Willan v. Menomonee Falls School Bd.

Decision Date24 April 1987
Docket NumberNo. 86-C-1214.,86-C-1214.
Citation658 F. Supp. 1416
PartiesJason M. WILLAN, et al., Plaintiffs, v. MENOMONEE FALLS SCHOOL BOARD, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Wisconsin

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Barr & Shapiro, by Charles H. Barr, Menomonee Falls, Wis., for plaintiffs; Irvin B. Charne, Howard A. Pollack, Charne, Glassner, Tehan, Clancy & Taitelman, S.C., Milwaukee, Wis., David S. Tatel, Elliot M. Mincberg, Hogan & Hartson, Washington, D.C., of counsel.

Grant F. Langley, City Atty., by Patrick B. McDonnell, Sp. Deputy City Atty., and Susan D. Bickert, Asst. City Atty., Milwaukee, Wis., for defendants.

DECISION and ORDER

MYRON L. GORDON, Senior District Judge.

Jason Willan, a minority pupil residing in Menomonee Falls, Wisconsin, and his parents commenced the instant action seeking damages, declaratory and injunctive relief, and attorneys' fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985 & 1988. The Willans also propose a class of plaintiffs to this action. The putative class consists of "all other similarly situated public school parents and guardians thereof."

The named plaintiffs challenge the constitutionality of Wis.Stat. § 121.85 (enacted as 1975 Wis.Laws ch. 220 and commonly known as "chapter 220"). Chapter 220 authorizes school districts to enter into voluntary agreements providing for interdistrict transfers of pupils to promote racial integration. Under these agreements, minority students living in Milwaukee may transfer to predominantly white suburban school districts; the state subsidizes their tuition. Similarly, white students living in participating suburbs may transfer to programs in the Milwaukee public schools and receive comparable state subsidization. At all times relevant to this case, a chapter 220 agreement existed between Menomonee Falls, a predominantly white suburban school district, and the Milwaukee public schools.

Currently, before the court is the defendants' motion to dismiss on grounds of mootness pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Because I am persuaded that the plaintiffs' claims are moot, the motion will be granted.

BACKGROUND

Jason Willan is at least one-half Wisconsin Oneida Indian and is recognized as a minority group pupil for purposes of chapter 220. See Wis.Stats. § 121.845(2) (defining minority group pupils as Black Americans, native Americans, Spanish-surnamed Americans and Oriental Americans). In the spring of 1986, at the suggestion of a guidance counselor at his school, Jason Willan applied to a summer school program at a Milwaukee high school. Menomonee Falls offered no comparable summer program. Three days before the summer school opened, Jason and his parents were notified that the state would not subsidize tuition and transportation costs on Jason's behalf. The Willans chose to send Jason to another program in Wauwatosa because tuition and transportation costs were substantially less than the unsubsidized cost of the Milwaukee program. Accordingly, the Willans paid $447.60 for Jason's summer school experience.

In August 1986, the Willans submitted a claim for $447.60 to the Menomonee Falls School Board. Their claim was rejected. Ultimately, the Willans filed the instant lawsuit against the Menomonee Falls School Board, its individual members, the Milwaukee Board of School Directors and its individual members.

On December 16, 1986, I signed a stipulation and order of dismissal of the Menomonee Falls School Board and its individual members. The plaintiffs agreed to settle their claims against the Menomonee Falls defendants for approximately $2,000: the amount of the plaintiffs' tuition and transportation expenditures, as well as a portion of the plaintiffs' then incurred attorneys' fees. The settling defendants expressly disclaimed any admission of wrongdoing but by their monetary settlement are protected from further claims for damages or attorneys' fees as a result of this dispute. The settling defendants also acknowledged the plaintiffs' intent to pursue this action against the remaining Milwaukee defendants.

ANALYSIS
Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction

It is the remaining defendants who have filed the motion to dismiss now before me. Under the auspices of Rule 12(b)(1), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the defendants contend that this court is without subject matter jurisdiction in this case because the plaintiffs' claims are moot. I agree.

In determining whether dismissal on grounds of mootness is appropriate in this case, I have only considered the nature of the named plaintiffs' claims. Although this case has been framed as a class action, the plaintiffs have not moved for certification and indeed the putative class has never been certified. "If the claim of the class representative becomes moot in advance of certification, the case may come to a halt even if a properly certified class action would survive the mootness of the representative claims." Glidden v. Chromalloy American Corp., 808 F.2d 621, 626 (7th Cir.1986). Thus, the following discussion regarding mootness considers the substance of the Willans' claims only.

