Wiley v. Colvin

• Decision Date: 20 February 2015
• Docket Number: No. 12 C 9482,12 C 9482
• Parties: JIMMIE G. WILEY, Plaintiff, v. CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

JIMMIE G. WILEY, Plaintiff, v. CAROLYN W. COLVIN, ActingCommissioner of Social Security, Defendant.¹

No. 12 C 9482

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS EASTERN DIVISION

February 20, 2015

Magistrate Judge Mary M. Rowland

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Jimmie G. Wiley filed this action seeking reversal of the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (Commissioner) denying his application for Disability Insurance Benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act (Act). 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 423 et seq. The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of the United States Magistrate Judge, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), and Plaintiff has filed a motion for summary judgment. For the reasons stated below, the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. THE SEQUENTIAL EVALUATION PROCESS

To recover Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB), a claimant must establish that he or she is disabled within the meaning of the Act. York v. Massanari, 155 F. Supp.2d 973, 976-77 (N.D. Ill. 2001).² A person is disabled if he or she is unable to perform "any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1505(a). In determining whether a claimant suffers from a disability, the Commissioner conducts a standard five-step inquiry:

1. Is the claimant presently unemployed?

2. Does the claimant have a severe medically determinable physical or mental impairment that interferes with basic work-related activities and is expected to last at least 12 months?

3. Does the impairment meet or equal one of a list of specific impairments enumerated in the regulations?

4. Is the claimant unable to perform his or her former occupation?

5. Is the claimant unable to perform any other work?

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1509, 404.1520; see Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 868 (7th Cir. 2000). "An affirmative answer leads either to the next step, or, on steps 3 and 5, to a finding that the claimant is disabled. A negative answer at any point, other than step 3, stops inquiry and leads to a determination that the claimant is not disabled." Zalewski v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 160, 162 n.2 (7th Cir. 1985). "The burden of proof is on the claimant through step four; only at step five does the burden shift to the Commissioner." Clifford, 227 F.3d at 868.

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff applied for DIB on August 16, 2010, alleging that he became disabled on August 30, 2008, because of back injury, diabetes, high cholesterol, and high blood pressure. (R. at 49, 83). The application was denied initially on October 1, 2010, and upon reconsideration on December 23, 2010. (R. at 49). Plaintiff filed a timely request for a hearing and on December 6, 2011, Plaintiff, represented by counsel, testified at a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). (R. at 49). The ALJ also heard testimony from James M. McKenna, M.D., a medical expert (ME), and Thomas F. Dunleavy, a vocational expert (VE). (R. at 49). Juanita Wiley, Plaintiff's wife, was present at the hearing, but did not testify. (See R. at 3).

The ALJ denied Plaintiff's request for benefits on January 9, 2012. (R. at 49-56). Applying the five-step sequential evaluation process, the ALJ found, at step one, that Plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since August 30, 2008, the alleged onset date. (R. at 51). At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff's diabetes mellitus, diabetic neuropathy, degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine, and obesity are severe impairments. (R. at 51). At step three, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of any of the listings enumerated in the regulations. (R. at 52).

The ALJ then assessed Plaintiff's residual functional capacity (RFC)³ and determined that he retained a light level residual functional capacity (R. at 54) and could perform light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b) except that "[Plaintiff can] never climb long ladders, ropes or scaffolds; occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, crawl or climb short step ladders, ramps or stairs; avoid concentrated exposure to extreme cold or heat, vibration or unpredictable moving machinery; and avoid all exposure to unprotected heights." (R. at 52). Based on Plaintiff's RFC and the VE's testimony, the ALJ determined at step four that Plaintiff is unable to perform any past relevant work as a pipefitter [DOT #862.281-022] and plumber [DOT #862.381-030]. (R. at 55). At step five, based on Plaintiff's RFC, his vocational factors, and the VE's testimony, the ALJ determined that there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff can perform, including occupations such as general hardware sales [DOT #279.357-050], cashier [DOT #211.462-010], cafeteria attendant [DOT #311.677-010], and assembler [DOT #739.687-030]. (R. at 56). Accordingly, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not suffering from a disability as defined by the Act. (R. at 56).

The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review on October 10, 2012. (R. at 63-68). Plaintiff now seeks judicial review of the ALJ's decision, which stands as the final decision of the Commissioner. Villano v. Astrue, 556 F.3d 558, 561-62 (7th Cir. 2009).

