Wilford v. State
Decision Date | 26 February 2016 |
Docket Number | No. 49S02–1602–CR–110.,49S02–1602–CR–110. |
Citation | 50 N.E.3d 371 |
Parties | Lamont WILFORD, Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee. |
Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
Ruth Johnson, Suzy St. John, Marion County Public Defender Agency, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellant.
Gregory F. Zoeller, Attorney General of Indiana, Ellen H. Meilaender, James B. Martin, Deputy Attorneys General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.
On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 49A02–1408–CR–534
RUSH
, Chief Justice.
Both the Federal and State Constitutions protect Hoosiers' private property from unreasonable State intrusion. And so, every inquiry into a warrantless impoundment and inventory search of a vehicle—like any other warrantless search or seizure—ultimately depends on whether those measures were reasonable based on the surrounding facts.
Here, police impounded Defendant's car from a parking lot because he was arrested for driving while suspended, the registered owner (his sister) was not present, and the car's windshield and bumper were damaged. Police then began to inventory the car and found a handgun inside, resulting in Defendant being charged with, and ultimately convicted of, carrying a handgun without a license.
Although such discretionary impounds may be permissible as part of law enforcement's community-caretaking function, they require proof of, among other things, an established departmental procedure that authorized the impoundment. Fair v. State, 627 N.E.2d 427, 433 (Ind.1993)
. Here, the State presented only the officer's bare assertion that such a policy existed and that his actions were consistent with the policy—but just as in Fair, there was no evidence of the particulars of that policy. We therefore hold that the State failed to prove an established departmental procedure as Fair requires, and thus failed to prove that the impoundment was reasonable. Consequently, the search that followed was unreasonable and the handgun obtained pursuant to the invalid search was inadmissible. We accordingly reverse Defendant's handgun conviction.
Facts and Procedural History
While driving through northwest Indianapolis, Lamont Wilford, Jr. was pulled over by Officer Eli Raisovich of the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department (“IMPD”) because the vehicle exhibited “multiple equipment problems”—namely, a damaged rear end, a broken tail light, and a cracked windshield. The car Wilford was driving belonged to his sister, who had lent it to Wilford's father, who had, in turn, lent it to him shortly before the traffic stop. Wilford pulled into the parking lot of a Planet Fitness gym, stopped the car, and produced an Indiana identification card.
Upon learning Wilford's license was suspended, Officer Raisovich (who was accompanied by a TV news film crew and on-air personality) radioed for backup, handcuffed Wilford, and placed him in the rear of a police cruiser. The officer then decided to impound the car “because of the unsafe condition of it and the fact that ... Wilford was being arrested and he was not the owner of the vehicle.” He further explained, “[W]ith our procedures in that situation, we towed the vehicle.” Prior to towing, police searched the vehicle and found a handgun, which Wilford was not licensed to carry. The record does not show whether police made any effort to contact Wilford's sister to retrieve her car, nor was any inventory sheet admitted into evidence.
At a bench trial, the court admitted the handgun over Wilford's objections and convicted him of carrying a handgun without a license and driving while suspended with a prior suspension—both as Class A misdemeanors. He was sentenced to 365 days, with 357 days suspended to probation, and a $100.00 fine. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding the impoundment and inventory search satisfied Fair 's requirements because the damaged, unsafe car posed a threat to the community or itself and the testimony from the impounding officer (a twenty-three-year IMPD veteran) sufficed as evidence of departmental procedures. Wilford v. State, 31 N.E.3d 1023, 1031–32 (Ind.Ct.App.2015)
. We now grant transfer, thus vacating the Court of Appeals opinion, Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A)(2), and reverse Wilford's handgun conviction.
Standard of Review
Although Fourth Amendment and Article 1, Section 11
questions require independent analyses, their answers turn on the same factor—reasonableness. The State bears the burden of proving warrantless impoundments and inventory searches are reasonable under both the Fourth Amendment and Article 1, Section 11. Fair, 627 N.E.2d at 431 (Fourth Amendment) ; Taylor v. State, 842 N.E.2d 327, 334 (Ind.2006) (Article 1, Section 11 ). Our evaluation requires that “we examine the evidence favorable to the trial court's decision, with all disputes resolved in favor of the ruling,” and also consider “any uncontested evidence favorable to the appellant.” Fair, 627 N.E.2d at 434. And we will overturn the trial court's factual findings only if they are clearly erroneous. Id. But the ultimate determination of “reasonableness” is a constitutional legal question meriting independent consideration by this Court. Id.
