Wilkinson v. U.S.

• Decision Date: 27 April 1982
• Docket Number: No. 81-2080,81-2080
• Citation: 677 F.2d 998
• Parties: Tilden R. WILKINSON, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

Page 998

677 F.2d 998

Tilden R. WILKINSON, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.

No. 81-2080.

United States Court of Appeals Fourth Circuit.

Argued March 3, 1982.

Decided April 27, 1982.

Howard I. Legum, Norfolk, Va. (Fine, Fine, Legum & Fine, Norfolk, Va., on brief), for appellant.

James A. Metcalfe, Asst. U. S. Atty., Norfolk, Va. (Elsie L. Munsell, U. S. Atty., John Franklin, III, Taylor, Walker & Adams, Norfolk, Va., on brief), for appellee.

Before BUTZNER, RUSSELL and MURNAGHAN, Circuit Judges.

MURNAGHAN, Circuit Judge:

We refer from time to time to a case as a hard one. We may mean that it is close and difficult to decide. Or we may mean, as we do here, that, while it is not so close, it is nevertheless difficult to decide because of its harsh impact on one of the parties. The other party to the case is innocent of any impropriety occasioning the hardship; whether others involved may have been equally free of criticism is a matter we need not address.

Here we have such a case.

On October 3, 1978, in the City of Virginia Beach, Virginia, the plaintiff, Tilden R. Wilkinson, as a pedestrian, was hit by an automobile driven by Richard Evans Gray, a first-class boatswain's mate in the United States Navy then serving aboard the U.S.S Miller which was undergoing repairs at a shipyard in Boston, Massachusetts.

Pursuant to orders from his commanding officer, Gray had driven a motor car leased by the U.S.S. Miller from Econo Car of Boston, a car-rental outfit, to the Norfolk, Virginia area to pick up and deliver certain items associated with the ship, including the ship's mail. Gray's residence was in Massachusetts. He was on a per diem allowance covering mileage, lodging and meals, and the accident occurred while Gray was returning to his hotel room after delivering the ship's mail with the intention of first stopping to eat dinner.

Promptly following the accident, Gray notified his commanding officer on the U.S.S. Miller and Econo Car of Boston. Shortly thereafter he was interviewed by a representative of the law firm retained to handle the claim made by Wilkinson as a consequence of injuries caused by the accident.

Plaintiff had promptly retained Howard I. Legum as counsel to represent him with respect to his claim against Gray. Legum ascertained that the car operated by Gray was leased from Econo Car and inaugurated discussions with the lawyers retained by the insurance carrier of Econo Car. Such counsel told Legum nothing to suggest that Gray had been operating the car in the course of his employment by the Government and Legum failed to explore the possibility that such was the case.

It was not until September 16, 1980, that is over 23 months after the accident, that Legum brought suit on behalf of Wilkinson by filing a motion for judgment in the Circuit Court of the City of Virginia Beach. Service on Gray was made via the Virginia long-arm statute. His last known address was shown to be the U.S.S. Miller, Boston, Massachusetts.

The responsive pleading made October 10, 1980, asserted that the accident occurred while Gray was acting within the scope of his employment ¹ with the United States Navy, and sought dismissal for failure to comply with the Drivers Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b), a provision of the Federal Tort Claims Act which reads:

The remedy against the United States provided by sections 1346(b) and 2672 of this title for injury or loss of property or personal injury or death, resulting from the operation by any employee of the Government of any motor vehicle while acting within the scope of his office or employment, shall hereafter be exclusive of any other civil action or proceeding by reason of the same subject matter against the employee or his estate whose act or omission gave rise to the claim.

The pleading further pointed out that there had been no presentation "in writing to the appropriate Federal agency within two years after such claim accrue(d)," 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b), with the consequence that the tort claim was "forever barred." Id.

In April 1981, a removal to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia ensued and the United States was substituted as the party defendant. Discovery had taken place in the state court and affidavits were filed in the district court. Summary judgment then was granted to the United States. ²

On appeal, the plaintiff-appellant contends that:

1) Gray was not acting within the scope of his employment when the accident took place.

2) The lack of awareness on plaintiff-appellant's part of a contention that Gray was acting within the scope of his employment excused the failure to file the administrative claim within two years of the accident.

