Wiley v. State, 95-DP-00149-SCT

Decision Date13 February 1997
Docket NumberNo. 95-DP-00149-SCT,95-DP-00149-SCT
Citation691 So.2d 959
PartiesWilliam L. WILEY v. STATE of Mississippi.
CourtMississippi Supreme Court

Page 959

691 So.2d 959
William L. WILEY
v.
STATE of Mississippi.
No. 95-DP-00149-SCT.
Supreme Court of Mississippi.
Feb. 13, 1997.

Page 960

Jack R. Jones, III, Taylor Jones Alexander Sorrell & McFall, Southaven, Susan M. Brewer, Brewer McReynolds & Ball, Southaven, for Appellant.

Michael C. Moore, Attorney General, Marvin L. White, Jr., Leslie S. Lee, Sp. Asst. Attorneys General, Jackson, for Appellee.

En Banc.

PRATHER, Presiding Justice, for the Court:

This capital murder case arises from an August, 1981, shooting/robbery in the Mineral Wells community of DeSoto County. The evidence reflects that J.B. Turner and his daughter were shot and robbed as they left Turner's small convenience store in the early morning hours of August 22, 1981. Turner was killed; his daughter was blinded and received other serious injuries. The murder weapon (a sawed-off shotgun that was traced to the defendant, William Wiley) was found in the undergrowth behind the store. Wiley, age 27, was later arrested. Thereafter, he confessed to waiting in the parking lot for his victims to close the store and then shooting and robbing them. He also led the police to the place where he had discarded the money bag.

During the past fifteen years, Wiley has been sentenced to death three times for the capital murder of J.B. Turner. From his third death sentence, Wiley now appeals to this Court. Because the issues raised by Wiley are without merit, the sentence of the trial court is affirmed.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Wiley was originally tried, convicted, and sentenced to death in February 1982. On direct appeal, this Court affirmed Wiley's conviction. However, the case was remanded for resentencing, due to comments by the prosecutor regarding the reviewability of the sentencing jury's decision. See Wiley v. State, 449 So.2d 756 (Miss.1984) (Wiley I ).

Wiley's second sentencing trial was held in June, 1984. The jury again sentenced Wiley to death, and that decision was affirmed by this Court. Wiley v. State, 484 So.2d 339 (Miss.1986) (Wiley II ), cert. denied Wiley v. Mississippi, 479 U.S. 906, 107 S.Ct. 304, 93 L.Ed.2d 278 (1986), overruled by Willie v. State, 585 So.2d 660 (Miss.1991).

Page 961

Thereafter, Wiley's request for post-conviction relief was denied. Wiley v. State, 517 So.2d 1373 (Miss.1987) (Wiley III ), cert. denied Wiley v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 1036, 108 S.Ct. 2024, 100 L.Ed.2d 610 (1988). Wiley then filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi. Via an unpublished memorandum, that court denied Wiley's petition.

Wiley next appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. That court held that Wiley's death sentence was improper because the sentencing jury was incorrectly instructed regarding the "especially heinous, atrocious or cruel" aggravating circumstance, pursuant to the United States Supreme Court decisions in Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 110 S.Ct. 1441, 108 L.Ed.2d 725 (1990), and Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 108 S.Ct. 1853, 100 L.Ed.2d 372 (1988). Wiley v. Puckett, 969 F.2d 86, 105-106 (5th Cir.1992) (Wiley IV ). The Fifth Circuit instructed the District Court to issue a writ of habeas corpus unless the State of Mississippi initiated appropriate state court proceedings within a reasonable time. Id.

The State did not initiate such proceedings, and Wiley filed a motion and application for life sentence, or, in the alternative, for a new sentencing hearing. In October 1993, this Court ordered a new sentencing hearing for Wiley. Wiley v. State, 635 So.2d 802 (Miss.1993) (Wiley V ). In February 1995, Wiley was sentenced, once again, to death. From that judgment, he appeals, and raises the following issues:

I. WAS THE SENTENCE OF DEATH IMPOSED UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF PASSION, PREJUDICE AND/OR OTHER ARBITRARY FACTORS?

A. DID THE TRIAL JUDGE IMPROPERLY TELL THE VENIRE ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF PAROLE?

B. DID THE PROSECUTOR MAKE AN IMPROPER COMMENT DURING CLOSING ARGUMENT?

C. DID THE TRIAL JUDGE ERR BY NOT GIVING A "DIMINISHED CAPACITY" INSTRUCTION TO THE JURY?

II. IS THE SENTENCE OF DEATH EXCESSIVE AND/OR DISPROPORTIONATE?

LEGAL ANALYSIS

I. WAS THE SENTENCE OF DEATH IMPOSED UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF PASSION, PREJUDICE AND/OR OTHER ARBITRARY FACTORS?