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Judicial review of the Commissioner's final decision is authorized by 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) of the Social Security Act. In reviewing this decision, the Court may not engage in its own analysis of whether the plaintiff is severely impaired as defined by the Social Security Regulations. Young v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 995, 1001 (7th Cir. 2004). Nor may it "reweigh evidence, resolve conflicts in the record, decide questions of credibility, or, in general, substitute [its] own judgment for that of the Commissioner." Id. The Court's task is "limited to determining whether the ALJ's factual findings are supported by substantial evidence." Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)). Evidence is considered substantial "if a reasonable person would accept it as adequate to support a conclusion." Indoranto v. Barnhart, 374 F.3d 470, 473 (7th Cir. 2004); see Moore v. Colvin, 743 F.3d 1118, 1120-21 (7th Cir. 2014) ("We will uphold the ALJ's decision if it is supported by substantial evidence, that is, such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.") (citation omitted). "Substantial evidence must be more than a scintilla but may be less than a preponderance." Skinner v. Astrue, 478 F.3d 836, 841 (7th Cir. 2007). "In addition to relying on substantial evidence, the ALJ must also explain his analysis of the evidence with enough detail and clarity to permit meaningful appellate review." Briscoe ex rel. Taylor v. Barnhart, 425 F.3d 345, 351 (7th Cir. 2005).

Although this Court accords great deference to the ALJ's determination, it "must do more than merely rubber stamp the ALJ's decision." Scott v. Barnhart, 297 F.3d 589, 593 (7th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). "This deferential standard of review isweighted in favor of upholding the ALJ's decision, but it does not mean that we scour the record for supportive evidence or rack our brains for reasons to uphold the ALJ's decision. Rather, the ALJ must identify the relevant evidence and build a 'logical bridge' between that evidence and the ultimate determination." Moon v. Colvin, 763 F.3d 718, 721 (7th Cir. 2014). The Court must critically review the ALJ's decision to ensure that the ALJ has built an "accurate and logical bridge from the evidence to his conclusion." Young, 362 F.3d at 1002. Where the Commissioner's decision "lacks evidentiary support or is so poorly articulated as to prevent meaningful review, the case must be remanded." Steele v. Barnhart, 290 F.3d 936, 940 (7th Cir. 2002).

IV. MEDICAL EVIDENCE

On April 4, 2007, Plaintiff was involved in a motor vehicle accident. (R. at 53, 246). That same day, Plaintiff received emergency treatment at Edwards Hospital in Naperville, Illinois. (R. at 246). He was then transferred to Rush-Copley Medical Center in Aurora, Illinois. (R. at 246-47).

Beginning September 18, 2007, Plaintiff was seen at Rush-Copley Medical Center, primarily by Dr. Chen. (R. at 377, 379-406). On September 18, 2007, he had an MRI of the lumbar spine without contrast which revealed degenerative changes from T12 to S1 with mild foraminal and canal stenosis. (R. at 383, 453). On February 4, 2008, an exam revealed that Plaintiff was in no medical distress. His gait was stable with no limp; cranial nerves II through XII were intact; motor strength was 5/5 throughout; and straight leg raise (SLR) was positive on the left at 45 degreesand 75 degrees on the right. (R. at 453). Starting in February 2008, Plaintiff had lumbar transforaminal epidural steroid injections in the lumbar spine performed by Dr. Chen. (See R. 387). The injections were performed on February 4, 2008 (R. at 389); February 25, 2008 (R. at 392); March 24, 2008 (R. at 395); April 21, 2008 (R. at 398); and July 3, 2008 (R. at 401). Initially the pain decreased. (R. 392, 395). On May 6, 2008, an EMG-NCV revealed mild but suggestive findings of left L4-5 radiculopathy. (R. at 377). On September 25, 2008, due to his failure to improve with the epidural steroid injections, Plaintiff underwent a percutaneous lumbar disc decompression at left L4-5 and L5-S1. (R. at 453).

On October 31, 2008, Plaintiff had a follow up MRI of the lumbar spine. (R. at 377, 384). The MRI scan showed minimal interval progression of degeneration changes; L4-5 circumferential bulging of the disc with moderate to severe right foramina, moderate left foramina and mild canal stenosis, slightly progressed since previous exam; and L5-S1 circumferential bulging of the disc with moderate bilateral...