Wilhelm v. Ryan

• Decision Date: 18 July 2006
• Docket Number: No. 175, 2005.,175, 2005.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Delaware
• Parties: Roger WILHELM, Jr., Plaintiff Below, Appellant, v. Catherine RYAN and Mary K. Ryan, Defendant Below, Appellees.

903 A.2d 745

Roger WILHELM, Jr., Plaintiff Below, Appellant, v. Catherine RYAN and Mary K. Ryan, Defendant Below, Appellees.

No. 175, 2005.

Supreme Court of Delaware.

Submitted: June 14, 2006.

Decided: July 18, 2006.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Court Below: Superior Court of the State of Delaware in and for New Castle County, C.A. No. 03C-05-016.

Upon appeal from the Superior Court. AFFIRMED.

Joseph M. Jachetti, Kenneth R. Schuster & Associates, P.C., Wilmington, Delaware, for appellant.

Edward F. Kafader, Wilmington, Delaware, for appellees.

Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and BERGER, Justices.

STEELE, Chief Justice.

Catherine Ryan, the defendant appellee, operated her vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. She disobeyed a traffic signal and collided with Cameron Logan's vehicle. Logan's vehicle then spun out of control and struck Robert Wilhelm's vehicle. Logan later died from injuries suffered in the accident. Ryan pleaded guilty to vehicular homicide as a result of causing Logan's death.

Wilhelm brought a civil suit against Ryan claiming negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. Wilhelm sought compensatory and punitive damages for his claims. Before trial, Ryan sent Wilhelm an offer of judgment for $25,000. Wilhelm rejected the offer and the case went to a trial before a jury. The jury returned a verdict in Wilhelm's favor and awarded him $4,108 in compensatory damages. As the prevailing party, Wilhelm filed a motion for costs under Superior Court Civil Rule 54(d). The trial judge granted Wilhelm's motion for his costs incurred before the offer of judgment, but denied his motion for his costs incurred after the offer of judgment. Moreover, the trial judge granted Ryan her costs incurred after the offer of judgment under Superior Court Civil Rule 68.

On appeal Wilhelm raises three claims of error: (1) the trial judge erred by denying his motion in limine to exclude Ryan's testimony about her criminal conviction and remorse for her actions; (2) the trial judge erred by denying his motion for a new trial or additur; and (3) the trial judge erred by failing to grant him the costs he incurred after Ryan's offer of judgment. Because the trial judge acted within his discretion and committed no legal error, we affirm.

I. Facts

On May 6, 2001, Ryan operated her motor vehicle on Route 202 in New Castle County while she was under the influence of alcohol. Ryan, who drove at approximately 80 mph, disobeyed a traffic signal and collided with Logan's vehicle. Logan's vehicle then spun out of control and struck Wilhelm's vehicle. After the collision, Wilhelm got out of his vehicle and attempted to help Logan and Ryan. Wilhelm approached Logan's vehicle and observed Logan bleeding from his eyes, mouth, nose and ears. Wilhelm then attempted to assist Logan with his injuries.¹ Logan died shortly after the accident, and Wilhelm witnessed Logan's death.

Because of the accident, Wilhelm developed pain in his neck and back.² Wilhelm visited his primary physician on May 8, 2001 to discuss his physical injuries and the shock of witnessing Logan's death. Wilhelm also had an MRI scan. This 2001 MRI scan, according to Ryan's medical expert, revealed substantially the same condition that a 1998 MRI scan had indicated.³ Wilhelm visited his physician two more times in the summer of 2001.⁴ Wilhelm did not visit his physician again until January of 2003 when he again complained of severe neck pain. Wilhelm's physician then ordered him to undergo another MRI scan. This 2003 MRI scan revealed a major disc herniation that the earlier MRIs did not reveal.⁵ On August 25, 2003, two years after his accident with Ryan, Wilhelm had surgery to repair two herniated discs in his back.⁶

Wilhelm filed a lawsuit against Ryan for negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress and punitive damages. In addition to pain and suffering, Wilhelm claimed that he sustained wage loss and medical bills of $72,000 directly resulting from Ryan's negligence.

The case went to trial before a jury. Ryan conceded liability and contested damages. A Superior Court jury returned a verdict granting Wilhelm $4,108 in compensatory damages and no punitive damages.⁷ After the trial, the trial judge awarded Wilhelm, as the "prevailing party," his costs incurred before the offer of judgment, but required Wilhelm to pay both his and Ryan's costs incurred after the offer of judgment because Ryan's timely $25,000 offer of judgment exceeded the jury's award.

