Wilkerson v. Hammond
| Decision Date | 07 November 2013 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 13-cv-815-GPM |
| Parties | DAVID WILKERSON, # N-63615, Plaintiff, v. RYAN HAMMOND, ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, WEXFORD HEALTH SOURCES, INC., CHRISTINE BROWN, SARAH JOHNSON, TERRI ANDERSON, and GODINEZ, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Illinois |
Plaintiff David Wilkerson, an inmate currently incarcerated at Menard Correctional Center ("Menard"), brings this pro se action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, based on events that transpired during his incarceration at Pinckneyville Correctional Center ("Pinckneyville"). Plaintiff is serving two 60-year sentences for aggravated criminal sexual assault and aggravated kidnapping, and a 30-year sentence for attempted aggravated criminal sexual assault. Plaintiff sues Defendants for violation of his constitutional rights, discrimination, conspiracy, and retaliation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985-86, the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-213, and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 ("Rehabilitation Act"), 29 U.S.C. § 794. He also asserts a medical malpractice claim under Illinois law. Plaintiff seeks monetary damages.
This case is now before the Court for a preliminary review of the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Under § 1915A, the Court is required to promptly screen prisonercomplaints to filter out nonmeritorious claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court is required to dismiss any portion of the complaint that is legally frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or asks for money damages from a defendant who by law is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
Plaintiff is paralyzed and confined to a wheelchair, as a result of a spinal cord injury he sustained prior to his incarceration (Doc. 1, p. 2). In the complaint, Plaintiff describes four separate incidents that occurred in connection with this medical condition while he was housed at Pinckneyville between June 6th and August 21st, 2012. Although the allegations are often unclear, the four incidents are summarized, to the extent possible, below.
First, Plaintiff alleges that he cannot physically transfer himself into or out of his wheelchair without experiencing pain and risking further injury (Doc. 1, p. 5). Rather than provide a trained medical professional to assist Plaintiff with these transfers, Pinckneyville staff routinely ordered other inmates to physically transfer Plaintiff into his wheelchair, shower, and bed (Doc. 1, p. 4). These inmates had no medical training or supervision by medical staff. As a result, they sometimes dropped Plaintiff or caused him to fall onto the floor.
Second, Plaintiff alleges that Pinckneyville correctional officers and medical staff conspired to deprive him of proper medical care in retaliation for filing grievances. Together, they routinely denied Plaintiff treatment for bed sores and showers. Showers were particularly important because Plaintiff required the use of a catheter and a colostomy and urine bag, which sometimes leaked or burst (Doc. 1, pp. 3-4). Plaintiff could not clean himself up because he was denied shower access (Doc. 1, p. 4). Consequently, he developed bed sores. During the 3:00 p.m. - 11:00 p.m. shift, Pinckneyville medical staff refused Plaintiff's requests for treatmentof his bed sores or a shower, explaining that they were only dispensing medication (Doc. 1, p. 9). During the 11:00 p.m. - 7:00 a.m. shift, Pinckneyville correctional officers would then accuse Plaintiff of refusing treatment and showers. Over time, Plaintiff's bed sores became infected. Upon transferring to Menard, Plaintiff tested positive for infection and required a three-week course of intravenous medications from August 24th - September 17th, 2012 (Doc. 1, p. 7).
Third, Plaintiff was subjected to the use of excessive force and denial of medical care by Defendant Hammond (Pinckneyville correctional officer) on June 20, 2012 (Doc. 1, p. 6). At the time, Plaintiff was seated in his wheelchair and handcuffed, awaiting a shower and bed sore treatment. Defendant Hammond grabbed Plaintiff's wheelchair from behind and repeatedly rammed it into the wall, causing Plaintiff to fall forward and hit his head. Defendant Hammond then ran Plaintiff's wheelchair into another inmate and the exit doors. Plaintiff sustained a knot on his forehead and broken, bleeding toenails. When he requested medical attention, Defendant Hammond told him to "shut the f*** up." Defendant Hammond denied Plaintiff a shower and treatment of his bed sores, head injury, and bleeding toenails (Doc. 1, p. 6). Plaintiff was apparently denied medical treatment and a shower that day, and every day, from June 6th until August 21st, 2012 (Doc. 1, p. 7). When Plaintiff asked why he was denied these services, other unidentified correctional officers told Plaintiff that he was on the "shit list."
