Wilkins v. Briggs

• Decision Date: 27 January 1908
• Citation: 107 S.W. 135
• Parties: WILKINS v. BRIGGS et al.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

107 S.W. 135

WILKINS v. BRIGGS et al.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas.

January 27, 1908.

Appeal from District Court, Fannin County; Ben. H. Denton, Judge.

Action by W. D. Wilkins, as administrator of the estate of Spencer Briggs, deceased, against Archie Briggs and others. From a judgment for defendants, plaintiff appeals. Reversed and rendered.

McGrady & McMahon, for appellant. O. P. Hale, Sturgeon & Moore, C. A. Wheeler, and H. A. Cunningham, for appellees.

HODGES, J.

The nature and result of this suit is concisely stated in the brief of the appellant, from which we quote substantially as follows: The appellant, as a creditor and administrator of the estate of Spencer Briggs, sued Archie Briggs, the sole heir of John Briggs, deceased, and the other appellees, as heirs of Spencer Briggs, deceased, and of Lucinda Briggs, the deceased wife of Spencer Briggs, in the district court of Fannin county, to recover 200 acres of land, and to cancel a deed signed and acknowledged by Spencer and Lucinda Briggs in 1890, duly recorded, and purporting to convey to John Briggs, in consideration of his four promissory notes aggregating the sum of $1,980, the land in controversy. It was alleged that the deed was never delivered, nor was it intended by the parties thereto to pass title, but was signed and recorded for the purpose of keeping the creditors of Spencer Briggs from taking the land and the annual crops and rents by legal process for their debts. The land was then the homestead, and in the actual possession, of Spencer Briggs and wife, and was their community property. It continued to be their homestead until the death of both. Lucinda Briggs died in 1900. Spencer Briggs died in December, 1904. John Briggs, to whom the deed was made in 1890, died in 1896, without having paid anything on the notes. It was alleged that, if the deed was ever delivered, Spencer Briggs rescinded the sale for failure to pay the notes, and also reacquired title to the land by adverse possession of 10 years. Appellant is a creditor of Spencer Briggs' estate, with a duly probated claim amounting to over $1,000, based upon a debt which was contracted in 1888. Spencer Briggs died insolvent, leaving neither wife nor minor children nor unmarried daughter. The trial was before the court without a jury. Judgment was rendered for the appellees, from which the appellant prosecutes this appeal individually and as the administrator of the estate of Spencer Briggs, deceased. After judgment the court filed findings of fact and conclusions of law, from which we make and adopt the following findings of fact:

Findings of Fact.

