Will of Leonard, Matter of
| Decision Date | 02 September 1986 |
| Docket Number | No. 8622SC161,8622SC161 |
| Citation | 82 N.C.App. 646,347 S.E.2d 478 |
| Court | North Carolina Court of Appeals |
| Parties | In the Matter of the WILL OF Zella May (Mae) LEONARD, Deceased. |
Wilson, Biesecker, Tripp & Sink by Joe E. Biesecker, Lexington, for caveator-appellant.
Brinkley, Walser, McGirt, Miller, Smith & Coles by Stephen W. Coles, Lexington, for propounder-appellee.
The caveator assigns as error the fact that the trial judge considered the records of Ms. Kinney's commitment proceedings. The caveator argues that this is error for a number of reasons including that the court records are hearsay and that were not properly authenticated, identified, tendered, and received into evidence. While those arguments are relevant on the issue of the record's admissibility into evidence for the fact finder to consider, they have no applicability to the issue of whether they may be considered by a trial judge conducting a voir dire examination to determine the competency of a witness.
G.S. 8C-1, Rule 104(a) provides, in part, that "[p]reliminary questions concerning the qualification of a person to be a witness ... shall be determined by the court." This is in accord with North Carolina practice. See H. Brandis, Brandis on North Carolina Evidence Section 8 (1982). Rule 104(a) also provides that "[i]n making its determination it [the court] is not bound by the rules of evidence except those with respect to privileges." This last provision of the Rule is dispositive here. The Rule's plain meaning, the Commentary to the Rule, and sound judgment all contemplate that, in deciding preliminary matters, the trial court will consider any relevant and reliable information that comes to its attention, whether or not that information is technically admissible under the rules of evidence.
The rules of evidence are designed to facilitate the introduction into evidence of relevant information which will aid the trier of fact. When deciding preliminary matters such as the competency of a witness, however, the trial court is not acting as the trier of fact. Rather, it is deciding a threshold question of law, which lies mainly, if not entirely, within the trial judge's discretion. State v. Robinson, 283 N.C. 71, 194 S.E.2d 811 (1973). State v. Fields, 315 N.C. 191, 337 S.E.2d 518 (1985). Where competency is questioned, the trial judge is not required to conduct a formal hearing at which all of the rules of evidence are applicable. The trial court must make only sufficient inquiry to satisfy itself that the witness is or is not competent to testify. The form and manner of that inquiry rests in the discretion of the trial judge.
While the trial court's power to determine the competency of a witness is not an arbitrary one, there is no abuse of its discretion where there is evidence to support its ruling. Where there is a clear abuse of discretion, however, the ruling will be reversed. Artesari v. Griffon, 252 N.C. 463, 113 S.E.2d 895 (1960). The remaining question then, is whether the trial judge abused her discretion in ruling Ms. Kinney incompetent to testify. We believe there is ample evidence to support the trial judge's ruling.
The competency of a witness is determined at the time the witness is called upon to testify. State v. Cooke, 278 N.C. 288, 179 S.E.2d 365 (1971); State v. Robinson, 283 N.C. 71, 194 S.E.2d 811 (1973); State v. Thomas, 296 N.C. 236, 250 S.E.2d 204 (1978). The test of competency is the capacity of the proposed witness to understand and to relate under oath the facts which will assist the jury in determining the truth with respect to the ultimate facts. State v. Cooke, supra. This is the applicable test even when the trial court finds, as it did here, that the witness is presently suffering from a mental illness. Even there, the witness may testify if they have sufficient understanding to apprehend their obligation to tell the truth and are able to give a correct account of the matters the witness seeks to testify about. State v. Benton, 276 N.C. 641, 174 S.E.2d 793 (1970).
Our rules of evidence are also applicable in determining the competency of a witness. G.S. 8C, Rule 601(b)...
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...be considered by the trial court conducting a voir dire hearing on a preliminary motion to suppress. See In re Will of Leonard, 82 N.C.App. 646, 648, 347 S.E.2d 478, 479–80 (1986) (dismissing challenge to trial judge's consideration of court records as hearsay and, inter alia, not properly ......
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