II. Wilhelm's claims on appeal

A. Wilhelm's claim that the trial judge erred by denying his motion in limine to exclude Ryan's testimony about her criminal conviction and remorse over Logan's death.

Before trial, Wilhelm filed a motion in limine to exclude Ryan's testimony about Ryan's criminal conviction, remorse for her actions, and planned reconciliation with Logan's mother.⁸ The trial judge denied Wilhelm's motion.

Wilhelm now claims that the trial judge abused his discretion by failing to grant his motion in limine to exclude Ryan's testimony because Ryan's testimony about her criminal conviction (both the crime to which she pleaded guilty and the sentence she received) was not admissible under Delaware common law. Wilhelm also argues that Ryan's testimony, if admissible under Delaware common law, was irrelevant or, if relevant, was unfairly prejudicial. Ryan counters by asserting that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion by admitting her testimony about her criminal punishment because the testimony was relevant and highly probative to mitigate Wilhlem's claim for punitive damages. Therefore, the primary issue with respect to this contention is whether Delaware's law allows a defendant's earlier criminal conviction to be admitted to mitigate a plaintiff's civil claim for punitive damages when the plaintiff's civil claim for punitive damages arises from the same actions for which the defendant received a criminal sentence. Whether Delaware permits a party to introduce evidence of a criminal conviction to mitigate a civil claim for punitive damages is a question of law. We review questions of law de novo.⁹

In his opening brief, Wilhelm relied on Armstrong v. Rhoades¹⁰ and Keller v. Taylor¹¹ to suggest that Delaware's common law prohibited the admission of Ryan's testimony to mitigate punitive damages.¹² Putting aside the fact that these cases are over 100 years old, Wilhelm's reliance is misplaced. Neither Armstrong nor Keller involved a claim for punitive damages; in both cases the Superior Court merely held that evidence of a criminal conviction could not be admitted to mitigate compensatory damages.

We would not be able to conclude that the trial judge legally erred by failing to follow either Armstrong or Keller. Ryan's counsel, following his ethical duty to cite all relevant cases, however, brought Jefferson v. Adams¹³ to our attention in his answering brief.¹⁴ We discuss Jefferson to remove any confusion about whether a defendant's earlier criminal conviction is admissible to mitigate a plaintiff's civil claim for punitive damages.

In Jefferson, the plaintiff brought a civil lawsuit against the defendant for compensatory and punitive damages because the defendant forcibly entered the plaintiff's home and violently assaulted him. By the time of trial in the plaintiff's civil case, the defendant had been convicted and sentenced for a criminal offense. The defendant contended that his criminal conviction and substantial fine barred the plaintiff's claim for punitive damages, or in the alternative, were proper evidence admissible to mitigate punitive damages. The trial judge determined that the plaintiff's claim for punitive damages was not barred and that the defendant's criminal conviction was not admissible to mitigate punitive damages:

It was for the jury to say whether there were circumstances of aggravation in this case, which ought in their judgment, to require a departure from the general rule of compensatory damages; and which called on them to add any thing by way of public example or punishment. As to the proceedings in the criminal court, they were not evidence, and could not have been given in evidence in this case, and were not to enter into the consideration of the jury in deciding it either as to the propriety of a verdict against the defendants, or for the amount of the damages. The indictment was between other parties; the State and these defendants, and not this plaintiff and the defendants; the verdict was rendered upon other testimony than that given in this case; even upon the testimony of the plaintiff himself and his wife; and the punishment, if any such has been inflicted, had reference to the public peace and not to this plaintiff's wrongs. It would obviously, therefore, be improper that these proceedings in the criminal court should enter into the present case for any purpose.¹⁵

Jefferson suggests that evidence of a defendant's criminal conviction should not be admissible where a plaintiff brings a civil claim for punitive damages out of the same set of facts because criminal punishment and punitive damages serve two separate purposes. In other words, criminal punishment provides retribution for the public while punitive damages provide retribution for the plaintiff. We can endorse Jefferson for the proposition that a defendant's earlier criminal conviction does not bar a plaintiff's civil claim for punitive damages on Double Jeopardy grounds,¹⁶ but we cannot follow Jefferson's apparent holding that a defendant's criminal conviction is not relevant to mitigate an award of punitive damages.¹⁷ In other words, we think the preferable rule is that a defendant's criminal conviction will not prohibit a plaintiff's civil claim for punitive damages, but the defendant will be permitted to admit evidence of her...