Article III of the Constitution permits the federal courts to consider "cases" or "controversies." The prohibition against judicial review of moot cases is derived from this constitutional limitation on jurisdiction. See North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246, 92 S.Ct. 402, 404, 30 L.Ed.2d 413 (1971); see also DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 316, 94 S.Ct. 1704, 1705, 40 L.Ed.2d 164 (1974). "To satisfy the Art. III case-or-controversy requirement, a litigant must have suffered some actual injury that can be redressed by a favorable judicial decision." Iron Arrow Honor Society v. Heckler, 464 U.S. 67, 70, 104 S.Ct. 373, 375, 78 L.Ed.2d 58 (1983).

In the instant case, although the plaintiffs may have suffered some actual injury in the past, a favorable decision by this court could not effectively redress any such injury. Consider, for example, the plaintiffs' original claim for monetary relief. The compromised settlement between the Willans and the Menomonee Falls defendants accomplished redress of this claim without assistance from the court.

In DeFunis, the Supreme Court identified mootness in a situation similar to the one now before me. In that case, the Court noted that the parties had entered into a stipulation that satisfied the plaintiff's demand for a mandatory injunction ordering the defendants to permit him to be matriculated in the University of Washington Law School. In light of this stipulated arrangement, which, like the arrangement in the Willans' case, did not resolve the underlying constitutional challenge, the Court held that the plaintiff's case was moot. The Court opined as follows: "A determination by this Court of the legal issues tendered by the parties is no longer necessary to compel Marco DeFunis' matriculation, and could not serve to prevent it."

Similarly, no resolution of the legal issues presented is necessary to compel or prevent the Willans from obtaining monetary relief. Productive negotiations between the plaintiffs and one group of defendants has resulted in substantial if not full pecuniary redress. The plaintiffs' claim for damages, therefore, must be dismissed on grounds of mootness.

The plaintiffs' claims for declaratory and injunctive relief are likewise moot. Jason Willan attended and completed a summer school program last summer. There is no assertion that Jason Willan or his parents are currently paying tuition and transportation costs for a program in the Milwaukee public schools, or one comparable. Nor is it alleged that Jason Willan contemplates such attendance at some time in the future. Thus, the plaintiffs' claims for equitable relief can be construed to arise only out of the defendants' conduct of last summer. Such claims, however, no longer constitute a present case or controversy.

"Past exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself show a present case or controversy regarding injunctive relief ... if unaccompanied by any continuing, present adverse effects." O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 495-96, 94 S.Ct. 669, 675-76, 38 L.Ed.2d 674 (1974). See also Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103, 109, 89 S.Ct. 956, 960, 22 L.Ed.2d 113 (1969) (past injury from allegedly unconstitutional statute deemed moot in absence of demonstration of "sufficient immediacy and reality" of present effects); cf. Super Products Corp. v. D.P. Way Corp., 546 F.2d 748, 753 (7th Cir.1976) (requiring sufficient immediacy and reality of actual controversy for the issuance of declaratory judgment on the validity of a patent). Recently, the court of appeals for the seventh circuit found an action to be moot where no party would benefit from the injunctive or declaratory relief sought. Mazanec v. North Judson-San Pierre School Corporation, 798 F.2d 230 (7th Cir. 1986). In that case, the court held that neither an injunction nor declaratory relief should be issued "just for the common weal or on behalf of those who, although not parties are currently or may be in the future burdened by the defendant's allegedly illegal conduct." Id. at 234.

In the instant case, there are no allegations that the Willans are currently being affected by the operation of chapter 220. Issuance of declaratory or injunctive relief would, therefore, not benefit the Willans. Fashioning such relief would, in my opinion, be an improper exercise of jurisdiction.

The plaintiffs attempt to counter the defendant's mootness argument by suggesting that despite the monetary settlement between the plaintiffs and the Menomonee Falls defendants, the alleged unlawful conduct could recur. According to the plaintiffs, "there has not been an indication of a policy change so as to protect Jason or any member of the proposed class from the type of...

To continue reading

Request your trial
2 cases
  • Brewer v. The West Irondequoit Central Sch. Dist.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit
    • September 30, 1999
    ...existing in schools and, indeed, such integration serves important societal functions. See also Willan v. Menomonee Falls Sch. Bd., 658 F. Supp. 1416, 1422 (E.D. Wisc. 1987) ("It is well-settled in federal law that state and local school authorities may voluntarily adopt plans to promote in......
  • Myrick v. U.S. Dep't of Veterans Affairs
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama
    • March 1, 2017
    ...was constitutionally moot once he closed his store with no intention of reopening the business); Willan v. Menomonee Falls Sch. Bd., 658 F. Supp. 1416, 1419-20 (E.D. Wisc. 1987) (holding that the constitutional challenge of a state statute was moot where the plaintiff requested declaratory ......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT