaintiff class equal access to child care services in violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d, and applicable state law.
The intervenors represent a broad spectrum of foster care clinicians and administrators who together care for approximately 4,600 children.3 A number of the intervenors were originally named as defendants in the Wilder litigation, but, by 1978, these defendants had all been dismissed from the case, many with prejudice.
Shortly before trial was to begin in August 1983, plaintiffs and the City defendants renewed their efforts at settlement. These negotiations proved fruitful and resulted in plaintiffs and the City defendants fashioning a draft stipulation of settlement. In or about January 1984, fourteen of the eventual intervenors, plus a number of other agencies, wrote the City expressing strong objections to the draft stipulation of settlement. The intervenors articulated their concerns with the draft stipulation to the Court and to the parties throughout the winter and early spring of 1984.
In April 1984, plaintiffs and the City defendants presented a proposed stipulation of settlement to the Court for approval. The Court then directed that notice of the proposed settlement be given to members of the plaintiff class. The intervenors, whose concerns with the draft had not been addressed in the proposed stipulation, continued to press their objections. They maintained that the proposed stipulation was fundamentally flawed because, inter alia, (1) it failed to protect the best interests of the children, (2) it unconstitutionally discriminated against children whose parents exercised a religious preference in child care, and (3) it failed to take into account the complex problems presented by the placement of children and the practical limitations inherent in the child care system. The intervenors were granted leave to intervene to oppose the proposed stipulation by order of the Court filed June 15, 1984.
The objections the intervenors presented to the Court concerning the proposed stipulation were comprehensive, and were supported by detailed affidavits from child care professionals. The affidavits and supporting materials presented by the intervenors provided the Court and the parties with important background and insight on the clinical and administrative realities confronting the child care system. Negotiations concerning the content of the proposed stipulation, in which the intervenors played an integral role, continued throughout the summer. Beginning on August 6, 1984, the Court commenced a hearing on the fairness, reasonableness and adequacy of the settlement. As this Court noted in Wilder III, sparked primarily by the criticisms and suggestions of the intervenors, the parties embarked on a series of meetings in open court to attempt to resolve the numerous legal and child care issues involved with the proposed stipulation of settlement. The intervenors reached agreement on certain general topics with plaintiffs and the City defendants, and suggested specific changes that could be made in the original settlement agreement to resolve or mitigate many of the remaining problems they had identified in their original objections. The parties continued to negotiate around the various concrete proposals offered by the intervenors. These efforts proceeded throughout the fall of 1984 and, on January 2, 1985, a second proposed stipulation of settlement, supported by the intervenors, was submitted to the Court. The finalized version of the stipulation of settlement was ultimately approved by the Court in Wilder III, over the opposition of the sectarian agencies.
The significant impact the intervenors had on the ultimate Stipulation was detailed throughout the Court's decision in Wilder III. For example, it was noted that:
The Intervenors' original comments proved extremely valuable to the Court, not only because they offered a fresh perspective on the day-to-day operation of New York City's child care system from the agency clinician's point of view ..., but because their criticism of the original settlement proposal was concrete, comprehensive and constructive.
Wilder III, 645 F.Supp. at 1346.
The intervening agencies, as nonparties vis-a-vis the underlying constitutional claims in the lawsuit, are the sole participants in this litigation who have been in a position to address freely and undistractedly the child care concerns that were prompted by the original settlement proposal. At the same time, their direct participation in the New York City foster care system, and their ongoing contact with the children in care, give them the ability and incentive to comment authoritatively on the likely impact of the settlement on agency administrators and clinicians and on the children they serve. The Court benefited immeasurably from the intervenors' initial insights into the operation of the child care system from the voluntary agency's perspective. The drafters of the original settlement undeniably benefited from the intervenors' constructive criticism and suggestions.
More specifically, the Court found the contributions made by the Intervenors were essential to the creation of the final Stipulation.
The intervenors worked to promote a more viable solution to the problems presented by the foster care system in New York, while at the same time assuring that the best interests of all children in the system were taken into account. They succeeded in forestalling entry of the proposed stipulation negotiated by plaintiffs and the City which did not satisfy their objections, and prevailed, through negotiations, in their proposals to modify the settlement to ameliorate the constitutional, clinical, and practical stumbling blocks they had identified in the original stipulation.4 While the settlement was obviously the result of more than just the work of the intervenors, they played an essential role in forging the final version of the Stipulation which was acceptable to all the parties except the sectarian agencies, and approved by this Court and the Second Circuit.
Intervenors now seek to recover attorneys' fees and costs for their work in crafting and enforcing the Stipulation.
Pursuant to the Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees Awards Act of 1976, a district court, in its discretion, may award attorneys' fees and costs to the prevailing party in any action or proceeding to enforce certain civil rights acts. 42 U.S.C. § 1988.5 The parties do not dispute that section 1988 applies to this litigation.
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