Wilkinson v. Davis

Decision Date15 January 1979
Docket NumberNo. 56637,56637
Citation252 S.E.2d 201,148 Ga.App. 696
CourtGeorgia Court of Appeals
PartiesWILKINSON v. DAVIS.

W. Ashley Hawkins, Forsyth, for appellant.

Ham, Mills & Freeman, W. Franklin Freeman, Jr., Forsyth, for appellee.

McMURRAY, Judge.

Despite the difference in names, this is the second appearance of this case in this court. See Davis v. Monroe County Hospital Authority, 137 Ga.App. 214, 223 S.E.2d 255. In that case there was an appeal of the first grant of a motion for new trial, and this court specifically stated that same would not be disturbed.

Davis, as plaintiff, sued Monroe County Hospital Authority and R. C. Wilkinson, d/b/a J. C. Reporting and Collection Service, and others, for "malicious use or abuse of process." By direction of the trial court the jury had found for the plaintiff against all defendants, and the court's direction provided for the liability of Monroe County Hospital Authority to be limited to $171.80 as damages. Only Wilkinson moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or in the alternative for new trial, which was granted.

Wilkinson had originally obtained default judgments against two of plaintiff's employees. Whereupon their wages were garnisheed, that is, those wages allegedly in the hands of the garnishee, Ronald Davis. Davis answered, contending he had no wages in his possession. Whereupon, Wilkinson caused to be issued two summons of garnishment to the Georgia Kraft Company against the plaintiff Ronald Davis in which he swore he had reason to apprehend the loss of debts unless summons of garnishment do issue. As a result Georgia Kraft Company made certain deductions from plaintiff's settlement sheet in regard to pulpwood sales.

Plaintiff Davis then brought this action referred to by this court in Davis v. Monroe County Hospital Authority, 137 Ga.App. 214, 223 S.E.2d 255, supra, as one based upon "malicious use or abuse of process," against the two defendants, Wilkinson and Monroe County Hospital Authority, and two others. However, only the defendant Wilkinson remains in the case.

Plaintiff alleged he had been damaged by the willful and malicious intention of the defendants to damage his credit rating, his business affairs and hold him up for shame and ridicule "damaging him in the sum of two thousand ($2,000.00) dollars." He averred the defendants willfully, knowingly and maliciously caused to be deducted from the settlement sheet of the plaintiff $378.04 on account of the garnishment attached to this petition, "using summons of garnishment in a manner not intended by law, with the willful and malicious intention to damage the credit rating of the plaintiff, and damage his business affairs and hold him up for shame and ridicule . . . "

In his answer, Wilkinson denied that he was acting for Monroe County Hospital Authority and contended that in garnisheeing the employees of the plaintiff he (the plaintiff) had admitted in open court that the amounts of garnishment were due and owing and "that he, the plaintiff, would pay said amounts . . . and said agreement was approved by the court." He otherwise denied the claim against him. The case then proceeded to trial for the second time.

The plaintiff testified that he had been garnisheed by the defendant (Wilkinson) with reference to two of his employees who owed money. He then offered in evidence his answers filed to the garnishments in which it was alleged that these defendants in garnishment (employees) owed him more money than the amount of the garnishments, and he testified there was no settlement in which he agreed to pay these bills. He then testified that the defendant went straight to Georgia Kraft and garnisheed certain of his funds held by Georgia Kraft; that the first knowledge he had was after the deduction of the amount sued for by Wilkinson against him had been paid by Georgia Kraft, and he had not been summoned as a defendant in these garnishment proceedings. He also testified that he was in production of pulpwood for Georgia Kraft, bought equipment from them by financing it; that his feelings were injured by reason of the garnishment; that he was embarrassed by the filing of the garnishments against him and in applying for credit he had been "given the run-around on it (the credit) and they told me right there they didn't want to loan it to me"; and $378.04 had been deducted from his settlement sheet with Georgia Kraft by reason of the garnishments which were taken out without basis of any claim against him. An employee of Georgia Kraft was called as a witness with reference to loans to pulpwood producers, in particular, the plaintiff. This witness testified that he did not recall ever turning him down for the financing of equipment because of the garnishments but that this would have had an influence upon him in the event such producers kept having garnishments filed against them.

The defendant Wilkinson testified with reference to his activities in the collecting business and in particular the attempt to collect the indebtedness of the two employees of the plaintiff, identifying the garnishment papers served on the plaintiff, as well as the answers filed thereto. He then testified that there was an agreement made orally in open court, and that the answers to the garnishments were false since the employees admitted they had not missed a payday, and these answers were dismissed in the Justice of the Peace Court by the justice of the peace upon defendant's request. He also testified that counsel for plaintiff at that time stated: "If I came up with proof that those people owed that money, that Mr. Davis would pay it off, and that was the agreement that, that was the statement that was made in the Court by Mr. Freeman (plaintiff's counsel)." He then admitted that as a result of what happened in the courtroom he filed garnishments against Mr. Davis at Georgia Kraft contending he had "received a default judgment against Mr. Davis." Later on in the trial he testified that he had gone back to the Justice of the Peace Court and "obtained a default judgment against Mr. Davis." Objection to this testimony was made that the default judgment itself would be the highest and best evidence, and the objection was sustained. On cross-examination the defendant as a witness admitted that he did not have anything in writing on any kind of default judgment. He was unable to prove the judgments against the employees by default or a default judgment against the plaintiff as having been obtained in the Justice of the Peace Court, although he testified that same had occurred. The justice of the peace was then called as a witness, who testified that he remembered holding court and that the employees, the plaintiff, the defendant, and the plaintiff's counsel were all present in the courtroom, but that he had...

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4 cases
  • Ferguson v. Atlantic Land & Development Corp.
    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • September 8, 1981
    ...effect, while the latter action lies for maliciously suing out civil process without probable cause.' (Cits)" Wilkinson v. Davis, 148 Ga.App. 696, 701(2), 252 S.E.2d 201 (1979). (a) " 'Two elements are necessary to an action for the malicious abuse of legal process: first, the existence of ......
  • Trawick v. Consolidated Capital Growth Fund
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • December 5, 1980
    ...West Ga. Pulpwood & Timber Co. v. Stephens, 128 Ga.App. 864, 868-869(2), 198 S.E.2d 420, supra, and cases cited; Wilkinson v. Davis, 148 Ga.App. 696, 701(2), 252 S.E.2d 201. Plaintiff also alleged a payment of all rent due and accepted by cashier's check, and this has not been overcome by P......
  • Newton v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • January 15, 1979
  • Epple v. Physician's Practice Group-Medical Research Foundation of Georgia, GROUP-MEDICAL
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • September 20, 1985
    ...effect, while the latter action lies for maliciously suing out civil process without probable cause.' [Cits.]" Wilkinson v. Davis, 148 Ga.App. 696, 701(2), 252 S.E.2d 201 (1979). "In malicious abuse of process actions there must be an ulterior motive on the part of the plaintiff to employ t......

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