Discussion and Decision
Both the Fourth Amendment and Article 1, Section 11
protect “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects” against unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV ; Ind. Const. art. 1, § 11. Automobiles are among the “effects” protected by these provisions. Brown v. State, 653 N.E.2d 77, 79, 81 (Ind.1995). Thus, when police impound a vehicle and inventory its contents, they effect a search and seizure, and both measures must be reasonable—that is, executed under a valid warrant or a recognized exception to the warrant requirement. Taylor, 842 N.E.2d at 330.
The inventory search is one such exception since it serves an administrative, not investigatory, purpose—because when police lawfully impound a vehicle, they must also perform an administrative inventory search to document the vehicle's contents to preserve them for the owner and protect themselves against claims of lost or stolen property. Id. at 330–31
. Consequently, proper impoundment is the “threshold question” to valid inventory search. Fair, 627 N.E.2d at 431. Nevertheless, as with any warrantless search or seizure, the State bears the burden of proving reasonableness, id. at 430, and that is where our analysis begins.
Impoundment is reasonable if it is authorized either by statute or the police's discretionary community-caretaking function. Id. at 431–32
. Impoundment pursuant to a statute is necessarily reasonable because the Legislature has deemed that citizens' privacy interests in their cars yield to State interests in those circumstances, making police inventorying a necessary collateral administrative function. Discretionary impoundment, by contrast, is an exercise of the police community-caretaking function in order to protect the car and community from hazards. Discretionary impoundments, too, may be reasonable—but as we recognized in Fair, and more recently in Taylor, they are vulnerable to constitutional reasonableness challenges because of their potential for misuse as pretext for warrantless investigative searches under the guise of inventory. See
Fair, 627 N.E.2d at 435 ; Taylor, 842 N.E.2d at 331–33. Unless the impoundment is proper, then, an inventory search is per se unreasonable and any contraband found during the search is inadmissible “poisoned fruit.”
Here, we must decide whether impounding Wilford's vehicle was reasonable—and because we find no statute specifically authorizing this impoundment,1 we focus on the community-caretaking function.
Community safety often requires police to impound vehicles because they are abandoned and obstruct traffic, create a nuisance, or invite thieves and vandals. See Fair, 627 N.E.2d at 431–33
. These impoundments fall under the police's “community caretaking function”—a catchall term for “the wide range of responsibilities that police officers must discharge aside from their criminal enforcement activities.” Id. at 431 (quoting United States v. Rodriguez–Morales, 929 F.2d 780, 785 (1st Cir.1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1030, 112 S.Ct. 868, 116 L.Ed.2d 774 (1992) ). Indeed, besides enforcing criminal laws, police “aid those in distress, combat actual hazards, prevent potential hazards ... and provide an infinite variety of services to preserve and protect community safety.” Rodriguez–Morales, 929 F.2d at 784–85.
We have said that “police may discharge their caretaking function whenever circumstances compel it,” Fair, 627 N.E.2d at 432
, but also that a decision to impound “must be ‘exercised according to standard criteria and on the basis of something other than suspicion of evidence of criminal activity.’ ” Id. (quoting Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 375, 107 S.Ct. 738, 93 L.Ed.2d 739 (1987) ). Otherwise, community-caretaking impoundments could too readily be used “for a general rummaging in order to discover incriminating evidence” under the pretext of an administrative inventory. Id. at 435 (quoting Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 4, 110 S.Ct. 1632, 109 L.Ed.2d 1 (1990) ).
In view of that potential for pretext, Fair set forth a strict two-prong standard for proving that the decision to impound a person's vehicle without a warrant was reasonable:
Id. at 433. The State must satisfy both elements—so if it cannot meet one, we need not consider the other. Taylor, 842 N.E.2d at 333
. Here, we focus solely on...
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