Wilkes v. Hccc Cent. Hosp.
| Decision Date | 07 February 2011 |
| Docket Number | CIV. NO. 11-00041 HG-BMK |
| Parties | JOSHUA ERIC WILKES, #A6008448 Plaintiff, v. HCCC CENTRAL HOSPITAL, HCCC JAIL HILO, 3 PANAL STATE DOCTORS OAHU MENTAL HOSPITAL, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Hawaii |
On January 19, 2011, pro se plaintiff Joshua Eric Wilkes, filed this prisoner civil rights Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and an in forma pauperis ("IFP") application. Wilkes names the Hilo Central Hospital, the HCCC Jail Hilo, and "3 Panal State Doctors [at] Oahu Mental Hospital, " as defendants to this suit. The court granted Wilkes's IFP application and now screens the Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915(A)(b)(1). The Complaint is DISMISSED with leave to amend as detailed below.
When he filed this action, Wilkes was awaiting trial in the Circuit Court of the Third Circuit, State of Hawaii ("circuit court"), on a charge of Promoting a Dangerous Drug in the First Degree in violation of Hawaii Revised Statute ("HRS") § 712- 1241.1 Wilkes was housed at the Hawaii Community Correctional Center ("HCCC"). On March 10, 2008, the circuit court suspended Wilkes's criminal proceedings and committed Wilkes to the custody of the Director of Health for a mental health examination pursuant to HRS § 704-404(2) (1993).2 On October 14, 2008, after the examination was completed and Wilkes was determined competent to stand trial, the circuit court released him on bail.
Two years later, when Wilkes failed to appear for his criminal trial in August 2010, the State moved for revocation of release and forfeiture of bail, and the circuit court issued a warrant for his arrest. Wilkes was taken into custody on September 28, 2010. On January 27, 2011, the circuit court accepted Wilkes's change of plea and deferred acceptance of nolo contendere to Promoting a Dangerous Drug in the Third Degree in violation of HRS § 712-1243. Wilkes was released from custody. See Hawaii Statewide Automated Victim Information and Notification ("SAVIN") System, https: //www.vinelink.com/vinelink.
Wilkes raises three causes of action; each count, however, is a semi-coherent, confusing, stream-of-conscious recitation of disconnected words and sentences laced with random phrases claiming numerous violations of his rights. The claims in each count overlap and are repetitive; no facts are presented in any claim showing that any individual or individuals are responsible for Wilkes's allegations. The court summarizes Wilkes's claims below, as much as it is possible to glean meaning from his words.
In Count I, Wilkes complains that he was forced to take anti-psychotic medication, presumably during his Chapter 704 examination and seven-month hospital stay from March to October, 2008.
In Count II, Wilkes claims he was denied adequate medical care for his food allergies, he has a religious right to eat non-allergenic food; (3) he was attacked by a guard who took his mattress pad, resulting in a permanent back injury; (4) his forced stay in the hospital during his mental health examination delayed his trial two years; and (5) his medical records are being used against him in court.
In Count III, Wilkes claims the "3 Panal Doctors" violated the Eighth Amendment by authoring a fraudulent mental health report about him that is being used against him in court.
Wilkes claims that he has studied and taught law and therefore his admission in court that he did not understand the charges against him (presumably resulting in his commitment for a determination of penal responsibility), is obviously frivolous. Wilkes complains that this delayed his trial. Wilkes may be asserting other claims, but they are not readily apparent even after a close reading of the Complaint.
The court is required to screen all complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff raises claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)-(2), § 1915(e)(2). If a pleading can be cured by the allegation of other facts, a pro se litigant is entitled to an opportunity to amend a complaint before dismissal of the action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127-29 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).
II. DISCUSSION
"To sustain an action under section 1983, a plaintiff must show '(1) that the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law; and (2) that the conductdeprived the plaintiff of a federal constitutional or statutory right.'" Hydrick v. Hunter, 500 F.3d 978, 987 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 129 S. Ct. 2431 (2009). Accord West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
To state a claim for relief, a pleading must contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). While Rule 8 does not demand detailed factual allegations, "it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). "Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice" to state a claim. Id. "[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id.
The court may dismiss a complaint with the factual elements of a cause of action scattered throughout and not organized into a "short and plain statement of the claim" for failure to satisfy Rule 8(a). Sparling v. Hoffman Constr. Co., 864 F.2d 635, 640 (9th Cir. 1988); McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172 (9th Cir. 1996).
The Complaint falls far below a short and plain statement showing Wilkes's entitlement to relief; it cannot be served as written. Wilkes gives no identifying details supporting his claims, such as when they occurred, who is responsible for them, or how these allegations violated his rights under the Constitution or laws of the United States. It is also impossible to determine who the defendants are and what Wilkes's specific claims against them entail. If the court were to guess at who Wilkes intends to name, it would be impossible for anyone to draft an answer to the Complaint in its present form. Rule 8 requires "sufficient allegations to put defendants fairly on notice of the claims against them." McKeever v. Block, 932 F.2d 795, 798 (9th Cir. 1991). Wilkes's claims do not comply with Rule 8's liberal pleading standards, therefore they do not state a claim for relief, and are DISMISSED.
Defendants, the "Hilo Central Hospital, " "HCCC Jail Hilo, " and "Oahu Mental Hospital" are not persons that can be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.3 See Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 365 (1990); Flint v. Dennison, 488 F.3d 816, 824-25 (9th Cir. 2007); Doe v. Lawrence Livermore Nat'l Lab., 131 F.3d 836, 839 (9th Cir. 1997); see also, e.g., Fischer v. Cahill, 474 F.2d 991, 992 (3rd Cir. 1992) ( that a prison's medical department is not a "person" within the meaning of § 1983); O'Haire v. Napa State Hosp., No. C 07-0002, slip copy, 2009 WL 2447752 *1 (N.D. Cal. 2009) ( California Dep't of Health and Napa State Hospital are not persons under § 1983); Castillo v. Blanco, No. 07-215, 2007 WL 2264285, at *4 (E.D. La. Aug. 1, 2007) ("[A] jail is merely a building, not a 'person' subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983").
While these defendants are not susceptible to suit under § 1983, it is possible the county or local governmental agencies that are in charge of them can be sued. See Shaw v. Cal. Dep't of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 788 F.2d 600, 604-05 & n.1, 610-11 (9th Cir. 1986) (police department of a city and the sheriffs department of a county are public entities under California law and therefore may be sued in federal court); see also Brewster v. Shasta County, 275 F.3d 803, 812 (9th Cir. 2001) ()).
Wilkes, however, fails to allege that "a deliberate policy, custom, or practice... was the 'moving force' behind the constitutional violation... suffered." Galen v. County of Los Angeles, 477 F.3d 652, 667 (9th Cir. 2007); City of Canton, Ohio, v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989). While detailed allegations are not required, Wilkes must still set forth "the grounds of his entitlement to relief[,]" which "requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action...." Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1964-65. As such, Wilkes has not stated a claim under § 1983 against the governmental entities responsible for the "Hilo Central Hospital, " HCCC Jail Hilo, and "Oahu Mental Hospital;" they are DISMISSED with prejudice.
"A person 'subjects' another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made." Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). Section 1983, therefore, requires that there be an actual connection or link between the actions of the defendants...
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