Finally, Plaintiff asserts that Pinckneyville's showers and cells were inaccessible to him (Doc. 1, p. 5). The showers had no handrails, non-slip flooring, or shower chairs with removable arms. Plaintiff also could not safely access his cell (Doc. 1, p. 8). Once inside, he was far removed from medical providers and supplies, and his cell lacked an emergency call button.
Plaintiff complained directly to Defendant Brown (Pinckneyville's health care unit administrator) about the denial of medical care, his lack of access to bathing facilities, and thepractice of allowing fellow inmates to transfer him (Doc. 1, p. 4). Defendant Brown disregarded his complaints. Plaintiff also filed grievances complaining about the denial of medical care and the conditions of his confinement to Defendants Johnson (ARB1 member), Anderson (ARB member), and Godinez (IDOC2 director), to no avail.
Plaintiff now sues Defendants Hammond, Brown, Johnson, Anderson, and Godinez, as well as Wexford Health Sources, Inc. ("Wexford") and the Illinois Department of Corrections ("IDOC"), for violations of the First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. In addition, Plaintiff asserts statutory claims against Defendants under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985-86, the ADA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-213, and the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794. Finally, he raises a state law medical malpractice claim.
The Court finds it convenient to divide the complaint into nine counts. The parties and the Court will use these designations in all future pleadings and orders, unless otherwise directed by a judicial officer of this Court.
Count 1: Eighth Amendment claim for use of excessive force against Plaintiff.
Count 2: Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate indifference to Plaintiff's medical needs.
Count 3: Eighth Amendment claim for unconstitutional conditions of confinement.
Count 4: First Amendment claim for retaliating against Plaintiff for filing grievances.
Count 5: Fourteenth Amendment claim for denying Plaintiff's grievances.
Count 6: Conspiracy claim under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985-86.
Count 7: Rehabilitation Act claim under 29 U.S.C. § 794.
Count 8: ADA claim under 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-213.
Count 9: State law medical malpractice claim for denying Plaintiff adequate medical treatment.
Upon careful review of the complaint and supporting exhibits, the Court finds it appropriate to exercise its authority under § 1915A; portions of this action are subject to summary dismissal.
Count 1 - Excessive Force
Accepting Plaintiff's allegations as true, the Court finds that Plaintiff has articulated a colorable Eighth Amendment excessive force claim (Count 1) against Defendant Hammond for injuring Plaintiff by repeatedly running him into a wall and door while Plaintiff was handcuffed and confined to a wheelchair. Plaintiff shall be allowed to proceed on Count 1 against Defendant Hammond.
However, Plaintiff has not included sufficient allegations in the complaint to implicate the personal participation of any other defendants in this constitutional violation. "Section 1983 creates a cause of action based on personal liability and predicated upon fault; thus liability does not attach unless the individual defendant caused or participated in a constitutional deprivation." Vance v. Peters, 97 F.3d 987, 991 (7th Cir. 1996). Therefore, to be held liable under § 1983, a defendant must have participated directly in the constitutional violation. The complaint contains no allegations suggesting that Defendants Brown, Johnson, Anderson, or Godinez were directly involved in the assault. Further, the IDOC is not a "person" within the meaning of the Civil Rights Act and is not subject to a § 1983 suit." Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). See also Wynn v. Southward, 251 F.3d 588, 592 (7th Cir. 2001) (); Billman v. Ind. Dep'tof Corr., 56 F.3d 785, 788 (7th Cir. 1995) (). Finally, Plaintiff makes no allegation that Wexford played any role in this constitutional violation. Therefore, Plaintiff shall not be allowed to proceed on Count 1 against Defendants IDOC, Wexford, Brown, Johnson, Anderson, or Godinez.
Count 2 - Deliberate Indifference to Serious Medical Needs
Plaintiff has articulated a colorable Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate indifference to his medical needs (Count 2) against Defendants Hammond and Brown for refusing Plaintiff's direct requests for medical care to treat his bed sores, injured toes, and/or head injury, and his requests for the assistance of trained professionals with his transfers. Plaintiff has also stated a claim against Wexford for instituting a policy or practice of providing inmate-assisted medical care to Plaintiff, in violation of his constitutional rights. See Minix v. Canarecci, 597 F.3d 824, 832 (7th Cir. 2010) ()....
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