Wilkins v. Arpaio

• Decision Date: 07 June 2011
• Docket Number: No. CV-09-1380-PHX-LOA,CV-09-1380-PHX-LOA
• Parties: Brian A. Wilkins, Plaintiff, v. Joseph M. Arpaio, in his individual and official capacity as Maricopa County Sheriff; Darren Dauch, in his individual and official capacity as a Maricopa County Detention Officer, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Arizona

Brian A. Wilkins, Plaintiff,

v. Joseph M. Arpaio, in his individual and official capacity as Maricopa CountySheriff; Darren Dauch, in his individual and official capacity as a Maricopa CountyDetention Officer, Defendants.

No. CV-09-1380-PHX-LOA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Dated:June 7, 2011.

ORDER

This matter is before the Court on the Motion for Summary Judgment by Defendants Sheriff Joseph Arpaio and Darren Dauch. (Doc. 159) Pro se Plaintiff has filed a response, doc. 163, to which Defendants Arpaio and Dauch have replied, doc. 166. After consideration of this matter, the Court will grant summary judgment in favor of Defendants Arpaio and Dauch.

I. Background

Plaintiff's claims arose during his confinement at the Lower Buckeye Jail ("LBJ") in Phoenix from July 22, 2008 to September 17, 2008. (Doc. 91 at 2-3; DSOF ¶ 2¹ )Plaintiff alleges that his constitutional rights were violated by inadequate medical care, overcrowding, and unsanitary living conditions - including spoiled food and polluted water. (Doc. 91) Plaintiff further alleges that he was sexually assaulted by Defendant Dauch during a strip search. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that Sheriff Arpaio is liable for these violations because they were the result of "a larger policy, pattern, and practice" of Defendant Arpaio. (Id. at 5) Plaintiff claims that the alleged violations caused him "emotional and physical pain and suffering." (Id. at 7)

Defendants Arpaio and Dauch seek summary judgment on the Second Amended Complaint in "its entirety." (Doc. 159) The Court issued a Rand Order² , advising Plaintiff of his obligation to respond to the summary judgment motion. (Doc. 162) The Order specifically advised Plaintiff in opposing the Motion for Summary Judgment, it was not sufficient to rely on the allegations in his Complaint. (Id. at 2) Rather, Plaintiff, "must set out specific facts in declarations, depositions, answers to interrogatories, or authenticated documents . . . that contradict the facts shown in Defendants' declarations and documents and show there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial." (Id.) The Order warned that "[i]f you do not submit your own evidence in opposition, summary judgment, if appropriate, may be entered against you." (Id.) Additionally, the Court directed Plaintiff to file a separate statement of facts in support of his opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment in accordance with Local Rule ("LRCiv") 56.1(b). (Id.) Although Plaintiff submitted a response, doc. 163, to Defendants' Motion, it does not satisfy the requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 or LRCiv 56.1(b). Specifically, Plaintiff's response does not include a separate statement of facts, and does not set out specific facts in the form of "declarations, depositions, answers to interrogatories, or authenticated documents." (Docs. 162-163); Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); LRCiv 56.1. Plaintiffs noncompliance with Rule 56(c) and LRCiv 56.1 alone supports entry of summary judgment against Plaintiff. Nevertheless, as set forth below, the Court has analyzed Plaintiffs various claims against Defendants Arpaio andDauch. The Court concludes that Plaintiff has not shown the existence of a genuine dispute of material fact, and Defendants are entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.

II. Summary Judgment Standard

A district court must grant summary judgment if the pleadings and supporting documents, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, "show that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Jesinger v. Nevada Fed. Credit Union, 24 F.3d 1127, 1130 (9th Cir. 1994). The moving party bears the initial burden of presenting the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the record which demonstrate the absence of a genuine dispute as to any material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. If the moving party meets its initial burden, the burden shifts to the opposing party to demonstrate an existing genuine dispute as a material fact. Substantive law determines which facts are material. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Jesinger, 24 F.3d. at 1130. In addition, "[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. The dispute must be genuine, that is, "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id.

