Wilkerson v. Monsanto Co., 1:90-CV-0408.

Decision Date06 November 1991
Docket NumberNo. 1:90-CV-0408.,1:90-CV-0408.
Citation782 F. Supp. 1187
PartiesGary F. WILKERSON, et ux. v. MONSANTO COMPANY.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Texas

John D. Stone, Stone & Stone, Beaumont, Tex., for plaintiffs.

Tanner T. Hunt, Jr., Wells, Peyton, Beard, Greenberg, Hunt & Crawford, Beaumont, Tex., for defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

COBB, District Judge.

Defendant Monsanto Company ("Monsanto") moves for summary judgment in this Texas Workers' Compensation case. Monsanto contends that it is the statutory employer of the plaintiff, Gary Wilkerson, and is therefore immune from suit under the exclusive remedy provisions of the Texas Workers' Compensation Act. Because a premises owner is not a prime contractor under the relevant provisions of the Texas Workers' Compensation Act, the motion for summary judgment is denied.

In June, 1988, Monsanto contracted with Austin Industries ("Austin") for construction services at Monsanto's Chocolate Bayou Plant near Alvin, Texas. Under that agreement, Monsanto provided workers compensation coverage for Austin's employees "for work performed at the Project Site or the ways immediately adjoining the Project Site." See Exhibit B, § 3.1.1.

Wilkerson now sues Monsanto at common law for injuries he allegedly received at the Chocolate Bayou Plant in July, 1988. Monsanto claims that because Monsanto provided workers compensation coverage for Wilkerson while he worked at the Chocolate Bayou Plant, it is a statutory employer entitled to immunity from suit under the exclusive remedy provisions of the Act.

Monsanto is not, however, the statutory employer. The agreement, drafted by Monsanto, refers to Monsanto Company as "Monsanto" and to Austin Industrial, Inc. as "Contractor." See Exhibit A. Later, the contract states, "Neither Contractor nor anyone employed or engaged by him shall become an agent, representative, servant or employee of Monsanto in the performance of the Work or any part thereof." Exhibit B, § 43.1.

At the time of injury the Texas Workers Compensation Act provided:

(a) A subcontractor and prime contractor may make a written contract whereby the prime contractor will provide workers' compensation benefits to the subcontractor and to employees of the subcontractor. ... In any such contract, the sub-contractor and his employees shall be considered employees of the prime contractor only for purposes of the workers' compensation laws of this state and for no other purpose.
(b) The term `subcontractor' means a person who has contracted to perform all or any part of the work or services which a prime contractor has contracted with another party to perform.
(c) The term `prime contractor' includes `principal contractor,' `original contractor,' or `general contractor' as those terms are commonly used and means the person who has undertaken to procure the performance of work or services.

TEX.REV.CIV.STAT.ANN. art. 8307, § 6 (Vernon 1991), now TEX.REV.CIV.STAT. ANN. art. 8308-3.05 (Vernon 1991). The Workers' Compensation Act further provided that an injured worker's exclusive remedy against his or her employer was under the Act. TEX.REV.CIV.STAT.ANN. art. 8306, § 3 (Vernon 1967), now TEX.REV. STAT.ANN. art. 8308-4.01(a).

In the absence of Texas authority to the contrary, this court must give the Texas statute its plain meaning. The words of the statute provide that general contractors, as that term is commonly understood, may become statutory employers for workers' compensation purposes and thus become eligible for immunity from suit. The definitions of prime contractors and subcontractors in the statute clearly indicates that a prime contractor is one who "has contracted with another party to perform" work or services. As a landowner who contracted to have certain work done on its property,...

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5 cases
  • Entergy Gulf States, Inc. v. Summers
    • United States
    • Texas Supreme Court
    • 3 Abril 2009
    ...is the very phrase that Summers argues prevents a premises owner from also being the general contractor. See Wilkerson v. Monsanto Co., 782 F.Supp. 1187, 1188-89 (E.D.Tex.1991) (interpreting "contracted with another party" in the pre-1989 definition to mean the prime contractor and premises......
  • Williams v. Brown & Root, Inc.
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • 6 Junio 1997
    ...did not contract with the owner, but instead was the owner, Eastman was not protected by Article 8308-3.05. Wilkerson v. Monsanto Co., 782 F.Supp. 1187, 1189 (E.D.Tex.1991). However, Williams cannot argue that the summary judgment in favor of Eastman somehow eviscerates Brown & Root's right......
  • Cho v. Itco, Inc., 1:91-CV-0838.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Texas
    • 2 Enero 1992
    ... ... Smith v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 875 F.2d 1325, 1328 (7th Cir.1989); Lee v. Washington Co. Bd. of Ed., ... ...
  • Summers v. Entergy Gulf States, Inc.
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • 30 Diciembre 2004
    ...arguably was not protected.1 Id. The court cited Wilkerson v. Monsanto Co., 782 F.Supp. 1187, 1189 (E.D.Tex.1991), in support. The court in Monsanto found that "[a]s a landowner who contracted to have certain work done on its property, Monsanto is the principal. Monsanto is not in the postu......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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