Wiley contends that the sentencing jury acted under the influence of passion, prejudice, and arbitrariness--in violation of Miss.Code Ann. § 99-19-105(3)(a). 1 He raises three arguments: (A) that the trial judge improperly told the venire during voir dire about the possibility of parole should Wiley receive a life sentence; (B) that the prosecutor made an improper comment during closing arguments; and (C) that the trial judge incorrectly refused to give a "diminished capacity" instruction.

A. DID THE TRIAL JUDGE IMPROPERLY TELL THE VENIRE ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF PAROLE?

Wiley first contends that the jury was improperly told about the possibility of parole, should he be sentenced to life in prison. The record reflects that the trial judge was repeatedly questioned by the veniremen during voir dire regarding the possibility of parole in the event that a life sentence should be imposed. Wiley bases his argument on the following interactions with the venire during voir dire:

Q. [BY THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY:] But the point is under state law sentencing is individualized. Okay? You've got to hear the evidence, good and bad, about this man and what he did to Mr. Turner in August of 1981 before you can

Page 962

weigh it. There's no automatic death. There may be cases where the death penalty is not the proper punishment. There may be cases where it is. But in order to comply with state law, those elements have to be weighed by a jury. Okay?

Yes, Sir?

A. [Prospective Juror No. 32]. Could you be a little more specific as to what process you're going to go through to have us arrive at this decision?

* * * * * *

[BY THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY:] We're going to have to show you the proof. Otherwise, I don't know how you could make a decision. Does that answer you?

A. Thank you.

Q. Yes, ma'am?

A. (Unidentified Prospective Juror) I have a question. Is this life with no parole or do they--will there be an opportunity for this jury to distinguish no parole as opposed to the death penalty?

THE COURT: The law says life in prison. The courts or the juries have absolutely nothing to do with parole laws. If the jury finds this person guilty, which has been done, if the jury sentences him to life, we don't know whether it's life with or without because that's up to the executive department. When a jury speaks and when the Court sentences, we're through with that part of it.

BY [THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY]:

Q. Ma'am, does that--

A. I didn't know if there was an alternative of no parole.

A. (Unidentified Prospective Juror) So he could get out after 20 years?

THE COURT: I think the jury must--I can't answer those type questions. I think the jury is just going to have to approach it as the prosecutor has been saying--take this, take this and weigh it and make your decision based upon the way you see the evidence, not upon some uncertainty unknown down the road which you have no control over and I have no control over and just call it the way you see it at the conclusion of the trial. That's the only thing we can do. All those contingencies, I don't know what the answers are, nor does anyone else.

I would go back just a minute. I think [the District Attorney] is about to wind down here. If you went back 20 or 30 years ago, the Legislature in Jackson determined what cases carried the death penalty. That didn't make any allowance for local feelings or decisions. Now, if a certain offense falls within this category, then it's up to the people in DeSoto County up here to determine whether that's a vote death penalty case or a life in prison case. It individualizes rather than a big body like the Legislature trying to speak for the state as a whole. It gives the local people an opportunity to take into consideration the crimes and also take into consideration the defendant himself and everything that can be legally admissible about him where you can make the decision based upon all the evidence that can be made available to you rather than just having a category. I don't know whether that helped you or not, but it will never be taken away from you. You will be the ultimate decision makers.

* * * * * *

[BY THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY]: Anybody else having problems with the death penalty?

Yes, Ma'am?

A. [Prospective Juror] No. 183.

Q. [No. 183]?

A. I just have a question. If the jury decides--does not unanimously decide for the death penalty and life imprisonment is the decision, who--when is--when is it justified--when would it ever be decided that it would definitely be life without parole? I was under the impression that decision could be made in lieu of the death penalty. And what I'm understanding you to say is that the death penalty is not the choice--there is a possibility that he would be given life imprisonment with parole as a possibility. Is that what you're saying?

Page 963

THE COURT: That's a possibility, yes.

PROSPECTIVE JUROR [No. 183]: But no jury has the right to say that it's life without parole?

THE COURT: The current status of the law is I'll instruct you as to exactly what the law says now, and that is if you prescribe death, that's your decision; if you prescribe life in prison, that's your decision. Those are the two options that I'll be--

PROSPECTIVE JUROR [No. 183]: So that is an option?

THE COURT: Yes. It will be in clear black and white print just like I said it just then.

A. [Prospective Juror No. 182] Is that like a hole in the law? To me--I don't know the circumstances of the case or what happened, and if I look at this case and see that I think this man would be a menace to society for the rest of his life and I don't vote for the death penalty but life imprisonment, I would be...

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