Wilkie v. Philadelphia Life Ins. Co.
| Citation | 197 S.E. 375,187 S.C. 382 |
| Decision Date | 02 May 1938 |
| Docket Number | 14677. |
| Parties | WILKIE et al. v. PHILADELPHIA LIFE INS. CO. et al. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of South Carolina |
On Rehearing June 3, 1938.
Appeal from Common Pleas Circuit Court of Richland County; Wm. H Grimball, Judge.
Action by Mamie Wilkie and others against the Philadelphia Life Insurance Company and Barbara H. O. Griffin to rerecover on a life policy issued by the first-named defendant. From a judgment favorable to plaintiffs, the last-named defendant appeals.
Reversed and remanded, with instructions.
The Master's report is as follows:
1. Pursuant to an order of reference granted by Hon. C.J Ramage, Presiding Judge of the Fifth Judicial Circuit, dated 27th day of February, 1937, referring the above entitled cause to the Master for the purposes set forth in said order I have held references herein, attended by the attorneys of record, took the testimony and other evidence offered and therefrom find and conclude as hereinafter set forth.
2. I find that under date the 10th day of November, 1923, the defendant, Philadelphia Life Insurance Company, in consideration of the payment of the premiums stipulated therein issued its certain policy of insurance Number 73779 upon the life of Eulela H. Otis, then a resident of the City of Columbia, Richland County, South Carolina, and did thereby in consideration of the payment of the premiums agreed to be paid insure the life of the said Eulela H. Otis in the principal sum of $3,000.00, payable upon due proof of the death of the said Eulela H. Otis to her executors administrators or assigns.
3. I further find that the right was reserved to the insured to change the beneficiary therein in accordance with the following policy provisions:
4. I further find that by instrument in writing, bearing date the 13th day of May, 1925, and attached to said policy, the Company and the insured entered into a special agreement for settlement at maturity and change of beneficiary by which the net sum of insurance with interest at 3 1/4%, compounded annually, shall be payable to Barbara H. Otis, daughter of the insured, in equal monthly installments of $30.00, the first installment to become due and payable upon receipt by the Company of due proofs of death of the insured.
5. I further find that at Philadelphia, Pa., the Home Office of the Company, the Company under date May 25, 1925, duly endorsed upon said policy of insurance the change of beneficiary from the estate of the insured to the defendant, Barbara H. Otis, as follows:
"At insured's request, the amount due at the death of insured, shall be payable not to the beneficiary hereinbefore designated but to Barbara H. Otis, daughter, in the manner and proportions, at and for the times, and upon the conditions specified in the special agreement for settlement at maturity, executed by the Company and the insured in duplicate originals, one of which is attached to this policy.
Philadelphia, May 25, 1925.
6. I further find that under date the 3rd day of April, 1936, the insured wrote the Company that she intended to change the beneficiary in said policy to her four sisters, Mamie Wilkie, Electra Kimbrough, Sallie H. Smith and Ella H. Jepson, the plaintiffs in this action, with the request that the change of beneficiary become effective immediately, which letter was received by the Company, at its Home Office in Philadelphia on April 6th, 1936. In the meantime, to wit: April 5th, 1936, the insured was admitted to the Columbia Hospital, Columbia, South Carolina, and on the morning of April 6th, 1936, underwent surgical operation; that by letter dated April 6th, 1936, the Company acknowledged the insured's letter and enclosed change of beneficiary form for her execution and return to the Company with the policy for endorsement thereon, which letter was delivered to the insured at the hospital on April 8th, 1936. The insured executed the form on April 8th, and retained the same in her possession until April 11th, at which time the insured had one of the attending nurses post the same in the Columbia Post Office, addressed to the Company. By letter dated April 14th, the Company acknowledged receipt of the form for change of beneficiary duly executed, and again requested that the insured forward the policy for endorsement, which letter was delivered to the insured at the hospital on April 16th.
7. I further find that during the times above mentioned the policy of insurance was in the insured's lock box in the vault of South Carolina National Bank, Columbia. I further find that on April 3, 1936, the insured delivered the key to her lock box to her attorney for the purpose of transacting certain business not involved in this suit, and that the attorney delivered the key to the insured in person on April 16th.
8. I further find that the insured underwent another operation on April 18th, from which she failed to recover and died on April 20th, without having forwarded the policy to the Company for the purpose of effecting the change of beneficiary, and further that said policy was in full force and effect at the time of her death. I further find that the insured was physically unable to leave the hospital, go to the bank, obtain the policy of insurance and forward same to the Company. I further find that up to and including the day before her death, the insured was surrounded by all reasonable and necessary conveniences and attendants, and with presence of mind by which she could have caused the policy to be forwarded to the Company.
9. I further find that the insured was a woman of strong mind and unusual business ability and that she was entirely rational up to and including the day before her death.
10. I further find that the insured was under no legal or equitable obligation to her four sisters or either of them to effect a change of beneficiary in said policy of insurance so as to make the benefits thereof payable to them, and that neither of the plaintiffs nor the defendant, Barbara H. Otis, the designated beneficiary, had any knowledge of the intention and efforts of the insured to make the change.
11. I further find that the defendant, Barbara H. Otis, as the designated beneficiary in the policy, filed due proofs of death with the Insurance Company, but that payment was refused on account of the conflicting claims of the plaintiffs and the said Barbara H. Otis, whereupon this action was instituted by the plaintiffs in which they claim to be equitably entitled to the proceeds of the insurance. The Insurance Company, by its answer, admits its liability to pay the face amount of the policy in accordance with the policy provisions. The defendant, Barbara H. Otis (now Barbara H. Otis Griffin), daughter of the insured and the designated beneficiary in said policy claims that she is entitled to receive payment in accordance with the trust provisions of said policy.
12. I conclude from the evidence in the record and from the facts as thus found that the plaintiffs have failed to establish such equitable title to the fund as would entitle them to receive payment and that the plaintiffs' claim should be dismissed on the merits.
Conclusions of Law.
The legal position of the plaintiffs, as stated by their counsel in the record and in argument is, that the insured substantially complied with the terms of the policy with reference to the change of beneficiary from the defendant, Barbara H. Otis, to them, and that she did everything reasonably within her power to bring about the change; that the insured's failure to forward the policy to the Insurance Company's Home Office for the endorsement as required by the terms of the policy was made impossible because of her physical inability to leave the hospital and go to the bank and get the policy; that the defendant Insurance Company, having admitted liability under the policy and having agreed to pay the proceeds to whomever the Court should adjudge to be entitled to receive payment, has waived its right to object to the failure of the insured to forward the policy to the Home Office for endorsement, and that the defendant, Barbara H. Otis, cannot at this time object to the failure of the insured to forward such policy in accordance with its terms, with respect to change of beneficiary.
It is apparent that the plaintiffs have attempted to bring their claim within the broad principles of equity jurisdiction that "equity regards and treats that as done which in good conscience ought to be done", and that "equity looks to substance rather than to form". The latter maxim is closely associated with and evolves out of the first. The first maxim is the basis upon which an equitable right or title is founded, while the latter appertains more exactly to the equitable remedy by which such equitable right or title, once established, is given legal effect, by dispensing with pure formalities which would otherwise defeat the equity.
If I have thus assigned the correct values to these two, and only two, underlying equitable principles on which the plaintiffs rely in support of their claim, I am forced to the conclusion that the facts as found and reported in the evidence fail to establish any equitable title in the plaintiffs to the fund in question.
The rule is stated, clearly and in its broadest sense in Volume I, Pomeroy's Equity...
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