Summary judgment is appropriate against a party who "fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Id. at 322; Citadel Holding Corp. v. Roven, 26 F.3d 960, 964 (9th Cir. 1994). The party opposing summary judgment "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of [the party's] pleadings, but. . . must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986). Brinson v. Lind Rose Joint Venture, 53 F.3d 1044, 1049 (9th Cir. 1995). There is no issue for trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party. If the evidence is merely colorable or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 24950. However, "[t]he evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiableinferences are to be drawn in his [or her] favor." Id. at 255 (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158-59 (1970)).

The facts which may establish a genuine issue of fact must both be in the district court's file and set forth in the response. Carmen v. San Francisco Unified School District, 237 F.3d 1026, 1029 (9th Cir. 2001). The trial court

may determine whether there is a genuine issue of fact, on summary judgment, based on the papers submitted on the motion and such other papers as may be on file and specifically referred to and facts therein set forth in the motion papers. Though the court has discretion in appropriate circumstances to consider other materials, it need not do so. The district court need not examine the entire file for evidence establishing a genuine issue of fact, where the evidence is not set forth in the opposing papers with adequate references so that it could conveniently be found.

Id. at 1031 (emphasis added).

III. Claims against Defendant Arpaio

Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Arpaio is liable, in his official and individual capacity, for the alleged constitutional violations.³

A. Claims Against Sheriff Arpaio in His Official Capacity

Municipal liability under § 1983 can result from the unconstitutional actions or omissions of a municipality's final policymaker. Monell v. N.Y. City Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978) (holding that a municipality's policy or custom that inflicts a constitutional injury may subject the municipality to § 1983 liability whether the policy or custom was "made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy"); City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388-90 (1989) (holdingthat the failure of a municipality's policymakers to ensure adequate police training may serve as the basis for § 1983 liability). Whether a particular official has final policymaking authority is a matter of state law. McMillian v. Monroe County, 520 U.S. 781, 786 (1997); Cortez v. County of L.A., 294 F.3d 1186, 1189 (9th Cir. 2002) ("To determine whether the Sheriff was acting as the final policymaker for the County, we follow the analytical framework set forth in McMillian.").

The parties do not dispute that Sheriff Arpaio has final policymaking authority under Arizona law with respect to the operation of the Maricopa County jails.⁴ Ariz. Const. Art. XII, §§ 3-4 (providing that there shall be created in and for each County of the State a Sheriff and that the Sherif's duties, powers, and qualifications shall be as prescribed by law); Arizona Revised Statute ("A.R.S.") § 11-441(A)(5) ("The sheriff shall. . . [t]ake charge of and keep the county jail. . . and the prisoners in the county jail."); Flanders v. Maricopa County, 203 Ariz. 368, 54 P.3d 837, (Az.Ct.App. 2002) ("The County acknowledged that the Sheriff was its chief policymaker for [Tent City]."); Judd v. Bollman, 166 Ariz. 417, 803 P.2d 138, 139-40 (Az.Ct.App. 1991) (stating that a sheriff has the duty "to maintain and operate the county jails pursuant to the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. § 11-441").

The Ninth Circuit has held that there are two routes to municipal liability under § 1983. Gibson v. County of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1185 (9th Cir. 2002). The first route applies when a municipality inflicts a constitutional injury through its policy, custom, or practice. Id. (citing Bd. of County Comm'rs of Bryan County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997)). Under this route, the plaintiff must satisfy traditional § 1983 requirements and show that "the municipality acted with 'the state of mind required to prove the underlying violation,' just as a plaintiff does when he or she alleges that a natural person has violated his federal rights." Id. (quoting Brown, 520 U.S. at 405). The second route to municipalliability arises from the Supreme Court's decision in City of Canton v. Harris. Under this route, a municipality becomes responsible, through its omissions, for a constitutional violation committed by one of its employees. Id. at 1186 (citing City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 387). A plaintiff need not prove that the municipality acted with actual, subjective intent. Id. Rather, a plaintiff "must show that the municipality was on actual or constructive notice that its omission would likely result in a constitutional violation," and yet failed to act. Id. This kind of deliberate...