Wiley v. Connelly
| Decision Date | 18 June 1901 |
| Citation | 179 Mass. 360,60 N.E. 784 |
| Parties | WILEY v. CONNELLY. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
Frank A. Pease, for plaintiff.
Hugo A Dubuque, for defendant.
This is an action for money had and received. The case was heard by the court without a jury, on an agreed statement of facts which gave the court power to draw inferences of fact. There was a finding for the plaiantiff, and the case is here on the defendant's exceptions to the refusal of the court to give certain rulings that were asked for and to the rulings that were given.
The plaintiff claims under an assignment executed and delivered to him November 14, 1898, by one McKenna, of all the claims and demands which he had against one Yates. It is agreed that on that day McKenna had a valid claim of mechanic's lien on the real estate of Yates. On November 16th, McKenna duly filed in the registry of deeds a statement of said lien. The defendant claims under an assignment made to him on November 16th by said McKenna for the benefit of his creditors. On December 16th, Yates, paid to the defendant, as assignee, the amount of the lien. The court found that the payment was made in good faith by Yates, and in ignorance of the assignment to the plaintiff, and found or ruled that it discharged the lien. The defendant, who is an attorney at law, drew and filed the statement of lien for McKenna, and was told by McKenna before accepting the payment from Yates, that he had made the assignment to the plaintiff. But the defendant had never seen the instrument before the money was paid, and did not know its exact contents. The statement of lien, a copy of which was annexed to the agreed statement of facts, sets out, in substance, that McKenna furnished labor on a building belonging to Yates by virtue of an agreement made by him, with the consent of Yates, with a firm by the name of McNulty & Hoag. The court found that the assignment from McKenna to the plaintiff operated to assign the debt due McKenna from McNulty & Hoag, and carried with it a right to maintain an action in the name of McKenna to enforce the lien against the real estate of Yates. The court also found that by reason of his knowledge of the prior assignment to the plaintiff, and by reason of the fact that he was assignee solely for the benefit of creditors, the defendant received the money that was paid him by Yates in trust for the benefit of the plaintiff, and ruled that the plaintiff could maintain an action for money had and received to recover it.
So far as the above rulings and findings relate to matters of fact, they are not open to revision here; so far as they relate to matters of law, we see no error in them. The assignment from McKenna to the plaintiff manifestly transferred to the plaintiff what was due McKenna from McNulty & Hoag, and the right to enforce the lien in McKenna's name passed with the debt.
The objection that there was no lien, and that it could not be transferred, is not well taken. The lien was created as soon as the labor was performed or furnished. Clifton v Foster, 103 Mass. 233, 4 Am. Rep. 539. The filing of the certificate was not necessary in order to create the lien. It simply kept the lien alive, and prevented its dissolution, so that proceedings could be taken to enforce it. Clifton v. Foster, supra. We see nothing in the nature of a mechanic's lien which renders it unassignable, and there is nothing in the statutes creating such liens which forbids the assignment of them. The lien is intended as a security for those performing or furnishing labor or material or both on real estate, and we see no reason why it should not pass with an assignment of the debt which it secures. See Moore v. Dugan (Ma...
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