Wilkes v. Stacy
Decision Date | 29 June 1914 |
Docket Number | 127,84 |
Citation | 169 S.W. 796,113 Ark. 556 |
Parties | WILKES v. STACY |
Court | Arkansas Supreme Court |
Appeal from Woodruff Circuit Court, Northern District; J. M Jackson, Judge; reversed.
STATEMENT BY THE COURT.
Appellant sued to recover damages under the following complaint:
The exhibit mentioned in the complaint, as being attached to it was as follows:
A demurrer was sustained to this complaint, and this appeal has been duly prosecuted from the order of the court dismissing the cause of action.
Judgment reversed and cause remanded.
Harry M. Woods, for appellant.
1. The damages alleged in the complaint were not speculative, or indeterminable, but the allegations are specific and accurate, and the profits claimed are certain and probable. This case falls within the rule stated by this court in S.W. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Memphis Tel. Co., 111 Ark. 474; see also 13 Cyc. 51-54; 69 Ark. 219; 78 Ark. 336; 80 Ark. 228; 91 Ark. 427; 95 Ark. 363; 97 Ark. 135; 103 Ark. 584.
2. It may be conceded that the term "furnishing trade" used in the contract is indefinite, yet the complaint alleged specifically the meaning and use of the term, and parol evidence was admissible to show its particular meaning among business men in the section of the country in which it is used. Lawson on Contracts (1893), § 383; 106 Ark. 409, and cases cited; 9 Cyc. 578, 582, 587 and 772; 85 Ark. 576.
S. Brundidge, for appellee.
1. Appellant, in his complaint, attempted to change and vary the terms of the written contract. He can not change or vary the terms of the contract by parol. 94 Ark. 130; 105 Ark. 50; 54 Ark. 423; 100 U.S. 686-692.
2. The profits alleged in the complaint, for the loss of which appellant seeks to recover, are too speculative and remote. Cases cited by appellant; 106 Ark. 400-410.
SMITH, J., (after stating the facts).
The allegations of the complaint appear to be more specific and definite than those contained in the exhibit. The complaint alleges the meaning of the term "furnishing trade" as used in the exhibit. The meaning of trade terms may be shown. The rule in such cases is stated in Lawson on Contracts, (2 ed.), § 390, p. 450.
This question was recently thoroughly considered by this court in the case of Paepcke-Leicht Lbr. Co. v. Talley, 106 Ark. 400, 153 S.W. 833, in which case it was said: And the same opinion quotes from Wood v. Kelsey, 90 Ark. 272, 119 S.W. 258, the following language: "Courts may acquaint themselves with the persons and circumstances that are the subject of the statements in the written agreement, and are entitled to place themselves in the same situation as the parties who made the contract, so as to view the circumstances as they viewed them, and so as to judge of the meaning of the words and of the correct application of the language to the things described."
It is urged by appellee that appellant undertook in his complaint to enlarge and vary the terms of the contract for the sale of the stock of goods. But the exhibit is merely evidentiary of the terms of the sale, and the sufficiency of the complaint is to be determined by a consideration of its allegations. We need not consider any possible difficulty which appellant may experience in proving the allegations of his complaint, as no such difficulties are before us, when the sufficiency of the complaint is tested on demurrer. We think the allegations of the complaint are sufficiently definite and certain to state a cause of action. It is urged that the complaint does not state what articles appellee would desire furnished to his tenants during the year 1912 and that the complaint does not state the quantity of such articles. But it can not be assumed that appellee did not know what articles he would wish to purchase from appellee, nor can we assume that ap...
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