Spencer Briggs and Lucinda Briggs, ancestors of the appellees herein, were husband and wife, having intermarried many years before the land in controversy was acquired. They purchased the land involved in this suit about the year 1885, and by virtue of that purchase it became their community property, and was used and occupied by them as their homestead up to the date that each of them died. Lucinda Briggs died November 8, 1900, intestate, leaving as her only children and heirs Thomas Johnson, Alex Briggs, Lewis Briggs, Adolphus Briggs, H. D. Briggs, Kate Tanner, Rachel Fields, Frances Railback, Closy Thomas, and Julia James, and her grandchild, Archie Briggs, a son of her deceased son John Briggs. After the death of his wife Spencer Briggs continued to reside upon the land, and to make the same his homestead until the date of his death, which occurred in December, 1904. He died intestate, leaving as his only heirs his grandchild, Archie Briggs, and his children, who are the same as those above mentioned, except Thomas Johnson; the latter, we presume, was the child of his wife by a former marriage. John Briggs, a son of Spencer and Lucinda Briggs, died in the year 1895, leaving as his only heir and child the appellee Archie Briggs, who is now a minor 14 years of age. All of the children of Spencer Briggs at the time of his death were over the age of 21 years, and all of his daughters were married women at the time of the death of both Spencer Briggs and his wife, and have continued to be married women, with living husbands, since that time. Spencer Briggs was married but once. In August, 1890, Spencer Briggs and his wife, Lucinda Briggs, signed and acknowledged before a notary public, in the usual statutory form, a general warranty deed purporting to convey to John Briggs the land involved in this suit and described in the appellant's petition. The conveyance recited a consideration of certain promissory notes aggregating the sum of $1,890, to be paid thereafter by John Briggs to Lucinda Briggs, and reserving a vendor's lien upon the land. Spencer Briggs caused the deed to be recorded in the deed records of Fannin county, but the deed never was in fact delivered to John Briggs nor accepted by him. It was the intention and understanding of all the parties in the deed that no title should pass by it, and that Spencer and Lucinda Briggs should continue to own the land in the same manner as if no such deed was ever made. They retained possession of the land, John Briggs never having taken possession nor made any claim to the land, nor paid anything on the notes recited in the deed. The sole purpose of making and recording the deed was to prevent the creditors of Spencer Briggs from levying upon the crops raised on the land, Spencer Briggs being at that time indebted to various persons and insolvent. Appellant is the duly appointed, qualified, and acting administrator of the estate of Spencer Briggs, deceased, having been appointed by the county court of Fannin county on the ____ day of April, 1905, and qualified as such in the same month. At the time Spencer Briggs died he owned an individed one half of the land in controversy, and the heirs of his deceased wife owned the other half; but Spencer Briggs was occupying all of it as his homestead. At the time of his death he was insolvent. Archie Briggs was then living with him on his homestead, and as such was a constituent member of Spencer Briggs' family, being supported, cared for, and protected by his grandfather. Archie Briggs had resided with his grandfather since before the death of his father, his mother having died before his father did, but was never adopted by either of his grandparents according to law. There was never any administration upon the estate of John Briggs, nor upon the estate of Lucinda Briggs, nor does her estate owe any debts. John Briggs at the time of his death owned a farm consisting of about 75 acres, adjoining the land in controversy. This was inherited by his son, Archie, upon his father's death, and is still owned by him exclusively. All of the children of Spencer and Lucinda Briggs were, at and before the death of himself and his wife, grown and married, as alleged in appellant's petition. Some time before the death of Spencer Briggs his daughter, Kate Tanner, separated from her husband because of alleged cruel treatment, and went to live with her father and mother. From that time till the death of her father she remained with them and did the household work, but to a large extent supported herself. With money of which she became possessed either before or after her separation from her husband she purchased and paid for a tract of land adjoining that owned by her father. She was living in the house with her father and Archie Briggs at the time of her father's death, but had never been divorced from her husband. In the year 1888 Spencer Briggs became indebted to the appellant, which debt was afterwards reduced to a judgment in the county court of Fannin county in 1893, amounting at that time to the sum of $668.81, and costs of suit. Execution was issued thereon in such a manner as to prevent the judgment from becoming dormant. This judgment was never paid by Spencer Briggs during his lifetime, and after his death letters of administration were granted to the appellant as a creditor of his estate. The claim based upon that judgment was made out, verified, and filed as a claim against the estate of Spencer Briggs, and entered upon the claim docket of the probate court of Fannin county on May 5, 1905. At the time the claim amounted to about $1,137. It was allowed for that amount by the county judge, and classed as a fourth-class claim on July 26, 1907.

Conclusions of Law.

From the conclusions of law filed by the trial court it is evident that he based his judgment in favor of the appellees upon the fact that Archie Briggs, a grandson of Spencer Briggs, residing with the latter at the time of his death as a constituent member of his family, upon the land in controversy, preserved the homestead exemption of Spencer Briggs' half interest in the land after the latter's death, and that this half descended to the heirs of Spencer Briggs free from the claims of creditors, and was not subject to administration. The correctness of this conclusion depends upon the proper construction to be given the constitutional and statutory provisions relating to the estates of decedents and creating exemptions in favor of heirs and devisees under certain conditions. Section 50 of article 16 of the Constitution reads as follows: "Sec. 50. The homestead of a family shall be and is hereby protected from forced sale, for the payment of all debts, except for the purchase money thereof, or a part of such purchase money, the taxes due thereon or for work and material used in constructing improvements thereon, and in this last case only when the work and material are contracted for in writing, with the consent of the wife given in the same manner as is required in making a sale and conveyance of the homestead; nor shall the owner, if a married man, sell the homestead without the consent of the wife, given in such manner as may be prescribed by law. No mortgage, trust deed or other lien on the homestead shall ever be valid, except for the purchase money therefor, or...