Wilkins v. Wilkins

• Citation: 192 So. 791,141 Fla. 188
• Parties: WILKINS et al. SAME v. WILKINS et al. SAME v. UNITED MUT. LIFE INS. CO. et al.
• Decision Date: 22 December 1939
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

192 So. 791

141 Fla. 188

WILKINS et al. SAME v. WILKINS et al. SAME v. UNITED MUT. LIFE INS. CO. et al.

Florida Supreme Court

December 22, 1939

Rehearing Denied Jan. 17, 1940.

Suit for accounting by Philip W. Wilkins, as administrator of the estate of William Cornelius Wilkins, deceased, and others against J. S. Wilkins and others, and suit by Philip W Wilkins, as administrator of the estate of William Cornelius Wilkins, deceased, and others, against the United Mutual Life Insurance Company, a corporation, and others, on a life policy. From decrees for the defendants, plaintiffs appeal.

Reversed with directions.

COUNSEL

Philip D. Beall, of Pensacola, and Philip C Gorman, of Leesburg, for appellants.

Harry P. Johnson, of Tavares, for appellees.

OPINION

BUFORD Justice.

The appeal brings for review a final decree in which the Court disposed of two cases, one being styled Philip W. Wilkins as Administrator of the Estate of William Cornelius Wilkins deceased, et al., plaintiffs, v. J. S. Wilkins and Nora Wilkins, his wife, defendants, known as Chancery Case No. 5643, and the other was the case of United Mutual Life Insurance Co., a corporation, plaintiff, v. Philip W. Wilkins et al., defendants, known as Chancery case No. 5684.

The insurance case involves the question as to whether or not J. S. Wilkins was made beneficiary of an insurance policy by change of beneficiary as result of undue influence and also it involves the question as to whether or not W. C. Wilkins the insured was mentally incapable of making a binding change as to the beneficiary of the policy at the time the change in beneficiary was made.

The accounting case involves a question as to whether or not (1) J. S. Wilkins was acting in a fiduciary capacity in handling the affairs of W. C. Wilkins, now deceased, from January 1, 1931, until the death of W. C. Wilkins on August 1, 1935; and (2) if the first question is answered in the affirmative, whether or not by reason of such fiduciary relationship J. S. Wilkins acquired control, possession and management of certain property theretofore belonging to W. C. Wilkins; and (3) whether or not certain properties shown to have been acquired by J. S. Wilkins from W. C. Wilkins during that period were lawfully acquired and became the property of J. S. Wilkins, or were procured by undue influence and, therefore, were not transferred or conveyed by valid sale, gift, conveyance or delivery from W. C. Wilkins to J. S. Wilkins.

The final decree adjudicated as follows:

'The Court is of the opinion that the plaintiffs in the accounting case have not proved a case to entitle them any relief, and that the bill of complaint should be dismissed, and the Court is likewise of the opinion that there is no evidence showing any undue influence on the part of Joe Wilkins in the matter of the change of beneficiary of the life insurance policy in the insurance case, and that a decree should be entered therein awarding to the said Joe Wilkins the proceeds of said policy and directing the payment thereof to him by the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Lake County, Florida.'

And thereupon, order was entered in Chancery case No. 5643 adjudicating,

'Ordered, adjudged and decreed that the bill of complaint herein, be and the same is hereby dismissed.

'It is further ordered that each of the parties pay and assume such costs as they may have occurred, paid or assumed in this case.

'Done and ordered at Chambers in Ocala, Marion, County, Florida, this the 2nd day of August, A. D. 1939.'

Another phase of the relationships and transactions between J. S. Wilkins and W. C. Wilkins was before this Court in the case of Wilkins v. Wilkins, 128 Fla. 273, 174 So. 412, and again in Wilkins v. Wilkins, 136 Fla. 86, 186 So. 826, 827. In the latter case we held:

'The Will was attacked upon two grounds: (1) That the testator was without testamentary capacity at the time of the execution of the Will and, (2) that the Will was invalid because its execution was the result of undue influence exercised over the testator by his brother, one of the major beneficiaries of the Will.

'The evidence fails to establish as a fact that the testator was not of testamentary capacity at the time of the execution of the Will. The record shows the exercise of undue influence to such an extent as to entirely invalidate the Will and, therefore, the judgment of the Circuit Court is affirmed.'

The will was executed on July 22, 1931.

The record in the instant case is a great deal more voluminous than was the record in the Will case above referred to but, when all is considered, the result is that we find cumulative evidence pro and con concerning the same factual conditions but must again arrive at the conclusion that during all these years between 1930 and the death of W. C. Wilkins, W. C. Wilkins was under the dominant influence of J. S. Wilkins.

The record shows conclusively that J. S. Wilkins occupied a position of trust and confidence with W. C. Wilkins; that he held power of attorney from W. C. Wilkins which purported to authorize him to act in the place and stead of W. C. Wilkins in business transactions and that under such power of attorney J. S. Wilkins caused to be transferred from W. C. Wilkins to himself negotiable bonds and other personal property of large value and that he also procured and received from W. C. Wilkins deeds of conveyance to real estate.

In the case of Harris v. Zeuch, 103 Fla. 183, 137 So. 135, 138, we said:

'This court has gone far in its interpretation of the term, 'fiduciary or confidential relation,' which it has declared 'is a very broad one.' Speaking through Mr. Justice Terrell, we said in Quinn v. Phipps, 93 Fla. 805, 113 So. 419, 421, 54 A.L.R. 1173:

"Stripped of all embellishing verbiage, it may be confidently asserted that every instance in which a confidential or fiduciary relation in fact is shown to exist will be interpreted as such. The relation and duties involved need not be legal; they may be moral, social, domestic or personal. If a relation of trust and confidence exists between the parties (that is to say, where confidence is reposed by one party and a trust accepted by the other, or where confidence has been acquired and abused), that is sufficient as a predicate for relief."

The law is a zealous guardian of confidence and trust and will not permit even the casual use of such relations to become the vehicle for the acquisition of personal gain or to acquire property without full, fair and adequate compensation.

A fiduciary will not be allowed to reap a harvest planted upon the fields of fiduciary relationship without a clear showing of good faith and no unfair advantage having been indulged.

In Sec. 497, Restatement of the Law, Contracts, it is said:

'Where one party is under the domination of another, or by virtue of the relation between them is justified in assuming that the other party will not act in a manner inconsistent with his welfare, a transaction induced by unfair persuasion of the...