Wilkes County v. Tankersley

• Decision Date: 14 February 1923
• Docket Number: 13521.
• Citation: 116 S.E. 212,29 Ga.App. 624
• Parties: WILKES COUNTY v. TANKERSLEY.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

116 S.E. 212

29 Ga.App. 624

WILKES COUNTY v. TANKERSLEY.

No. 13521.

Court of Appeals of Georgia, Second Division

February 14, 1923

Syllabus by the Court.

Since a county is not liable to suit unless made so by statute (Civ Code 1910, § 384), and since the liability of a county for injuries caused by reason of a defective bridge upon a highway arises only under the statute, which provides a liability against a county "for all injuries caused by reason of any defective bridges" (Civ. Code 1910, § 748; Ga. Laws 1888, p. 39), a county is liable to a person injured by reason of a defective bridge only when the county has failed to exercise ordinary care in performing this statutory duty to keep the bridge in repair, and not by reason of any negligent failure to post signs or other warnings informing travelers of the defective condition of the bridge. See, in this connection, Stamps v. Newton County, 8 Ga.App. 230 (5), 68 S.E. 947; Nunez v. Emanuel County, 22 Ga.App. 219, 95 S.E. 718.

In a suit against a county by a person seeking to recover damages for injuries sustained by reason of the collapse of an alleged defective bridge, where it was alleged the county failed to exercise due care in keeping the bridge in repair it was error for the judge in his charge to submit to the jury the question whether ordinary care on the part of the county would have required the placing of some signs or other warning at the bridge informing travelers of its defective condition.

While the county is under no duty to place such warning signs upon a bridge on one of its highways, yet the absence of such signs, when taken in connection with the absence of knowledge of the defect by an approaching traveler, is proper for consideration by a jury in determining whether or not such traveler has exercised the required care and diligence resting upon him to avoid the injury.

This court cannot hold that, under the evidence in this case as to the time elapsing between the notice to the county authorities of the defective condition of the bridge and the time of the happening of the injury to the plaintiff, the county exercised due care and diligence in keeping the bridge in repair. Assuming that at the time the county authorities received notice of the defect in the bridge the bridge gang of the county was at such a distance from it that, on account of the impassable condition of the roads caused by incessant rains, it was physically...