It is inescapable, however, that Gray was acting in the scope of his employment. Cooner v. United States, 276 F.2d 220 (4th Cir. 1960); Johnston v. United States, 310 F.Supp. 1, 2 (N.D.Ga.1970) ("The question in this case is whether the alleged negligence of a National Guardsman, away from his home at a military base on temporary active duty, receiving per diem pay, who drives to lunch at a public eating house in a truck furnished him by the government for that purpose, can be imputed to the United States government under the Georgia law of respondeat superior. The court holds that it can."); Southern Motor Lines Co. v. Alvis, 200 Va. 168, 170-72, 104 S.E.2d 735, 737-39 (1958).

Just as clearly, the passage of two years without the filing of the administrative claim was fatal to Wilkinson's case. Wollman v. Gross, 637 F.2d 544, 547 (8th Cir. 1980) (2-1 decision, rehearing en banc denied by an equally divided vote, 646 F.2d 1306 (8th Cir. 1981)) ("Prior to bringing a suit a claim must be presented in writing to the appropriate administrative agency 'within two years after such claim accrues' "); Kielwien v. United States, 540 F.2d 676, 679 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 929, 97 S.Ct. 491, 50 L.Ed.2d 588 (1976) ("That requirement is jurisdictional and is not waivable.").

Wilkinson would escape the holding in Wollman and the cases there cited, ³ on the grounds that he was lulled by Gray or by the United States into a false sense of security. Cf. Kelley v. United States, 568 F.2d 259, 262 (2d Cir. 1978), holding that "the Government could not lull plaintiffs into a false sense of security by waiting until plaintiffs' time to file an administrative claim had expired and thereupon move to be substituted and to dismiss."

The Government here is not open to such a charge. Econo Car's insurance carrier was the party with whom Legum, counsel for Wilkinson, negotiated prior to filing suit. As in Wollman v. Gross, supra, 637 F.2d at 549, plaintiff-appellant was aware at the time of the accident that Gray was employed by the Navy.

He was unaware only of the legal significance of this fact. The purpose of the statute of limitations is to require the reasonably diligent presentation of tort claims. This may require a plaintiff to obtain appropriate legal counsel and together with counsel discover the facts and their possible legal ramifications so as to enable plaintiff to bring the suit within a reasonable time.

Id. ⁴

Gray himself did all that he could reasonably be expected to do in promptly informing his commanding officer and Econo Car. He cooperatively gave an interview to counsel provided by Econo Car's insurance carrier to defend him. Gray's commanding officer has not been shown to have had any duty to supply information to Wilkinson or Legum. It has nowhere in the record been established that Gray's commanding officer even knew that there was any lack of awareness by them that the proper and exclusive defendant was the United States Government, or that there was a legal necessity for Wilkinson to file, within two years, an administrative claim. The commanding officer, after all, was a sailor, not a lawyer. (Even a sea lawyer should not be charged with knowledge of such legal intricacies.)

The attorneys for the Government were not shown to have known that the accident had even occurred until a date more than two years after the accrual of the claim. The motion to dismiss in the state court of October 10, 1980 was filed by private counsel retained by the insurance carrier for Econo Car. That private counsel represented Gray in all aspects of the state court proceedings. Insofar as the record in the case discloses, it appears that the first communication to Wilkinson or Legum of the fact that Gray had been acting in the scope of his naval employment was the pleading of October 10, 1980, filed seven days after the expiration of the two year period. ⁵ Nothing suggests that the pleading was delayed or untimely.

The first appearance of Government lawyers occurred ⁶ on April 6, 1981 with the filing of the petition for removal, followed on April 30, 1981 by a motion for substitution of the United States as party defendant and motion to dismiss. Nothing suggests that Government counsel had any knowledge whatever of the proceedings until well after the two years available to the plaintiff-appellant to meet a necessary precondition to suit had fully expired.

Reviewing the circumstances of the case, it is evident that the two year requirement had not been met, and that unambiguously, therefore, the federal tort claim of Wilkinson was "forever barred." 28 U.S.C. §§ 2401(b), 2675(a). It is equally clear that there could be no proceeding against the governmental employee, Gray. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b). No less established is the fact that the Government has not behaved in any unfair way, and that, as between it and Wilkinson, the latter, or, more realistically, his counsel, brought about the consequences resulting from counsel's inaction. There simply is no basis for a finding that "the actions of (Gray) or of the United States lulled plaintiff into a false sense of security...." Wollman v. Gross, supra, 637 F.2d at 550.

Accordingly, the order of dismissal in favor of the...